Paris, Feb. 21, 1879.
I have just received your telegram announcing your concurrence in Waddington's draft instructions to Cairo, and I shall communicate it to him forthwith.
Waddington seemed quite firm on the point of not allowing the Khedive to resume his personal power, and would no doubt be ready to join in any practical steps for that purpose; but in the meantime it may be feared that His Highness is consolidating his resumption of power. Waddington looks upon the whole affair as a simple manœvre of the Khedive to upset the new system of government. It does not in fact seem likely that so arrant a coward would have risked his own precious person, if he had not had a pretty good understanding with the rioters. Public opinion in France would, I think, support Waddington in taking strong measures. There does not seem to be any one but Nubar of position enough to be a Prime Minister of any independence; Waddington seemed fully aware that if the Khedive is present at the council of Ministers, no Egyptian Minister will open his lips.
Godeaux telegraphed last night that order having been restored, the presence of a ship of war at Alexandria might not be necessary, but Waddington thought on the contrary that it would be 'essential in order to produce a salutary impression on the Khedive, and keep him in some check.'
Nubar Pasha was regarded as English and anti-French, and his fall was, therefore, received at Paris with some degree of complacency; but the feeling was not sufficiently strong to make the Government hold out against his restoration to office, should that be considered necessary for the purpose of checking the Khedive, and the tendency was to make no suggestions and to wait for the lead of England, it being understood that both Governments were resolved not to consent to any change of the political system in Egypt.
Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons.
March 1, 1879.
As to Egypt, I gather from your telegram to-day that Waddington looks on our message to Vivian[24] as in the nature of an ultimatum, and he is puzzled what we are to do next if it should be rejected. We do not in the least look on it as an ultimatum, and it is not so phrased. We may well receive either from the Khedive or the Agents some alternative proposal which may be discussed, and perhaps hammered into an acceptable arrangement at least for a time. But in any case our position cannot be worse here than if we had acquiesced at once in the results of the conspiracy against Nubar; while the chances are that it will enable us to arrive at some plan for partially curbing the Khedive, which at all events shall partially disguise the check we have undoubtedly received. The causes are obscure. It is evident there has been imprudence. I wish I could be quite satisfied there has been perfect loyalty.
Writing a day or two later, Lord Salisbury explained that he was in some difficulty, as Mr. Vivian and Mr. Rivers Wilson held different opinions. The former wanted to conciliate the Khedive by not forcing upon him the restoration of Nubar, while Mr. Rivers Wilson strongly insisted upon his return. Lord Salisbury himself was inclined to the latter course because 'otherwise the Khedive will be like a horse who has succeeded in beating his rider, and will never be safe for that rider to mount again,' but eventually decided against it. From the following letter it looks as if the retirement of the hapless British Representative at Tunis was intended as a peace offering to the cause of Anglo-French joint action in Egypt.