Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.

Paris, Dec. 26, 1884.

I suppose Waddington's private statement to me that we must not expect an answer to our Egyptian proposals before the end of the year was intended to imply that we should get an answer about that time.

I pressed Ferry strongly on the subject the day before yesterday. He assured me that he had studied our papers and was occupying himself without intermission on the subject, but I could not bring him to book as to the exact time we might look for an answer, nor could I extract from him any hint as to what the answer was to be.

I am afraid that the draft of it has gone, or is going, to Berlin, and I augur anything but good from this. It seems to me that without being driven to anything of the kind by German interests, Bismarck has lately taken a sort of malicious pleasure in treating matters in a way calculated to embarrass and discredit us.

You may be quite sure that I shall leave no stone unturned to get an answer as soon as possible. I don't think threats of Tunisifying Egypt, or of bankruptcy, or other strong measures, would tell upon the French. They would not believe that we should have recourse to such measures, in face of the opposition of France, Germany, Austria, and Russia, even if we had the thoroughgoing support of Italy. I should hesitate to bring matters to a point at which we could only execute our threats by a very large display of military and naval force, or back out of them. The best card in our hand, and it is not a high trump, is the reluctance of the French to be thrown irretrievably into the clutches of Bismarck by a distinct quarrel with us.

Ferry seemed grateful to you for the way in which you sounded him through Waddington about new proposals from China, but he appears to think that any eagerness on his part to receive new proposals would be looked upon by the Chinese as a sign of weakness, and short of absolutely giving in on the part of China, an action d'éclat on the part of the French forces would answer best for him with the Chambers.

Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.

Paris, Dec. 30, 1884.

I put your letter myself into Errington's hand this morning.[42] He starts for Italy this evening.

You will see by the despatch I send with this that Ferry promises an answer on the Egyptian Finances on the 15th of next month, and that he intends to make counter-proposals. I cried out at his mentioning so distant a date as the 15th, but he would not name a nearer one. If, as I cannot but surmise, he is consulting Berlin, I fear that neither speed nor conciliation to us will be recommended from that quarter. I confess I cannot think of any threat which would be likely to mend matters. The French would probably rejoice at any crisis which might array distinctly against us the three Emperors, as well as this Republic. I doubt the Tonquin affair being very much of a safeguard. I should feel safer if France were not getting into the habit of sending out distant expeditions.

I report officially this evening Ferry's language about the new Chinese proposals. The Chambers were all in favour of an action d'éclat. I don't think Ferry could face them with another doubtful negotiation on his hands which would suspend military action. At any rate he does not seem to wish to hear anything of Chinese proposals, short of actual surrender.

At the beginning of 1885 Her Majesty's Government were confronted with the unpleasant fact, that whereas hitherto they had only had French opposition to reckon with in respect to Egypt, Bismarck had now engineered a European combination against them in consequence of dissatisfaction at the English attitude towards his colonial policy. The English financial proposals, more especially those which suggested that the interest on the debt should be reduced, and the Anglo-French Administration of the Daira and Domain Lands should be abolished, were denounced in unmeasured terms in France. Nor did it seem easy to devise any efficacious means either of reconciling the French to the proposals or of putting pressure on them. The time for putting pressure on France was past; earlier in the day, a representation that a refusal to consent to measures necessary for the well being and good administration of Egypt would oblige the British Government to take the country formally under their protection, after the fashion of Tunis, would have met with little opposition; but now France might go to any extremities to resist such an arrangement, feeling sure that in so doing she would have the support of Germany, Austria, and Russia. Under these circumstances the prospect of a financial crisis, or even of bankruptcy, produced little alarm, because it was felt that the support of the three Empires would be forthcoming in demanding that the Egyptian financial administration should be placed under the joint control of the Powers; and it was in fact only too probable that the intractability of the French Government would increase in proportion with the support obtained from Germany and the Powers which followed the German lead.