Charleston, April 19, 1861.
I arrived here the night before last viâ Baltimore, Norfolk and Wilmington. North Carolina was in revolt—that is, there was no particular form of authority to rebel against, but the shadowy abstractions in lieu of it were treated with deserved contempt by the 'citizens,' who with flint muskets and quaint uniforms were ready at the various stations to seize on anything, particularly whisky, which it occurred to them to fancy. At Wilmington I sent a message to the electric telegraph office for transmission to New York, but the 'citizens' of the Vigilance Committee refused to permit the message to be transmitted and were preparing to wait upon me with a view of asking me what were my general views on the state of the world, when I informed them peremptorily that I must decline to hold any intercourse with them which I the more objected to do in that they were highly elated and excited by the news from Sumter. I went over the works with General Beauregard: the military injury done to Sumter is very trifling, but Anderson's defence, negative as it was, must be regarded as exceedingly creditable to him.
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In a week's time the place will be a hard nut to crack. One thing is certain: nothing on earth will induce the people to return to the Union. I believe firmly their present intention is to march upon Washington, if it were merely as a diversion to carry the war away from their interior.
War having now actually broken out, the question of the blockade of the Southern ports became all important for England.
Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell.
Washington, April 15, 1861.
I am getting very uneasy about the intention of the Government with regard to stopping intercourse with Southern Ports. Now that war has begun it seems difficult to suppose that they will abstain from taking advantage of their one great superiority, which is their navy. I suppose that a regular blockade would be less objectionable than any such measures as closing the Southern Ports as Ports of entry, or attempting to collect duties for the U.S. by ships stationed off them. The rules of a blockade are to a great extent determined and known, and our ships could at all events resort to any Ports before which the U.S. did not establish a regular effective blockade. But if the U.S. are to be permitted to seize any ship of ours wherever they can find her within their jurisdiction on the plea that by going to a Southern port she has violated the U.S. custom laws, our commerce will be exposed to vexations beyond bearing, and all kinds of new and doubtful questions will be raised. In fact, this, it seems to me, would be a paper blockade of the worst kind. It would certainly justify Great Britain and France in recognizing the Southern Confederacy and sending their fleets to force the U.S. to treat British and French vessels as neutrals in conformity with the law of nations.
Just as Mr. Seward was confident that he had prevailed in the Cabinet, the President and the violent party suddenly threw over his policy. Having determined not to resign, he pretends to be pleased, and one of his colleagues says of him that in order to make up for previous lukewarmness he is now the fiercest of the lot. It is a great inconvenience to have him as the organ of communication from the U.S. Government. Repeated failures have not convinced him that he is not sure to carry his point with the President and the Cabinet. He is therefore apt to announce as the fixed intentions of his Government what is in reality no more than a measure which he himself supports.
I am in constant apprehension of some foolish and violent proceeding of the Government with regard to Foreign Powers. Neither the President nor any man in the Cabinet has a knowledge of Foreign Affairs; they have consequently all the overweening confidence in their own strength which popular oratory has made common in this country. I believe the best chance of keeping them within bounds will be to be very firm with them, particularly at first, and to act in concert with France, if that be possible.
As I have mentioned in my despatches, information coming from the Southern Commissioners sent to negotiate with the Government here, it may be as well to mention that they did not seek any intercourse with me, and that I never had any communication with them, direct or otherwise. I do not know that I should have thought it necessary to refuse to communicate with them, if it had been proposed to me, but the fact is as I have just said.
The policy of acting in conjunction with France was adopted with considerable success, as will appear later, but hitherto the British Government had not given any very clear lead, Lord John Russell contenting himself with the view that he relied upon 'the wisdom, patience, and prudence of the British Minister to steer safely through the danger of the crisis.' It was absolutely necessary, however, to deal with the Blockade Question, and the Cabinet consulted the Law Officers of the Crown, with the result that the Southern States were recognized as belligerents.