Paris, March 27, 1868.
I ought to say that there are, among not unreasonable or inexperienced people, vague apprehensions that the Emperor may, more suo, resort to a coup de théâtre and declare war when it is least expected. The only act which can be cited in support of these apprehensions is the formation of two more camps of instruction this year than usual. It is said that the effect of this will be to have two additional army corps ready to take the field at short notice. But the real ground of the apprehension appears to be a resemblance real or fancied between the declaration and proceedings of the Emperor now, and those which preceded the war with Italy. I believe it to be true that Prince Napoleon has told the Emperor that war with Germany must be made this year or never, but I do not think the Prince advises the war being made at all. The general impression indeed here appears to be that there is at this moment an amount of discontent in the annexed provinces which might be turned to account now by France, but which will subside in a year's time, if the Prussian Government is left to carry into effect its plans. Southern Germany, it is thought, would go with France after a French victory, but not without one. For my own part I am more inclined to believe that the Emperor is sincerely anxious to preserve peace. In case of war he must take the field in person, and it is much doubted whether he is willing or able to endure the mental and bodily fatigue of a campaign. Defeat would be fatal and anything short of great success and additions of territory far from advantageous. It is of course impossible to say what a man so reserved and really so little in the habit of making up his mind long beforehand, may or may not do, and therefore the possibility of a coup de théâtre must I suppose always be kept in one's mind. Still I must say that all I can make out leads me to believe that his present wishes and intentions are peaceful.
A good deal of interest had been aroused by a visit of Prince Napoleon to Germany in the spring, which gave rise to much speculation in the political world. His friends gave out that it was merely an ordinary tour. Others, who were supposed to be well informed, declared (probably much to the satisfaction of the Prince) that he had been sent on a private mission from the Emperor, of which none of His Majesty's Ministers had any cognizance. Two different objects were assigned to the mission; one that he was commissioned to assure Bismarck of the Emperor's determination to remain at peace if possible, but to represent that Bismarck should act so as to make it easy, and should not use the presumed hostility of France so frequently as a lever to move public opinion in Germany. The other and less probable object with which he was credited, was that he was to summon Prussia to join France against Russia in Turkey, a fantastic absurdity which was directly contrary to Moustier's policy in the East. The probability is that Prince Napoleon had no mission at all, but the long letter which follows is interesting as showing what correct conclusions an intelligent person can occasionally draw from a well-timed visit to a foreign country.
Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley.
Paris, March 31, 1868.
Although I have not seen Prince Napoleon myself since his return from Germany, I think I can give you a tolerably accurate notion of the language he holds.
He speaks with satisfaction of the manner in which he was himself received at Berlin. He thinks that Count Bismarck will not provoke France to war by increasing at present the area of the North German Confederation, or any other overt act. He believes him to be sincerely desirous of avoiding a war, but not to be willing to allow any interference on the part of France in the affairs of Northern Germany, or to make any patent concession whatever to France. He conceived it to be vain to talk to Prussia of disarmament, as she would answer that she was already disarmed, having only 200,000 men under arms. Her system, which would enable her to put from 4 to 600,000 men in a condition to take the field in eight or ten days, she could not be persuaded to change.
The Prince has seen nothing, except in the United States, like the contempt in which foreign nations are held in Prussia. Austria is not considered to be worth taking into account at all. Great indifference is professed as to Italy and Turkey. The Prince does not believe that there is any formal treaty between Russia and Prussia, but is convinced that there is an understanding that, in return for a friendly neutrality in the West, Prussia is, in case of being at war with France, to give Russia free scope in the East.
The Prince gives no weight to the assertions that the recently annexed provinces would see with pleasure an attack by France upon Prussia and use it to recover their independence. He is not blind to the discontent which prevails among a great part of the populations in those provinces, but he is convinced that an attack from abroad would rouse an almost universal spirit of resistance in Germany which would extend even to the German possession of Austria. The allegations to the contrary come from adherents of the dispossessed dynasties, who fancy that their own peculiar feelings are the feelings of the mass of their countrymen. The Saxon army might possibly be a danger to the Prussians, if the Prussians should be defeated, and in that event, Bavaria and Wurtemberg might also support France. But they would none of them do anything for France until she had gained so decided a victory as to have no need of them. In Saxony the Prince found the army to be ill-disposed to Prussia, but not the commercial classes.
The Prince has not come back with the idea that France could easily attempt to annex Rhenish Prussia. He believes that the inhabitants are now prosperous and contented and better off than they would be under France with her present institutions. Cologne might turn out to be another Saragossa to France. The case might in his opinion be different in the Palatinate, and France would, he supposes, have little difficulty in 'assimilating' Belgium if she obtained possession of that country.
So far the impressions brought back by the Prince are calculated to show that the policy of France should be to remain at peace, and his language to the Emperor may have had a good effect. But he has also said to the Emperor and others that a war with Prussia should be made this year or never; that the consolidation of Germany is proceeding surely and rapidly; that the adhesion of Southern Germany will soon follow, and that hereafter war would have to be waged with a Germany thoroughly united and perfectly organized.
Prince Napoleon is himself opposed to war. He considers that an unsuccessful war would overthrow the Emperor and his dynasty and send the whole Bonaparte family to the right about. A war only partially successful would, he thinks, rather weaken than strengthen the Emperor at home, while a thoroughly successful war would simply give His Majesty a fresh lease of 'Cæsarism' and adjourn indefinitely the liberal institutions which he considers essential to the durability of the dynasty. At the same time the Prince is not without apprehension as to war being made this season. He fears weak men, and he looks upon the Emperor as a weak man. He fears the people who surround His Majesty, the Generals, the Chamberlains, the ladies of the Palace. It has been particularly observed that while the Prince has been very communicative as to the opinions expressed by him to the Emperor, he has been, contrary to his wont, wholly silent as to what the Emperor said to him.
This account of Prince Napoleon's views was derived from Colonel Claremont, the British Military Attaché, who was on intimate terms with him. Prince Napoleon, one of the best abused and most unpopular of Frenchmen, had, with all his talents, little fixity of purpose, no real perseverance, and was too much wanting in courage to become the head of a party; but the insight which he displayed with regard to the real situation between France and Prussia is really remarkable. There is hardly a single opinion, in the letter quoted above, which was not shown subsequently to be absolutely accurate and well founded, and one cannot help suspecting that he afterwards must have derived some melancholy consolation from the realization of his prophecies of evil.
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