A fuller account of the taking of Ogdensburg may be read in Mr W. James’ “Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurrences of the late War between Great Britain and the United States of America,” vol. i. p. 135–141: London, 1818; he adds, “Previously to dismissing the affair at Ogdensburg it may be right to mention that Sir G. Prevost’s secretary, or some person who had the transcribing of Major (Colonel) Macdonnell’s (Macdonell’s) official letter, must have inserted by mistake the words ‘In consequence of the commands of his Excellency.’ Of this there needs no stronger proof than that Major (Colonel) Macdonnell (Macdonell) while he was in the heat of the battle, received a private note from Sir G. dated from ’Flint’s Inn at 9 o’clock,’ repeating his orders not to make the attack; and even in the first private letter which Sir G. wrote to Major Macdonnell (Colonel Macdonell) after being informed of his success, he could not help qualifying his admiration of the exploit with a remark that the latter had rather exceeded his instructions—(Note.—Both of these letters the author has seen”), vol. i. 140. Colonel Macdonell’s explanation to me of his taking this responsibility on himself was simply that he saw that the fate of the whole of Upper Canada depended upon it. Colonel Macdonell had received information that 5000 American troops were moving up in the direction of Ogdensburg, and they, in fact, came up a week after it was taken, under General Pike; but seeing the altered aspect of affairs, they moved off, and fell back upon Sackett’s Harbour, anticipating a similar attack at that point.
Colonel Macdonell always spoke with much emotion of the gallant conduct of a Captain Jenkins, a young officer under his command, who, although he had both arms shattered by two successive shots, struggled on at the head of his men until he swooned. He survived some years, but died of the overcharge of blood to the head consequent on the loss of his limbs.
As Ogdensburg was a frontier town on the American side of the St Lawrence, Sir G. Prevost authorised payment for any plunder by the troops, but Colonel Macdonell received a certificate from the inhabitants that they had not lost a single shilling—which must be recorded to the credit of the Glengarry Highlanders under his command.
As I have already said, although Colonel Macdonell commanded the larger force, and by an independent command, at the action of Chateaugay, his name is not mentioned in Sir G. Prevost’s dispatch, nor in Alison, who apparently follows the official account (xix. 131, 7th ed.) In Alison, De Saluberry is called, by a clerical error, De Salavary—such, after all, is fame! saith Hyperion. Although his troops, raw levies, broke, and Colonel De Saluberry was virtually a prisoner when Colonel Macdonell came up to the support, it was through no fault of his disposition of his men—(Colonel Macdonell always spoke of him as an excellent officer, who behaved on the occasion in the most noble and intrepid manner).
The American troops at Chateaugay are variously stated at 7000 to 5700 (Alison says, “4000 effective infantry and 2000 militia, and 10 guns,” xix. 131). The British, 300 French Canadian militia, under De Saluberry; 600 under Colonel Macdonell, and some Indians, without artillery.
A full, but, Colonel Macdonell said, inaccurate account (from imperfect information) will be found in Mr W. James’ “Military Occurrences,” above referred to.
I extract the following passages, i. 307:—“The British advanced corps, stationed near the frontiers, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel De Saluberry of the Canadian Fencibles, and consisted of the two flank companies of that corps and four companies of voltigeurs, and six flank companies of embodied militia and Chateaugay chasseurs, placed under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonell, late of the Glengarrys, who so distinguished himself at Ogdensburg. The whole of this force did not exceed 800 rank and file. There were also at the post 172 Indians under Captain Lamotte.” Colonel Macdonell’s account differed substantially. It has been already mentioned that he had brought up his troops by a forced march the night before, and held them under a separate command. I conclude with the following passage as bearing out Colonel Macdonell’s version:—“The Americans, although they did not occupy one foot of the ‘abatis,’ nor Lieutenant-Colonel De Saluberry retire one inch from the ground on which he had been standing, celebrated this partial retiring as a retreat.... By way of animating his little band when thus momentarily pressed” [Colonel Macdonell’s version was, that although the troops were driven back, Colonel De Saluberry literally “refused to retire one inch himself,” and virtually remained a prisoner until—] Colonel De Saluberry ordered the bugleman to sound ”the advance. This was heard by Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonell, who thinking the Colonel was in want of support, caused his own bugles to answer, and immediately advanced with two [‘six’] of his companies. He at the same time sent ten or twelve buglemen into the adjoining woods with orders to separate [‘widely’], and blow with all their might. This little ‘ruse de guerre’ led the Americans to believe that they had more thousands than hundreds to contend with, and deterred them from even attempting to penetrate the ‘abatis.’”
For the rest of the account I must refer my readers to Mr W. James’ “History,” as above; though, if a complete and accurate account of an engagement which probably saved British Canada were ever thought desirable, Colonel Macdonell’s commentaries (MS.) on the above and the official accounts, would afford valuable supplementary information.[5]