Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley.
Paris, Oct. 13, 1868.
Lord Clarendon arrived here on Saturday. He has given me accounts of interesting conversations he has had with the King and Queen of Prussia and with General Moltke. The details he will no doubt repeat to you when you see him. The sum of what was said by all three is that Prussia earnestly desires to keep at peace with France; that she will be very careful not to give offence and very slow to take offence: that if a war is brought on she will act so as to make it manifest to Germany and to Europe that France is the unprovoked aggressor: that a war brought on evidently by France would infallibly unite all Germany. Moltke seemed to believe that the Emperor Napoleon must know too well how thoroughly prepared Prussia is to provoke a war lightly. He was, on his side, well aware of the complete state of preparation in which the French were: he thought Prussia had lost an opportunity after Sadowa, and that if she had then known that France could not bring more than 150,000 men into the field, she might have settled the whole affair of German unity out of hand. This opportunity had been lost, according to him, by the incorrectness of the information from the Embassy at Paris, and now Prussia must have peace if possible in order to organize her system of government civil and military.
In short, Lord Clarendon is sure that the Emperor Napoleon may be confident that he has nothing to fear from Prussia, if he does not give her just provocation: but, on the other hand, that Prussia does not fear a war, if she can show Germany and the world that she is really forced into it.
I think I might very well mention to Moustier the impression Lord Clarendon has brought back, and indeed to the Emperor, if I have an opportunity.
Lord Clarendon gathered from Moltke and others that there is a very strong feeling in the Prussian army against Russia and a very great repugnance to accepting Russian assistance. In case however of a war with France, Prussia must of course (Moltke observed) get help wherever she could find it, and must at all events use Russia to paralyze Austria. Austria he thought hostile, and very naturally so, to Prussia, and ready to do all the harm she can. She is not however, in his opinion, in a condition to be otherwise than neutral at the beginning of a war.
Lord Clarendon tells me he most forcibly pointed out to the King of Prussia and Moltke the extreme danger of giving France any provocation; anything like a challenge could not be passed over by the Emperor: if the glove were thrown down, public feeling would oblige His Majesty to take it up. Lord Clarendon urged them to settle the Danish question, and even suggested that some way should be sought of giving a satisfaction to French amour propre.
It will be seen that the information obtained by Lord Clarendon coincided more or less with the impressions derived by Prince Napoleon. Upon Lord Stanley it produced a reassuring effect, and confirmed him in his opinion that the Prussians were in a state of alarm which they were endeavouring unsuccessfully to conceal, under an ostentation of being ready for whatever might happen. In any case, he thought, they would have a respite until the spring.
Lord Clarendon was fortunate enough to be able to give the Emperor Napoleon the benefit of his Prussian experiences.
Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley.
Paris, Oct. 20, 1868.
Lord Clarendon dined at St. Cloud yesterday, and had a long conversation with the Emperor after dinner. He repeated to His Majesty the pacific language which he had heard from the King of Prussia, the Queen of Prussia, and General Moltke. The Emperor heard the pacific assurances with evident satisfaction, and spoke very strongly himself in the same sense. Lord Clarendon was thoroughly convinced that the Emperor was exceedingly anxious to avoid war and thoroughly convinced that peace was desirable for the interests of the dynasty. At the same time, His Majesty declared that if anything like a challenge came from Prussia it would be impossible for him to oppose the feeling of the army and the nation, and that he must, in such a case, for the sake of his own safety, make war. He was most anxious that England should step in to enable France and Prussia to withdraw with honour from their present antagonistic attitude. This is an idea which, as you know, has been vaguely suggested to me more than once by men more or less in the Emperor's confidence. It has never been hinted by Moustier in speaking to me. The Emperor appears, however, to have dwelt a good deal upon it with Lord Clarendon yesterday, and even to have entered a little upon details. He seems to have relished the idea of other great powers being united with England in a sort of mediation, but I did not gather that he had any matured plan, or any distinct notion of the way in which practical effect could be given to his wishes. His object was to calm public opinion in France, and the means of doing this were to be a sort of collective confirmation by Europe of the Treaty of Prague, and a sort of pressure to be exercised by Europe on France and Prussia which would compel them, or rather enable them, to diminish their military preparations and take effectual steps to restore public confidence. Whatever may be the feasibility of the Emperor's project, it is important to know what is in his mind, and convenient to learn it with so much certainty, and at the same time in a way which prevents its being presented to H.M. Government as a proposal or a suggestion to them. There is nothing as the matter stands which necessitates even an expression of opinion from us.
The Emperor told Clarendon in strict confidence of a proposal which he had not, he said, mentioned even to his Ministers. Men of weight (des hommes sérieux) had proposed a Confederation between the South German States and Switzerland. Lord Clarendon pointed out objections to the notion, such as the want of any real bond of sympathy or interest between Switzerland and the proposed confederates, and the offence which would be taken by Prussia, and the Emperor appeared (for the moment, at least) to have given up the idea.
The King of Prussia told Lord Clarendon, and Lord Clarendon repeated it to the Emperor, that the speech at Kiel was intended to be thoroughly pacific, and that its object was to make the Prussian army and the public take quietly the anti-Prussian cries stated to have been uttered by the French troops at the camp at Chalons. The Emperor positively declared that no anti-Prussian cries and no political cries of any kind beyond the usual loyal cheers had been uttered at the camp.
Of Spanish affairs little seems to have been said in the conversation with the Emperor. At dinner the Empress talked of little else. She did not appear to favour any particular solution of the question or any particular candidate for the Crown. She appeared to expect both political troubles and extreme misery from the famine which she says is undoubtedly impending. As to her own estates and those of her relations in Spain she says they return absolutely nothing, and that the peasants have not even put by grain enough to sow the land. No one dares to store up grain or to bring it from abroad lest he should be torn to pieces by the ignorant people as an accapareur.