The Duke of Dalmatia maintained, that the left bank of the Seine was not tenable: that it was even very hazardous, since the occupation of Aubervilliers, to remain on the right side: that if the line of the canal, that joins St. Denis to Lavillette, should be forced, the enemy might enter by the barrier of St. Denis pell-mell with our troops.
Some of the members, agreeing in opinion with the Duke of Dantzic, demanded, that positive information should be procured respecting the possibility of putting the left bank into a state of defence, previous to coming to a decision. In fine, after some debate, it was decided, that the assembly was not competent, to determine such a question: and that it should be submitted to the examination and decision of a council of war, which the Prince of Eckmuhl should convene for the night following.
The occupation of Paris by the foreigners was the object of the impatient wishes of the royalists, and of the men who had sold or devoted themselves from policy, ambition, or fear, to the party of the Bourbons. Persuaded, that it would decide the fate of France in 1815, as it had done in 1814, they had omitted beforehand no step, no promise, no threatening insinuation, that could tend to accomplish their wishes and their triumph by the surrender of the city.
The Duke of Otranto, whether he were in concert with the royalists, or considered the speedy capitulation of Paris necessary to his own security; or were desirous of making a merit, at some future day, of having brought France under the sway of its legitimate sovereign without effusion of blood; appeared to consider it of great importance that the defence of Paris should not be prolonged. "Every thing is on the point of being settled," said he to the members, who had most influence in the chambers and in the army: "let us be very careful not to sacrifice a secure present to an uncertain future. The allies are agreed, that we shall have a Bourbon; but it is necessary, that he submit to the conditions imposed on him by the nation. The chamber will be retained, the generals will remain at the head of the army; all will go well. Is it not better to submit, than to expose France to be partitioned, or delivered over to the Bourbons bound hand and foot? A prolonged resistance would have no other result, than to retard our fall. It would rob us of the price of a voluntary submission, and authorise the Bourbons to be implacable." If little disposition were shown, to share his confidence and his sentiments; he imposed silence on the refractory by all the forms of the most lively interest. "Your opposition," he said to them, "astonishes and grieves me: would you pass for an incendiary, and incur the penalty of being exiled? Let us go on our own way, I conjure you: I will answer for the future.".... An internal presentiment warned the hearers, that this future would be far from answering the expectations of M. Fouché: but his political life, his great talents, his connexions with the foreign ministers, the attention paid him in 1814 by the Emperor Alexander and the king of Prussia, gave such weight, such an ascendancy, to his words, that they ultimately did violence to their own reason, and gave themselves up, though not without murmuring, to confidence and hope.
The council of war assembled on the night of the 1st of July at the head-quarters at Lavillette, under the presidentship of the Prince of Eckmuhl. Care was taken, it appeared, to keep away some suspected generals; and not to neglect calling those officers, whose principles, moderation, or weakness, was known. All the marshals present in the capital were admitted; and they, who had lately refused to fight, did not refuse to come to capitulate.
The committee, in order to prevent all political discussion, had stated the questions, to which the members of the council were to confine their deliberations: but this precaution, as might be supposed, did not prevent their entering familiarly into the moral and political considerations, that might influence the defence or surrender of the place besieged. Marshal Soult pleaded the cause of Louis XVIII.; and was eagerly seconded by other marshals, and several generals, who, though they entered into the council under the national colours, would willingly have gone out of it with the white cockade.
It is impossible, to recapitulate the opinions, given in turn or confusedly by the fifty persons, who were called to take a share in this great and important deliberation. Their speeches, or rather their conversation, turned alternately on Paris and on the Bourbons.
"We are told," said the partisans of Louis XVIII. and the capitulation, "that Paris, covered without by an army of eighty thousand men; and defended within by the federates, the sharpshooters, the national guard, and an immense population; might resist the efforts of the allies for twenty days at least. We are told, that its immense extent will render the arrival of provision easy. We admit the possibility of all this: but what will be the ultimate effect of this resistance? To allow the Emperor Alexander, and the Emperor of Austria, time to arrive.... The allies, we know perfectly well, promise to leave us the power of choosing our sovereign: but will they keep their promises? and what conditions will they annex to them? Already Wellington and Blucher have announced, that they will require guarantees, and fortified towns, if Louis XVIII. be rejected. Is not this equivalent to a formal declaration, that the allies are resolved, to retain that sovereign on the throne? Let us voluntarily rally round him, therefore, while we still can. His ministers led him astray, but his intentions were always pure: he knows the faults he has committed; he will be eager to repair them, and to give us the institutions yet necessary, to consolidate the rights and liberties of the people on bases not to be shaken."
"This reasoning may be just," answered their opponents; "but experience, of more weight than any reasoning, has convinced us, that we must not rely on empty promises. The hopes you have conceived rest on conjecture, or on the word of the agents of the Bourbons. Before we surrender ourselves into the hands of the King, he must make known to us the guarantees, by which we are to be secured. If they be agreeable to us, then we may deliberate but if we open our gates without conditions, and previous to the arrival of Alexander, Wellington and the Bourbons will make a jest of their promises, and oblige us to submit to the will of the conqueror without pity. Besides, why should we despair of the safety of France? Is the loss of a single battle, then, to decide the fate of a great nation? Have we not still immense resources, to oppose to the enemy? Have the federates, the national guard, and all true Frenchmen, refused to shed their blood in defence of the glory, the honour, and the independence of their country? While we are fighting under the walls of the capital, the levy in mass of the patriots will be arranged in the departments: and when our enemies see, that we are determined to defend our independence, they will rather respect it, than expose themselves to a patriotic and national war for interests not their own. We must refuse, therefore, to surrender; and place ourselves in a situation, by a vigorous defence, to give the law, instead of receiving it."
"You maintain," it was replied, "that we may raise in mass the federates and the patriots. But how will you arm them? we have no muskets. Besides, can a levy in mass be organised on a sudden? Before you could have a single battalion at your disposal, Paris would have under its feeble ramparts sixty thousand Bavarians, and a hundred and forty thousand Austrians more to fight. What will you do then? You must ultimately surrender: and the blood you will have shed will be lost without return, and without utility. But will not that we shall have spilt of the enemy fall on our own heads? Will they not make us expiate our mad and cruel resistance by a disgraceful capitulation? If the allies, at the present moment, think themselves strong enough to refuse you a suspension of hostilities, what will they do, when they have their twelve hundred thousand soldiers on our territory? The dismemberment of France, the pillage and devastation of the capital, will be, perhaps, the fruit of the rash defence you propose to us."