The Art of War

by baron de Antoine Henri Jomini

By dividing each of the four companies into two platoons, making eight in all, the formation of double column on the center might be made on the fourth and fifth platoons as the leading division; but then each division would be composed of two platoons belonging to different companies, so that each captain would have half of the men of his company under the command of another officer, and half of his own division would be made up of another company.

Such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, as the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of his own company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty than any stranger. In addition, if the double column should meet with a decided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, it would be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged to run from one side to the other to find their companies. In the French system, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming as many platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since each company is conducted by its own captain. It is true that there will be two captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather an advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulation between the two captains and their men, which will lead to greater display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there, to command the division as a whole.

It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the important question at issue.

Since I have alluded to the system adopted by Wellington, it is proper to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the light of historical events.

In Spain and Portugal, particularly, Wellington had under his command a mass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidence in regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want of instruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred of the French and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the enemy. Having learned by experience the effects of the fury and impetuosity of the French columns when led by such men as Massena and Ney, Wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosity and afterward securing a triumph over it. He chose positions difficult to approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of Spanish and Portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on the tactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddled the advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire, while his excellent English infantry, sheltered from the fire, were posted a hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of these columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a general discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by the infantry with the bayonet.

This system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable to Spain and Portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind of troops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they could be useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicable to Belgium. At Waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field of fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this plateau were well protected. Wellington, from the crest of the plateau, could discover the slightest movement in the French army, while his own were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented his losing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to his aid.

Every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terrible battle, which I have elsewhere impartially described. I demonstrated that its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use of deployed lines by the English, but to the following accidental causes, viz.:—

1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in the attack painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective, and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery.

2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the French, principally on the right wing.

3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each other, but they were in no case simultaneous.