We must be very clumsy to invite so much indignation in France and at the same time to run the risk of being turned out next month for being so subservient to her.
Waddington seems in earnest to bring about a good understanding, but our press, over which the Government has absolutely no control, will be most offensive, until the vote of censure against the Conference, which is almost sure to be brought on, is decided one way or the other.
It will require all Salisbury's want of caution to try to come in upon a quarrel with all Europe upon the Egyptian question.
The Egyptian policy of the Gladstone Government, subsequently to the successful campaign of 1882, never met with much favour in any quarter in England, but it was not surprising, on the whole, that Lord Granville should be pained by French hostility, since nothing whatever had been done to warrant it. Had we behaved ill to France, there might have been a chance of returning to favour by altering our procedure; as it was, there was no reasonable ground of offence whatever, and therefore the prospect of restoring friendly relations appeared to be all the more remote.
Lord Hartington, then a prominent member of the Gladstone Government, was in Paris at the beginning of June, and Lord Granville seems to have been much alarmed as to the language which he might use with reference to Egypt in conversation with French Ministers. Lord Hartington was probably not in the least desirous of conversing with French Ministers upon Egypt or upon any other subject, and wished to go incognito, 'as he was constantly in the habit of doing;' but it was represented to him that unless he called upon Jules Ferry it would be believed that he was engaged upon a secret mission, and Lord Lyons was therefore asked to give him some preliminary coaching.
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, June 3, 1884.
I sent Lord Hartington your letter yesterday, and I had a long visit from him in the afternoon.
As matters stand, what seems to me most to be dreaded with a view to our relations with France is a vote of the House of Commons censuring an arrangement made by Her Majesty's Government with the French Government. Such a vote, and the debate by which it would be preceded, would, I cannot but fear, have a truly lamentable effect.
I understand that Jules Ferry is having a memorandum on the Finances of Egypt drawn up by Blignières, and that it will dispute the accuracy of Mr. Childers's information and represent that the Finances were in a flourishing condition, and that there were surpluses even during Arabi's rebellion, up to the time at which England took the thing in hand. The memorandum will probably deny there being any necessity for reducing the interest of the debt, if the Finances be properly managed.
I do not know whether such a reason will be assigned to us, but in fact it seems that the French object to any large loans being guaranteed by England, on account of the lien, so to speak, which it would give England upon Egypt. The French would prefer a simple fresh issue of Unified stock.
In the meantime, the French bondholders are bestirring themselves and protesting against any arrangement being made without their being consulted.
Jules Ferry, however, himself thinks little of any other consideration in comparison with the political success which it would be to him to give France again a political footing in Egypt, and as a means to this, to get a time fixed for the departure of our troops. I do not think he is afraid of much disapproval here of his counter-concession—the engagement that French troops shall not enter Egypt, either on the departure of the English troops or afterwards. Unless the engagement were very formally made and very peculiarly and stringently worded, it would be felt here that it did not amount to much. For though it would preclude the occupation of Egypt by the French to preserve order and promote reforms in the same way we occupy the country now, it would not be interpreted here as preventing France using force to avenge an insult or protect distinct French interests in cases which would constitute a casus belli as regarded any ordinary country.
I do not quite understand the exact position in which stands the suggestion that the Financial question should be first settled by England with the several Powers separately, and then a conference be held for a day or two only to ratify what had already been settled. Does this afford an opening for purely financial negotiations, and admit of dropping the French political proposals which appear to be so unpopular in England? I believe Jules Ferry is in some tribulation about the difficulties his proposals have met with in England, and is half inclined to be sorry he made them so strong, though I doubt whether Waddington has made him fully aware of the violence of the opposition they encounter in England.
Generally speaking, I am very unhappy about the growing ill-will between France and England which exists on both sides of the Channel. It is not that I suppose that France has any deliberate intention of going to war with us. But the two nations come into contact in every part of the world. In every part of it questions arise which, in the present state of feeling, excite mutual suspicion and irritation. Who can say, when and where, in this state of things, some local events may not produce a serious quarrel, or some high-handed proceedings of hot-headed officials occasion an actual collision?
The variety and number of questions upon which Lord Lyons was requested to pronounce an opinion have already been commented upon; now he was asked to consider the effect of a hypothetical vote of the House of Commons.