The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important operations in war, strategy fixes the direction of movements, and that we depend upon tactics for their execution. Therefore, before treating of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made.
By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.
From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters of operations is found in what follows:—
1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in accordance with [Article XVIII.]
2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy with the least risk to one's self.
3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for retreats parallel to the frontiers.
On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims presented in [Article XXI.]
4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from affording each other mutual support.
5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important strategic points of the theater of war.