Mr. Meredith said there were two kinds of contempts; one of personal insult to the bench, with which Passmore Williamson is not concerned; but the contempt consisting in not making a proper return to the process of the court.
Mr. Meredith then proceeded to argue that such a contempt could be purged by making an answer to the court and paying the costs, which he was now prepared to do.
Judge Kane said, that up to this moment there has been, on the part of the individual to whom the function of the court has been delegated and exercised in this matter, not a single particle of conscious excitement. He did not believe it was in the power of the entire press of the United States, after he had honestly administered his duty to the best of his ability, to give him a pang, or produce one excited feeling; therefore, now as heretofore, he looked upon the question as one that has no feeling on the bench.
If he understood the remarks of Mr. Meredith, he meant to say to the court that Passmore Williamson was desirous of testifying now his willingness to obey the exigencies of the writ of habeas corpus. If so, he had a simple, straightforward, honorable course to pursue. He has no need of making a narrative of facts or arguments of protest; let him come forward into court, declaring that he is willing to obey the writ issued by this court; and when he has done that, in the estimation of the judge, he is purged of his contempt.
Nothing on his part of personal offence was evinced to the court; his demeanor was entirely respectful; but he failed to obey the writ which the law issued to him; and when he has obeyed that writ, it will be the duty of this court to free him. What is understood by ‘purgation’ is not simply a mere form of words. It matters not about that, provided he received, from the party who is in contempt for having disobeyed the process of the court, the assurance that he is now prepared to obey such process, and, until he is prepared to announce his disposition to obey, he could not hear him upon any other subject which asserts that the court has erred either in point of fact or law, or has exercised a jurisdiction which does not belong to it. He said he would hear the counsel upon the question whether the court can legally hear any other petition than the one of purgation.
The respondent’s counsel then proceeded to argue the right of the court to hear a petition, other than of purgation, from Passmore Williamson.
Mr. Meredith said he had found nothing in the authorities, either English or American, where persons were held guilty of a contempt in responding to a writ of habeas corpus unless the return was evasive. He referred to a case in 3 Mason, where, in a return to a writ before Judge Story, there was clearly an evasion shown on the face of the return.
Under these circumstances, Judge Story declared that the course of practice was to propound interrogatories and compel the respondent to disclose more fully. Mr. M. submitted whether it was not proper to subject the petitioner in this case to a further questioning. He could not find in English or American books any other course.
Mr. M. supposed that the respondent was committed until he should answer interrogatories. Why had they not been propounded in the form that the court might think proper to put them? No case could be shown in which a defendant was to be committed for contempt, until he presented a prayer to have interrogatories propounded to him. How is he to answer what has not been filed?
According to the books, the defendant may come into court at any time, and take advantage of an omission to file interrogatories within four days. If another view should be taken by the court, he would then ask that an order be made to show the defendant what he was to do to rid himself of the contempt.