Therapia, Nov. 1, 1866.
The Prince will, I suppose, arrive at Bucharest two or three days before this reaches you. I hope he is satisfied with his visit to Constantinople. There was some hitch about the interchange of civilities with the Russian Minister and one or two other chiefs of missions, I believe. I suppose however all was set right before His Highness went away. The Prince himself showed, I thought, great good sense in these matters of etiquette as well as in more important matters. I should be glad if you would take an opportunity of letting him understand discreetly that I personally was thoroughly satisfied, not that he can doubt it.
The Principalities Question having been satisfactorily settled, M. de Moustier, who, in the meanwhile, had become Minister for Foreign affairs, lost no time in claiming all the credit for himself. With his usual good sense, Lord Lyons showed complete indifference to the egotism of his former colleague.
'It is the way of French diplomatists everywhere, and of almost all diplomatists at Pera, to take to themselves the credit of every good thing that has been done,' he wrote to Lord Cowley, 'so far as the Turks are concerned. I have borne in mind what you told me in Paris of your own system of dealing with them, and have endeavoured to let them have the credit of their good deeds, whatever part I may have had in bringing them about. M. de Moustier has certainly not followed the same plan. His article in the Moniteur gives no credit either to the Turks or to me. Whatever may be our relative shares in settling the questions, it cannot be doubted that if I had chosen from jealousy, or any other motive, to thwart him, I could easily have done so. However, if good is done, I am willing to forego my share of the boasting.'
It is hardly necessary to state that the semi-comic question of the Principalities was but one of many difficulties threatening in every part of the Turkish Empire, from the Fortress of Belgrade to the Lebanon. The long letter to Lord Stanley of December 19 is one which, with slight variations, might have been written by every British Ambassador at Constantinople at any time during the last fifty years, but is quoted in full because it seems to constitute a comprehensive review of the condition of Turkey at the close of 1866; and it is perhaps worthy of note, as showing how completely the politics of Europe have changed, that the gigantic struggle between Prussia and Austria passed unnoticed and without producing the slightest apparent effect in the Near East.
Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley.
Constantinople, Dec. 19, 1866.
I am afraid that it is only too true that a storm is brewing in the East. There is a very apparent change in the policy of Russia, or at least, in that of her agents in Turkey. When I arrived a year ago there was every appearance of a desire on the part of Russia to keep things quiet in Turkey. Now her agents make no secret of their sympathy with the Cretan insurrection and with Christian malcontents throughout the Empire and appear to be determined to recover their old position as the special friends and protectors of all the Orthodox Christians, and to be willing enough to see troubles and disturbances break out in all directions. Greece is bent upon mischief, and the question whether we are or are not to have an Eastern Question forced upon us in the spring depends upon whether or no Greece can be kept in order. All this suits the Russian game. If we interfere to bring the Hellenes to their senses, she hopes to recover her lost popularity at our expense. If we do not, she will claim the merit of having hindered us.
I cannot make up my mind to recommend the Turks to take a bold course. Discouraging as is the spectacle afforded by the Turkish army and navy in Crete, I think it probable that the Turks would in the end get the better of the Hellenes if they were allowed to deal with them without any interference from Europe. But Europe undoubtedly would interfere. I very much dread the effects of allowing the Greeks to get up disturbances in this country in the spring. If the disturbances are very serious they will probably lead to the destruction of Ottoman rule in Europe. What will take its place it is impossible to foresee, but I think it is pretty clear that the Turks will not go without a desperate struggle, and that in mixed districts we shall have massacres and every kind of horror. Great calamities may possibly be avoided if we can keep the Turks going and make them go on tolerably well for some years longer. If they are really capable of radical improvement, if they can live upon equal terms with the Christians, and establish a good government, so much the better. If things go on as they have done lately, the Turks will be gradually squeezed out, as the Americans say, by the increase in numbers, wealth and intelligence of the Christians. I am not one of those who look upon the Turkish Empire as good per se—to be upheld at all hazards—but in the interest of all parties, I should like to let it down gently; but in order to make this possible, the Turks must be prudent and behave well to all their subjects.
The arguments against giving up the Fortress of Belgrade are strongly put in Mr. Longworth's despatch to me of which he has sent you a copy. For my own part I doubt whether the Levée en masse of the Mussulman population of Turkey to defend it, would not shake the Empire to pieces. In the face of the extreme unpopularity of the Sultan personally and of the Government with the Mussulmans, I doubt whether the Ministers would be willing to risk an appeal to them. The same state of things however makes the Ministers very fearful of the effect of giving up the Fortress. It seems that Europe will advise the Porte to abandon it, and this, I am inclined to think, is the proper advice for Europe to give. I do not think that it is advice which it would be fair to press very strongly unless (as is by no means impossible) the Porte may wish to be able to say to the Sultan and the people that they were obliged to yield to all Europe united against them on the point. I don't think that England, or any other power, should encourage the Porte to hold out, unless of course it were deemed to be a matter of such importance that material aid would be given to help the Porte out of any scrape into which its holding out might bring it. On the other hand, unless we were prepared to do this and to do it effectually, we should make ourselves unnecessarily odious to the Christian races, and neither obtain nor deserve any gratitude from the Turks, if we alone advised them to keep the Fortress. Aali Pasha does not talk as if he had any idea of yielding. His plan will probably be to say neither yes nor no, unless circumstances compel him to give a categorical answer to the Servians.
Lord Stanley, who at this period ruled at the Foreign Office, was not an optimist by nature, had no illusions about the future of Turkey, and his letters contain references to many other questions which appeared likely to create trouble in Europe; besides Crete and the Fortress of Belgrade. With regard to the latter he observed that the 'Turks have the same right to stay there that every one has to do foolish things where only his own interest is concerned.' 'The Austrians,' he wrote in October, 'have made their greatest mistake of this year (which is saying a good deal) in the choice of Beust as Minister.