There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and plans of cabinets. They may be called political objective points.
Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but often very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great errors in strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of the Duke of York to Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. The expedition of the same prince to Holland in 1799—likewise due to the views of the English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria on Belgium—was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the Archduke Charles from Zurich upon Manheim,—a step quite contrary to the interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. These illustrations prove that political objective points should be subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been attained.
This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events of the campaign. Applying this rule to the examples just given, it will be seen that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirk should have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; in other words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for great attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions of this kind are generally included in grand diversions,—to be treated of in a separate article.
FOOTNOTES:
I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,—since a line cannot be a point, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisive or objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that objective points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of expression used to designate the object which an army desires to attain.
This only applies to continental armies, and not to the English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have nothing to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.