I hardly see how England is to avoid supporting the Andrassy Note. If we stand aloof we shall stand alone. If our secession produces no effect and the Turks still accept, we shall be in the same foolish position France was in 1840; with this serious inconvenience, that if the Andrassy plan fails in pacifying the Herzegovina, we shall be blamed for the failure, as having caused it by breaking up the unanimity of Europe. If the Turks do not accept, they will be ready enough to throw the responsibility upon us, and to call upon us to get them out of the scrape into which they will get with the other Powers. I think that by consenting we should leave the Powers least excuse for attacking Turkey, or at all events, least excuse for pushing on without consulting us. I should not be for qualifying our support too much, for, if we do, the failure of the plan, which is in my opinion more than probable, will still be attributed to us, and a support, given as it were against our will, and restricted to the least possible amount, will be treated very much as opposition. I say all this because you ask me to tell you what I think: but there are two important elements for forming an opinion which I lack. I mean a knowledge of public opinion in England, and a knowledge of the real feelings of the three Empires towards each other.
The despatch from Odo Russell looks as if Bismarck was preparing for the possibility of a quarrel with Russia. Ever since 1870 he has been very naturally trying to turn every opportunity of dividing England from France to account. But since you joined Russia in insisting upon peace last year, and still more since the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, he has no doubt formed a higher opinion of England, and conceived the idea that she still has the will and the means to play a foremost part in European politics. Like everybody else, he feels sure that if there is a quarrel between Russia and Germany, France will side with Russia. In order to prevent his enemy being all powerful at sea, he must have the English fleet not merely neutral, but on his side. The only advantage he can offer to England is support on the Eastern Question, and it is on this question that he would have the best chance of embroiling her with Russia. What part he means Austria to play, I find it more difficult to guess. That he intends some day, and by some means, to annex German Austria to the German Empire I make no doubt, but I suppose he is in no hurry to add so large a Roman Catholic and Southern population to the electors of the Diet of the Empire.
The worst service we could render France at present would be to set up a separate understanding with her in opposition to Germany.
The French Government was desperately anxious that England should not separate herself from the other Powers, partly from fear that such action would cause European complications, and partly because it was particularly desirous of getting credit with Russia for having brought English opinion round to Russian views. Her Majesty's Government finally decided to join in the Andrassy Note, although it would appear from Lord Derby's language, that the Cabinet were not unanimous on the question.
Meanwhile French internal politics remained in the same confused and unsatisfactory state which had prevailed for so long. The divisions amongst the Conservatives had made Monarchical Government in any form impossible, and yet they refused to acquiesce, even temporarily, in the moderate form of Republic which had been established, and seemed bent upon doing all they could to exchange their King Log for a King Stork in the shape of a Red Republic. The elections which took place in the beginning of the year 1876 resulted in large Republican majorities both in the Senate and in the Chamber, and in the case of the former, this result was singularly unfortunate for Marshal MacMahon, as it deprived him of the power of forcing a dissolution. A letter from Lord Lyons to the Prince of Wales, who was on his way back from India, summarizes the French internal situation.
Paris, March 7, 1876.
I cannot give your Royal Highness a very satisfactory account of French politics, although I do not take so gloomy a view of them as many Frenchmen do. The large number of advanced Republicans in the new Chamber of Deputies, the not inconsiderable number of Ultra-Radicals, and the complete defeat of the Moderate Conservatives in the Elections not unnaturally frighten the upper classes of Frenchmen. But in fact so many of the members are quite new men, that one cannot foresee how parties will group themselves. The Chambers meet to-morrow, and in about a month's time it will be possible to form an opinion as to how things are likely to go. So long as Marshal MacMahon is at the head of the State and of the army, there can be no fear of any serious disturbance of material order; and if he is at the same time firm and conciliatory with the new Chamber, and willing to take a Ministry from the more moderate members of the majority, he will very probably be rewarded by finding how tame demagogues can become in office. I understand the Marshal insists upon having Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs whom he knows and in whom he has confidence, but that he is willing to let the other Departments be filled by men taken in the ordinary way from the majority.
So far we have not this year been disturbed, as we were last spring, by rumours of war, and agriculture and commerce are flourishing in France, and the revenue goes on increasing.
Of the Egyptian Financial Question Your Royal Highness will learn all particulars on the spot. Neither that, nor the Herzegovina question are settled at this moment, but we must hope that they are on the eve of being settled.
One of the new features in the French political situation was the recovery by Gambetta of his former influence, and as he was now a person of considerable influence, Sheffield was utilized for the purpose of eliciting his views. The late Mr. George Sheffield, who acted as Lord Lyons's private secretary for over twenty years, was a well-known figure in the political and social world of Paris, and included in his acquaintance most people both there and in London who were worth knowing. Not only did he enjoy much personal popularity, but as he was known to be completely in Lord Lyons's confidence, he was the recipient of much confidential information, and generally believed to be a model of discretion. One of his peculiarities was that, in spite of much practice, he spoke very imperfect French with an atrocious accent, but this circumstance never appeared to prejudice him in any way, and it may incidentally be noted that the possession of what is called a good French accent is a much overrated accomplishment in France itself. Frenchmen rarely wish to listen; they desire to talk themselves and to be listened to; to them, as a rule, a foreigner is a foreigner and nothing more, and whether he speaks French well or ill, they seldom notice and rarely care.
Gambetta, having secured a listener in the person of Sheffield, was no doubt delighted to expound his views on the situation. First of all, speaking on the subject of Bonapartist successes at the elections, he said that Bonapartism would die out as soon as it was realized that a moderate Republic was firmly established. He expressed great delight at the fall of Thiers (Thiers had once described him as a fou furieux), and said that under him no real self-acting Republic could ever have been formed, that it would have fallen to pieces at his death, and indeed that the best thing Thiers could do for the Republic would be to die. For Marshal MacMahon's entourage he had a great dislike, but for the Marshal himself much respect, and he aspired to be Prime Minister under him—a post to which he considered that he was fully entitled, but which the Décazes, Broglie, the Marshal's secretaries and the Maréchale and her friends would do their best to prevent him obtaining. He professed confidence in being able to keep the extreme Radicals in order; said that the Red Flag was as obnoxious to him as the White Flag; that he was not inclined to grant a general amnesty to the Communists, and that he would not agree to the re-establishment of the National Guard. He also professed himself to be in favour of Free Trade, and asserted that the commercial Treaty concluded by Napoleon III. accounted for many of the Bonapartist successes.
Gambetta's aspiration of serving under the Marshal was never fulfilled, the above-mentioned entourage being presumably too strong for him; but the upper classes in France continued to look forward to the future with undiminished apprehension. French capital, reversing the present process, began to pour steadily into England, and it was stated that the rich Radicals were not the last in sending their money abroad.