Canada in Flanders, Volume II

by Baron Max Aitken Beaverbrook

The idea of the Anglo-French offensive in the summer of 1916 had long been a nightmare to the great Headquarters Staff. They dreamt of the continual piling up of men and munitions from beyond the narrow seas at some pre-arranged point; they believed that a vigorous offensive at one or two places would disturb their opponents and confuse the threatened move. According to this theory, Verdun and the third battle of Ypres were defensive-offensive operations. Neither action prevented the offensive at the Somme. However that may be, the Germans remained impassive after their first two strokes, while the Canadian Corps devoted itself in quietness and confidence to the preparation of the real attack. They borrowed liberally both in men and guns from the army corps on their right and left, but no general reserve of the British Army was shifted to imperil the great offensive on the Somme. There has been nothing pleasanter in the course of the campaign than the feeling of good comradeship, common among soldiers, which subsisted between the Imperial Service and the Canadian Corps. The Canadian Corps had borne the brunt of the fighting on the Ypres salient, and, as far as they were concerned, to ask was to have. A British brigade was moved into the St. Eloi district, so as to set the 2nd Division free for retaliation. A reserve cavalry division of the British Army was moved up at once to occupy the third line in order that the Canadian generals might have no doubt as to their freedom of action in moving to the final assault against the captured positions. The Higher Command now had the reserves necessary to make them secure in an advance, and they certainly needed such security. In the fighting which ensued between June 2nd and 14th every Brigade of the Canadian Corps was fully engaged, and many of them suffered severe casualties. None the less, they endured until the end and the Canadians regained the lost ground. Their attitude is best summed up by the remark of a senior Staff Officer, who, basing prejudice on military knowledge, declared "that this was a personal matter between the Württembergers and the Canadians and that the Canadians were going to win." Troops animated by this spirit are not likely to fail.

But the work of the real counter-attack had to be done behind the lines. The failure of the first effort had been due to lack of artillery preparation on unknown trenches. None the less, the heavy guns were on the march. Some were asked for from neighbouring Army Corps, others were freely offered as a voluntary contribution to the gallantry of the Canadian infantry. The new reinforcements were stupendous.

General Burstall, of the Canadian Corps, thus commanded one of the greatest assemblages of guns ever concentrated on the British front. I have described already the effect of the enemy's bombardment on the Canadian front. The Germans were now about to get a little of their own medicine back. The guns were divided into groups, the trenches accurately ranged, and each battery was given its definite and proper objective.

On the other side of the line, one must conceive the Germans toiling mightily, with the assiduity of coral insects, to make good what they seem to have imagined was to be their permanent home. Their industry was certainly marvellous. When the weather grew clear again and the aeroplane photographs could be taken, they showed no fewer than eight communication trenches driven up from the old German line to the new one, and an entire and excellent support line, dug just west of our own original front trench, now battered almost out of recognition, while the assault revealed deep dug-outs innumerable. So, from June 4th to June 12th the powers of offence and defence got ready, one for the other.

Map—POSITION 9th-l2th JUNE BEFORE SUCCESSFUL ATTACK

But while the heavy guns were being brought into position, it was necessary to reorganise the infantry and to mass the Corps for a strong and concerted attack. An immediate assault had been put out of the question by the failure of June 3rd. June 4th-12th. The enemy's trenches had to be located accurately before the fire of the guns could be directed upon them. For some days after the 3rd the weather remained unfavourable, and in the heavy rains and mists it was impossible for our aircraft to obtain good photographs, or for the ranging shots of our guns to be observed adequately. This delay gave us an opportunity for the reorganisation of the infantry, preparatory to a general assault, and it is, after all, by the infantry that the final issue will be decided. The Canadian battalions were therefore massed in great strength for the night of the 12th-13th.

The 9th British Brigade took over the St. Eloi sector, and thus released the 2nd Division, which was enabled to take over the ground on the northern sector, while the 1st Division prepared for the attack, and recuperated its forces in rest billets. June 8-9th. When the reliefs had been accomplished the position on June 8th was as follows: 6th Brigade of the 2nd Division at Hooge, and 9th Brigade of the 3rd Division from Zouave Wood to Maple Copse; 5th Brigade of the 2nd Division in line of Maple Copse to Hill 60; 4th Brigade of 2nd Division from Hill 60 to Ypres-Commes Canal; 9th British Brigade in the St. Eloi sector.