XI.
The Emperor of Brazil, Don Pedro, then became King of Portugal; and having to decide on the relinquishment of one of these kingdoms, it seeming impossible to keep them permanently united, he assumed that, in abdicating the throne of Portugal, he had the right of dictating the method and terms of his abdication. He proposed, then, first, to take upon himself the crown to which he had succeeded; secondly, in his capacity of sovereign of Portugal, to give a constitution to the Portuguese; thirdly, if that constitution were accepted, and that Don Miguel, his brother, were willing to espouse Donna Maria, his (Don Pedro’s) daughter, to place the ancient sceptre of Portugal in that daughter’s hands.
The apparent countenance of Great Britain, however obtained, was no doubt of consequence to the success of this project, and Sir Charles Stuart was prevailed upon to accept the title of Portuguese ambassador, and in such capacity to be the bearer of the new constitutional charter to Portugal. He thus, it is true, acted without Mr. Canning’s authority, for the case was one which could hardly have been foreseen, and it may be doubted whether his conduct was well advised; but still no experienced Diplomatist would have taken upon himself so important a part as Sir Charles Stuart assumed, unless he had pretty fair reasons to suppose that he was doing that which would be agreeable to his chief; and when Mr. Canning gave his subsequent sanction to Sir Charles’s conduct, by declaring in a despatch, dated July 12, 1826, that the King entirely approved of the ambassador’s having consented (under the peculiar circumstances of his situation in Brazil) to be the bearer of the Emperor’s decrees to Lisbon, the world in general considered the whole affair, as in fact it had become, the arrangement of Great Britain.
In this manner did we appear as having recognised the South American Republics, as having arranged the separation and independence of the great Portuguese colony; and, finally, as having carried a constitution into Portugal itself. All the Powers leagued in favour of despotism, protesting at this time against the recognition of any colony, and France being then as their deputed missionary in Spain, for the express purpose of putting down a constitution in that country.
This is the second memorable epoch in Mr. Canning’s foreign policy—the second period in that diplomatic war which at Troppau and Verona had been announced, and which when the Duc d’Angoulême crossed the Pyrenees, had been undertaken against Liberal opinions.
XII.
If our government at last stood in a position worthy of the strength and the intellect of the nation it represented, that position was, nevertheless, one that required for its maintenance the nicest tempering of dignity with forbearance; no offence was to be heedlessly given, none timidly submitted to. Spain and Portugal, long jealous and hostile, were marshalled under two hostile and jarring opinions. The most powerful, backed by friendly and kindred armies, was likely to invade the weaker; and that weaker we were bound to defend by an indissoluble alliance.
The first step manifesting the feelings of King Ferdinand’s government was a refusal to recognise the Portuguese Regency established at King John’s death; but matters were certain not to stop here. Portuguese deserters were soon received in Spain, and allowed to arm; nay, were furnished with arms by Spanish authority, for the purpose of being sent back as invaders into their native country. Even Spanish troops, in more than one instance, hostilely entered Portugal, while the Spanish ministry scrupled at no falsehoods that might stretch a flimsy covering over their deceitful assurances and unfriendly designs.
Things were in this state, peace rested upon these hollow and uncertain foundations, when Mr. Canning received at the same time the official news that the rebel troops which had been organised in Spain were marching upon Lisbon; and the most solemn declarations from Spain herself that these very troops should be dispersed, and their chief arrested. The crisis for action seemed now to have arrived; for England was bound, as I have said, by treaty, to defend Portugal against a foreign power, and a foreign power was in this instance clearly, though meanly, indirectly, and treacherously assailing her. To shrink from the dangerous obligation to which we stood pledged, or even to appear so to shrink, was to relinquish that hold upon public opinion, both at home and abroad, which hold we had at last obtained, and to abandon the moral power which, if a contest did arise, would be the main portion of our strength. On the other hand, to comply with the request of the Portuguese government for succour (that request was now formally made), and to send a British force to Portugal was, no doubt, an event that might be the commencement of a general war. Of all policies, a hesitating, shuffling policy would have been the worst. Had it been adopted, Spain, or those who then governed Spain, would have proceeded to more violent and irremediable acts—acts to which we must have submitted with the grossest dishonour, or resented with the smallest chances of success.