The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a new era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the capture or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies of two or three divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy was here fully developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely corollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the system of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italy not to meet with his approval.

It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted to all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there can be any return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to the old system of wars of position. After a comparison of the marches and camps of the Seven Years' War with those of the seven weeks' war,—as Napoleon called the campaign of 1806,—or with those of the three months which elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 till its arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as to the relative merits of the two systems.

The system of Napoleon was to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight, and then to camp in quiet. He told me that he knew no other method of conducting a war than this.

It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his personal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred in urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare to adopt. This is probably true; but between the extremes of very distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and, without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has marked out. It is probable that the old system of wars of positions will for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much modified and improved.

If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches, humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun, are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is not likely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has been demonstrated by Napoleon's wars,—viz.: that remoteness is not a certain safeguard against invasion,—that a state to be secure must have a good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and military institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. Then the people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve as reserves to the active armies, which will render the latter more formidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the more necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results.

If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,—if nations, instead of fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the political equilibrium,—then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, and perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale. Then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand men return to a mixed system of war,—a mean between the rapid incursions of Napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. Until then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion.

The science of marches now includes more than details, like the following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and the means of communication between the columns, all of which is a part of the duties of the staff of an army. Outside and beyond these very important details, there is a science of marches in the great operations of strategy. For instance, the march of Napoleon by the Saint-Bernard to fall upon the communications of Mélas, those made in 1805 by Donauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806 by Gera to turn the Prussians, the march of Suwaroff from Turin to the Trebbia to meet Macdonald, that of the Russian army on Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisive operations, not because of their relation to Logistics, but on account of their strategic relations.

Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point; and this point is to be determined from the considerations given in [Article XIX.] What was the passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line of operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of the enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? The marches of Ulm and Jena were the same maneuvers; and what was Blücher's march at Waterloo but an application of interior strategic lines?

From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the principle of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. The operations of the French in 1793 from Dunkirk to Landau, and those of Napoleon in 1796, 1809, and 1814, are models of this kind.

One of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to so combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest strategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple object of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease and rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. However, it is necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means of concentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow.