The Art of War

by baron de Antoine Henri Jomini

During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity. The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany lived sometimes in the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the country, and often by plunder and pillage. To subsist an army on the granaries of Belgium, Italy, Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine and Danube, is easy,—particularly if it marches in a number of columns and does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but this would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite impossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It may readily be conceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where every thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. This system gave Napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying it on too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable.

A general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to make them uniform and legal, while he himself should see to their fulfillment. If the authorities do not remain, he should create provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinary powers. The provisions thus acquired should be collected at the points most convenient for the operations of the army. In order to husband them, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking care to reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them. The inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey the supplies to the points occupied by the troops.

It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to undertake without having previously established these depots, as much depends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of the people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:—

1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from the enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of country, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any single operation.

As the first operation never requires more than a month, during which time the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants of the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain at a particular point. Thus, the army of Napoleon, while half of it was besieging Ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and if there had been a scarcity the operation might have failed.

2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the wants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a position to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise.

3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of communication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of the army, and to extend as much as possible the area from which successive supplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should be as well covered as possible. To this end, it would be well to have the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations, which will be generally found in the center. This arrangement has two real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts of the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, it facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a single point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the offensive and gained some advantage.

4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to advance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its lines of depots.

5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not impossible.

6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid expeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable articles,—as biscuit, rice, &c.: the wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country, and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour.