Map—the Voormezeele-St. Eloi area
The actual situation in the front line was still obscure. It was known that the mound and certain trenches to the west of it, were in German hands. It was also known that towards the east we had lost certain trenches known to our Intelligence Staff as P and A. It was uncertain whether the trench T was still held by our troops. It was decided, in a matter in which certainty was unattainable, to proceed towards a farm building which was an easily recognised objective. This course at least promised information, for if trench T had fallen it was certain that the Battalion would at once be heavily attacked. If it was still intact the Battalion would, it was hoped, cover the commencement of an assault along the German line against trenches A and P and the mound, successively.
The alternative was to advance southwards with the Battalion right on the Ypres-St. Eloi road. The adoption of this plan would have meant slow progress through the enclosures round St. Eloi, and the subsequent attack would have been exposed to heavy flanking fire from trenches A and P.
The progress of the Battalion was necessarily slow; the street in Voormezeele was full of stragglers. Touch was difficult to maintain across country without constant short halts. It was necessary always to advance with a screen of scouts thrown out.
It was ascertained in St. Eloi that trench A had been retaken by British troops. This knowledge modified the plan provisionally adopted. The Battalion altered its objective from the farm building to a breastwork 200 yards to the west of it. This point was reached about twenty minutes before daylight, and an attack was immediately organised by Number 2 Company against trench P, approaching it from the back of trench A. The attack was made in three parties.
The advance was made with coolness and resolution, but the attackers were met by heavy machine-gun fire from the mound. No soldiers in the world could have forced their way through, for the fire swept everything before it. It was clear that no hope of a surprise existed, and to have spent another company upon reinforcement would have been a useless and bloody sacrifice. Three platoons were, therefore, detailed to hold the right of the breastwork in immediate proximity to the mound, and the rest of the Battalion was withdrawn to Voormezeele, reaching Dickebush about 8 a.m.[[1]]
The forces engaged behaved with great steadiness throughout a trying and unsuccessful night, and at daylight withdrew over open ground without Voormezeele, reaching Dickebush about 8 a.m.
On March 20th the Battalion sustained a severe loss in the death, by a stray bullet, of its Commanding Officer, Colonel Farquhar. He had been Military Secretary to the Duke of Connaught. This distinguished officer had done more for the Battalion than it would be possible in a short chapter to record. The Regiment, in fact, was his creation. A strict disciplinarian, he was nevertheless deeply beloved in an army not always patient of discipline tactlessly asserted; he was always cheerful, always unruffled, and always resourceful. Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Buller succeeded him in command of the Regiment.
After the death of Lieut.-Colonel Farquhar, the Battalion again retired to rest, and it has not since returned to the scene of its earliest experience in trench warfare. On April 9th it took up a line on the Polygone Wood, in the Ypres salient, and there did its round of duty with the customary relief in billets. By this time the men were becoming familiar with their surroundings, and gave play to their native ingenuity. Near the trenches they built log huts from trees in the woods, and it was a common thing for French, Belgian, and British officers to visit the camp to admire the work of the Regiment. Breastworks were built also behind the trenches under cover of the woods, and the trenches themselves were greatly improved.