CHAPTER IV
COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR
(1862-1865)
Although the immediate danger of war between England and America had at all events temporarily vanished, and the United States Government had put a good face upon the matter, it was only natural that a soreness should remain; nor did the slowness of military operations tend to restore that government to a more equable frame of mind. Much of the enthusiasm which marked the outbreak of hostilities had already evaporated, but the hatred of the South had continued to grow in intensity, and although the latter was undoubtedly suffering great hardships and privations, there was no sign of failing courage, and every prospect of a long and bitter contest. The difficulty of finding men for the Northern army continued to increase; the prospect of having to raise twenty or thirty millions sterling in taxes from a people unaccustomed to pay any apparent taxes at all for Federal purposes was particularly unpleasant, more especially as there appeared to be no immediate probability of a striking military success; and it was not surprising that the country showed signs of great depression. Under these circumstances, a marked division of parties in the North began to show itself. One, which may be termed the Revolutionary Party, was in favour of prosecuting the war at all hazards and by all means; of proclaiming the immediate abolition of slavery in the South; promoting a servile insurrection there; turning out the Cabinet, and even deposing the President if he proved to be an obstacle; keeping Congress permanently in session to spur on the Government, and the Generals, maintaining a paper currency by inflicting heavy penalties for depreciating it, and so on. The Foreign Policy of this party consisted in a return to reckless conduct and language towards Europe in general, and an attempt to obtain the support of France against England.
On the other side, however, were now ranged the President, Mr. Seward, and the more moderate men. Mr. Seward had now, strange to say, become a kind of guarantee for peace, for after the concessions he had made, a foreign war would have been fatal to his reputation, and it was only fair to assume that his conversion to a more moderate course was genuine. Still there was danger to England from both sides. If the party of violence should show itself reckless enough to risk anything, the moderate party might conceivably provoke a foreign war either as an excuse for giving up the contest with the South, or to divert popular irritation after having abandoned the contest as hopeless.
Meanwhile, Mr. Seward's demeanour towards England had changed so much that, early in 1862, his friendliness had become actually embarrassing. Quite a considerable force, according to British standards, amounting to something like 12,000 men, had been already despatched, or were under orders to proceed to Canada, and Mr. Seward now made the surprising offer that these troops and stores should be landed at Portland, a port in the United States, and sent overland to Canada. However well meant the invitation, it would manifestly have been most imprudent to accept it. It must have been plain to the densest understanding that these troops and stores were only being sent to Canada in order that we might be prepared, if unhappily a rupture should take place between England and the United States. Therefore, if troops and stores so conveyed were eventually used against the United States, there would have been a violent outcry of treachery against us throughout the country. The danger, too, of some unpleasant incident occurring during the landing or during the passage of the trains with which it would be impossible to deal, was so obvious, that the invitation was declined with thanks. Too much love is sometimes almost more inconvenient in diplomacy than hatred.
Mr. Seward's anxiety, at this time, however, to show himself a friend to England continued, and he took particular care to point out, in proof of his new attitude, that up till the last moment (December 26) he had been the only person in the Government who was in favour of the surrender of Slidell and Mason, and that President Lincoln had been opposed to surrender and was in favour of arbitration only. In fact, Mr. Seward appeared to be seized with the desire of overwhelming not only England, but France as well, with demonstrations of friendship and confidence, and it is perhaps not uncharitable to assume that two reasons were contributory causes to this agreeable change of tactics. One of these was that the appearance of a good understanding with these two Powers would exercise a beneficial influence upon the money market; the other was the fear of one or both of them recognizing the South and breaking up the blockade. Probably Mr. Seward's fears of French interference were increased by a visit paid by M. Mercier, in the spring, to Richmond, the Confederate Headquarters. M. Mercier, whether instructed from home or not, was bent upon this visit, which the United States Government could not prevent, but which they could hardly be expected to view with favour, and after the manner of French diplomatists of the period, he was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying to effect a striking coup, although there was not the slightest reason to suspect him of any disloyalty to his English colleague. Lord Lyons wisely declined to accompany him, and prophesied that he would end by getting into trouble, which proved to be the case, for the journey naturally gave rise to all sorts of comments. As will be seen from the following letter, both M. Mercier and Mr. Seward drew incorrect conclusions from the information derived during this visit; the former being convinced that the subjugation of the South was an impossibility, and the latter confidently believing that the end of the war was close at hand.
Lord Lyons to Lord Russell.
Washington, April 23, 1862.