Washington, Feb. 9, 1864.

I am very sorry to say that the agitation against the Reciprocity Treaty has gone on increasing, and that it now appears probable that a Resolution calling upon the President to give as soon as possible notice for abrogating it, will be passed by Congress. The Canadian Ministers are very anxious to be doing something in the matter, in order to cover their responsibility as regards their constituents hereafter. They had a desire to send an agent here to advise with me and to speak to the American Cabinet and to members of Congress. This I have told Lord Monck privately, I will not hear of. I could not undertake to keep the peace for a month if I had a man here by my side, over whom I could have no practical control, and who would be really guided only by Canadian party politics, but who would yet be supposed to be more or less in my confidence, and therefore to be entitled to speak for me and H.M. Government. My troubles are great enough without adding Canadian electioneering views to the difficulties I have to contend with.

Mr. Seward's opinion was that the quieter the Canadians kept the better, and so was mine, and so it would be still, if Mr. Seward had not changed his. He now thinks that discussion on the subject cannot be avoided, and a good effect would be produced by visits to Washington of influential Canadians coming 'on their own hook' and talking in a friendly manner to Senators and Deputies. He does not recommend that they should appear to have any special connexion with me, nor any semblance of an official or quasi-official character of any kind, nor does he consider it to be desirable that any one individual should stay long.

I am corresponding privately with Lord Monck about this action of Mr. Seward's, and I defer writing about the Treaty officially until I come to some understanding with him about it. Mr. Seward's opinion is so much more likely to be correct than mine, that I do not like to discourage Canadians coming in the way he suggests. Beside which I have very little hope of staving off the Resolution for the abrogation of the Treaty in any way, and therefore do not feel justified in preventing efforts being made by the Canadians themselves, provided I am clear of all connexion with them, and that they do not compromise me or the Imperial Government.

The attack on the Treaty is now caused much more by ill will to England and her Colonies than by any commercial or financial considerations. The same spirit has caused the introduction of a Bill into Congress to repeal the Act allowing goods to pass through the United States without paying duty in transit to and from Canada. In fact the absence of any serious opposition in Congress renders both Houses very unmanageable.

The views expressed in these two letters may appear unsympathetic as regards Canada, but apart from his rooted and well-founded distrust of amateur diplomatists, Lord Lyons's main task was to keep the peace if possible between England and the United States, and he was therefore justified in refusing to be associated with any persons who might conceivably add to the difficulty of a very critical situation. In addition to this he was always inclined to resent the tendency of Canadian Ministers to do a little diplomacy of their own, and held strongly that it would be time enough for them to think of diplomacy when they had provided themselves with an army and a navy.

The extreme caution which he constantly displayed in avoiding anything which might disturb American susceptibility in the smallest degree is well illustrated by a letter to Mr. Hammond respecting the appointment of a new secretary to the Washington Legation.


Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond.

Washington, April 5, 1864.

I have been terribly frightened by hearing that there has been a notion of sending Mr. Horace Johnstone to this Legation. To have the brother of a man married to the sister of Slidell's Secretary of Legation in Paris would expose the whole of this mission to all kinds of suspicion and ill will. It is impossible for any one not here to conceive the captiousness of the Federals, in and out of office, on these points. It is almost beyond my power to keep matters straight with them, do what I can, and if I had a man in the Legation who was personally suspicious to them I should have no hope of keeping out of scrapes. If Mr. Johnstone were here, I think the only way I could employ him for the advantage of H.M.'s service would be in carrying the next despatches home.

So much alarmed was he at the prospect of Mr. Johnstone's appearance that he also communicated his objections to the Private Secretary at the Foreign Office, and even wrote to Lord Russell saying that if Mr. Johnstone arrived he should feel it his duty to order him to remain at the port of disembarkation until further instructions were received. Most men would probably have considered that the family connexions of a junior member of the Legation were of no importance, but Lord Lyons was one of those who never took any risks.

In accordance with the suggestion made in the previous autumn, some officers were at last despatched from England in order to follow the operations of the Federal Army.