Thus then it appears that on our arrival in the South Seas we might have found the whole coast unprovided with troops and destitute even of arms: for we well know, from very particular intelligence, that there were not three hundred fire-arms, of which too the greatest part were matchlocks, in all the province of Chili. Whilst at the same time, the Indians were ripe for a revolt, the Spaniards disposed to mutiny, and the governors enraged with one another, and each prepared to rejoice in the disgrace of his antagonist. At this fortunate crisis we, on the other hand, might have consisted of near two thousand men, the greatest part in health and vigour, all well armed, and united under a chief whose enterprising genius (as we have seen) could not be depressed by a continued series of the most sinister events, and whose equable and prudent turn of temper would have remained unvaried in the midst of the greatest degree of good success; and who besides possessed, in a distinguished manner, the two qualities the most necessary for these uncommon undertakings—I mean that of maintaining his authority and preserving, at the same time, the affections of his people. Our other officers too, of every rank, appear, by the experience the public hath since had of them, to have been equal to any attempt they might have been charged with by their commander: and our men (at all times brave if well conducted) in such a cause, where treasure was the object, and under such leaders, would doubtless have been prepared to rival the most celebrated achievements hitherto performed by British mariners.
It cannot then be contested but that Baldivia must have surrendered on the appearance of our squadron: after which, it may be presumed, that the Arraucos, the Pulches, and Penguinches, inhabiting the banks of the river Imperial, about twenty-five leagues to the northward of this place, would have immediately taken up arms, being disposed thereto, as hath been already related, and encouraged by the arrival of so considerable a force in their neighbourhood. As these Indians can bring into the field near thirty thousand men, the greatest part of them horse, their first step would have been the invading the province of Chili, which they would have found totally unprovided both of ammunition and weapons; and as its inhabitants are a luxurious and effeminate race, they would have been incapable, on such an emergency, of giving any opposition to this rugged enemy: so that it is no strained conjecture to imagine that the Indians would have been soon masters of the whole country. Moreover, the other Indians, on the frontiers of Peru, being equally disposed with the Arraucos to shake off the Spanish yoke, it is highly probable that they likewise would have embraced this favourable occasion, and that a general insurrection would have taken place through all the Spanish territories of South America; in which case, the only resource left to the Creolians (dissatisfied as they were with the Spanish government) would have been to have made the best terms they could with their Indian neighbours, and to have withdrawn themselves from the obedience of a master who had shown so little regard to their security. This last supposition may perhaps appear chimerical to those who measure the possibility of all events by the scanty standard of their own experience; but the temper of the times, and the strong dislike of the natives to the measures then pursued by the Spanish court, sufficiently evince at least its possibility. However, not to insist on the presumption of a general revolt, it is sufficient for our purpose to conclude that the Arraucos would scarcely have failed of taking arms on our appearance: since this alone would so far have terrified the enemy that they would no longer have employed their thoughts on the means of opposing us, but would have turned all their care to the Indian affairs; as they still remember, with the utmost horror, the sacking of their cities, the rifling of their convents, the captivity of their wives and daughters, and the desolation of their country by these resolute savages in the last war between the two nations. For it must be observed that the Chilian Indians have been frequently successful against the Spaniards, and possess at this time a large tract of country which was formerly full of Spanish towns and villages, whose inhabitants were all either destroyed or carried into captivity by the Arraucos and the other neighbouring Indians, who in a war against the Spaniards never fail to join their forces.
But even, independent of an Indian revolt, there were two places only, on all the coast of the South Sea, which could be supposed capable of resisting our squadron; these were the cities of Panama and Callao: as to the first of these, its fortifications were so decayed, and it was so much in want of powder, that the president himself, in an intercepted letter, acknowledged it was incapable of being defended; whence I take it for granted it would have given us but little trouble, especially if we had opened a communication across the isthmus with our fleet on the other side. And with regard to the city and port of Callao, its condition was not much better than that of Panama; since its walls are built upon the plain ground, without either out-work or ditch before them, and consist only of very slender feeble masonry, without any earth behind them; so that a battery of five or six pieces of cannon, raised anywhere within four or five hundred paces of the place, would have had a full view of the whole rampart, and would have opened it in a short time; and the breach hereby formed, as the walls are so extremely thin, could not have been difficult of ascent; for the ruins would have been but little higher than the surface of the ground; and it would have yielded this particular advantage to the assailants, that the bullets, which grazed upon it, would have driven before them such shivers of brick and stone as would have prevented the garrison from forming behind it, supposing that the troops employed in defence of the place should have so far surpassed the usual limits of Creolian bravery as to resolve to stand a general assault. Indeed, such a resolution cannot be imputed to them; for the garrison and people were in general dissatisfied with the viceroy's behaviour, and were never expected to act a vigorous part. On the contrary, the viceroy himself greatly apprehended that the commodore would make him a visit at Lima, the capital of the kingdom of Peru; to prevent which, if possible, he had ordered twelve gallies to be built at Guaiaquil and other places, which were intended to oppose the landing of our boats, and to hinder us from pushing our men on shore. But this was an impracticable project of defence, and proceeded on the supposition that our ships, when we should land our men, would keep at such a distance that these gallies, by drawing little water, would have been out of the reach of our guns; whereas the commodore, before he had made such an attempt, would doubtless have been possessed of several prize ships, which he would not have hesitated to have run on shore for the protection of his boats; and besides, there were many places on that coast, and one particularly in the neighbourhood of Callao, where there was good anchoring, though a great depth of water, within a cable's length of the shore; consequently the cannon of the man-of-war would have swept all the coast to above a mile's distance from the water's edge, and would have effectually prevented any force from assembling to oppose the landing and forming of our men. And this landing-place had the additional advantage that it was but two leagues distant from Lima; so that we might have been at that city within four hours after we should have been first discovered from the shore. The place I have in view is about two leagues south of Callao, and just to the northward of the headland called, in Frezier's draught of that coast, Morro Solar. Here there is seventy or eighty fathom of water within two cables' length of the shore; and here the Spaniards themselves were so apprehensive of our attempting to land, that they had projected to build a fort close to the water; but as there was no money in the royal chests, they could not compleat so considerable a work, and therefore they contented themselves with keeping a guard of a hundred horse there, that they might be sure to receive early notice of our appearance on that coast. Indeed some of them (as we were told), conceiving our management at sea to be as pusillanimous as their own, pretended that this was a road where the commodore would never dare to hazard his ships, for fear that in so great a depth of water their anchors could not hold them.
