The reason I abstained from any further pronouncement was stated.
Yours, etc.,
(Signed) Fisher.
I note you will kindly testify to the accuracy of my statement that I left the Council table with the intention of resigning, but yielded to Kitchener’s entreaty to return.
Have you the letter I wrote on January 28th, 1915, to Mr. Asquith, beginning:—
“I am giving this note to Colonel Hankey to hand to you ...,” because in it occur these following words:—“At any moment the great crisis may occur in the North Sea, for the German High Sea Fleet may be driven to fight by the German Military Headquarters, as part of some great German military operation.”
It looks as if Hindenburg might try such a coup now.
I heard from Jellicoe a few days since that the Zeppelins now made the German submarines very formidable, and by way of example he pointed out that the “Falmouth” was torpedoed even when at a speed of 25 knots and zigzagging every five minutes.
* * * * *
In some notes compiled on this matter I find it recorded that I was present at the meeting on the 13th January, when the plan was first proposed and approved in principle, and was also present at the meeting on the evening of the 28th January, when Mr. Churchill announced that the Admiralty had decided to push on with the project. On the morning of the 28th January I said that I had understood that this question would not be raised to-day, and that the Prime Minister was well aware of my own views in regard to it.
After the failure of the naval attack on the Narrows on the 18th March, I remarked at the meeting on the 19th March that I had always said that a loss of 12 battleships must be expected before the Dardanelles could be forced by the Navy alone, and that I still adhered to this view.