Canada in Flanders, Volume I

by Baron Max Aitken Beaverbrook

This unfortunate impression is largely due to the fact that it is impossible at the opening of a great battle for the commander to give any indication of his intentions; that newspaper correspondents are debarred from discussing them; and that the official despatches which reveal the purpose and the plan of a battle, are only issued when the engagement has already passed into history and has been lost sight of among newer feats of arms.

As a matter of fact, the battle of Festubert is, in all its aspects, one of the most clearly defined of the war, notwithstanding the length of time that it covered and the numerous and confused individual and sectional engagements fought along its front. Its aim was clear, and it was a portion of a definite scheme on the part of the Allies. The actual fight is perfectly easy to follow, and the results are important, not only from the military point of view (although in this respect Festubert must be counted a failure), but from the political changes they produced in England—changes designed for the better conduct of the war.

As I have already explained, if we had completely broken the German lines at the battle of Neuve Chapelle, we should have gained the Aubers Ridge, which dominates Lille, the retaking of which would have completely altered the whole aspect of the war on the Western front.

General Joffre had determined on a great offensive movement in Artois, in May, for which purpose he concentrated the most overwhelming artillery force up to this time assembled in the West. It was on a par with the terrific masses of guns with which von Mackensen was, about the same time, blasting his way through Galicia. The French made wonderful progress, and only a few of the defences of Lens, the key of the whole French objective, remained in German hands. But the Germans were pouring reinforcements into the south, and it was then that Sir John French, in conjunction with General Joffre, moved his forces to the attack. This British offensive was designed to hold up the German reinforcements destined for Lens, and at the same time to offer the British a second opportunity for gaining the Aubers Ridge, from which Lille and La Bassée could be dominated. If the British could gain the ridge, which they hoped to secure at the battle of Neuve Chapelle, and if the French could win through to Lens, the Allies would then be in a position to sweep on together towards the city which was their common goal.

The attack on the German positions began on May 9th,[[1]] and continued through several days and nights, and waned, only to be renewed with redoubled fury on May 16th. On May 19th, the 2nd and 7th Divisions, which had suffered very severely, were withdrawn, and their places taken by the Canadian Division and the 51st Highland Division (Territorial). With the share of the battle which fell to the lot of the Canadians I will deal in detail directly.

The British attack failed to clear the way to Lille, which still remains in German hands. With the reasons which resulted in our check at Neuve Chapelle I have already dealt, and it is now necessary to consider the two principal reasons which may be assigned for our second failure to secure the all-important Aubers Ridge.

The first reason is definite and explicable. The second reason is debatable.

At various points along this sector of the front, and on many occasions, the German lines were pierced—pierced but not broken. Again and again the British and Canadian troops took the first, the second, and the third line German trenches. This may have destroyed the mathematical precision of the German line, but it only succeeded in splitting it up into a series of absolutely impregnable fortins. It must be remembered that the Germans fought a defensive battle, and in this they were greatly assisted by the nature of the ground, which was dotted with considerable hummocks, cleft with ravines and indented with chalk pits and quarries, and was, moreover, abundantly furnished with pit-heads, mine-works, mills, farms, and the like, all transformed into miniature fortresses, to approach which was certain death. They had constructed trenches reinforced by concrete-lined galleries, and linked them up with underground tunnels. The battle of the miniature fortresses proved the triumph of the machine gun. The Germans employed the machine gun to an extent which turned even a pig-stye into a Sebastopol. Only overwhelming artillery fire could have shattered this chain of forts, bound by barbed wire and everywhere covered by machine guns.

Our artillery fire was not sufficient to reduce them, and the British attack slowly weakened; and finally the battle died out on the 26th, when Sir John French gave orders for the curtailment of our artillery fire.

This brings me to the second reason which has been assigned for our failure to clear the way to Lille at the battle of Festubert, and that is the debatable one of "shortage of munitions."