And let it not be imagined that I am proceeding upon groundless and extravagant presumptions, when I conclude that fifteen hundred or a thousand of our people, well conducted, should have been an over-match for any numbers the Spaniards could muster in South America. Since, not to mention the experience we had of them at Paita and Petaplan, it must be remembered that our commodore was extremely solicitous to have all his men trained to the dexterous use of their fire-arms; whereas the Spaniards, in this part of the world, were wretched provided with arms, and were very awkward in the management of the few they had: and though on their repeated representations the court of Spain had ordered several thousand firelocks to be put on board Pizarro's squadron, yet those, it is evident, could not have been in America time enough to have been employed against us. Hence then by our arms, and our readiness in the use of them (not to insist on the timidity and softness of our enemy), we should in some degree have had the same advantages which the Spaniards themselves had on the first discovery of this country against its naked and unarmed inhabitants.
Now let it in the next place be considered what were the events which we had to fear, or what were the circumstances which could have prevented us from giving law to all the coast of South America, and thereby cutting off from Spain the resources which she drew from those immense provinces. By sea there was no force capable of opposing us; for how soon soever we had sailed, Pizarro's squadron could not have sailed sooner than it did, and therefore could not have avoided the fate it met with. As we should have been masters of the ports of Chili, we could thereby have supplied ourselves with the provisions we wanted in the greatest plenty; and from Baldivia to the equinoctial we ran no risque of losing our men by sickness (that being of all climates the most temperate and healthy), nor of having our ships disabled by bad weather. And had we wanted sailors to assist in the navigating of our squadron whilst a considerable proportion of our men were employed on shore, we could not have failed of getting whatever numbers we pleased in the ports we should have taken, and from the prizes which would have fallen into our hands. For I must observe that the Indians, who are the principal mariners in that part of the world, are extremely docile and dexterous; and though they are not fit to struggle with the inclemencies of a cold climate, yet in temperate seas they are most useful and laborious seamen.
Thus then it appears what important revolutions might have been brought about by our squadron had it departed from England as early as it ought to have done: and from hence it is easy to conclude what immense advantages might have thence accrued to the public. For, as on our success it would have been impossible that the kingdom of Spain should have received any treasure from the provinces bordering on the South Seas, or should even have had any communication with them, it is certain that the whole attention of that monarchy would have been immediately employed in endeavouring to regain these inestimable territories, either by force of arms or compact. By the first of these methods it was scarcely possible they could succeed; for it must have been at least a twelvemonth after our arrival before any ships from Spain could have got into the South Seas, and when they had been there, they would have found themselves without resource, since they would probably have been separated, disabled, and sickly, and would then have had no port remaining in their possession where they could either rendezvous or refit. Whilst we might have been supplied across the isthmus with whatever necessaries, stores, or even men we wanted; and might thereby have supported our squadron in as good a plight as when it first set sail from St. Helens. In short, it required but little prudence so to have conducted this business as to have rendered all the efforts of Spain, seconded by the power of France, ineffectual, and to have maintained our conquest in defiance of them both. Whence they must either have resolved to have left Great Britain mistress of the wealth of South America (the principal support of all their destructive projects), or they must have submitted to her terms, and have been contented to receive these provinces back again, as an equivalent for such restrictions to their future ambition as she in her prudence should have dictated to them. Having thus discussed the prodigious weight which the operations of our squadron might have added to the national influence of this kingdom, I shall here end this second book, referring to the next the passage of the shattered remains of our force across the Pacific Ocean, and all their subsequent transactions till the commodore's arrival in England.