Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons.
June 6, 1879.
The recent course of the French newspapers which have the credit of being inspired by Gambetta and Léon Say is certainly a puzzle. Looking over the course of negotiations between us and Waddington on Egypt, I should find it very difficult to say which of the two Governments had pulled the other on, and which had dragged the other back. As far as any important negotiations go, I should say that we had been a shade more in favour of active measures than the other side. The two newspapers in question are evidently well informed; and therefore their assumption that we have prevented the French from acting must be put on for a purpose; what purpose it is difficult to say. The most obvious solution—bearing in mind the English friendships of the two statesmen concerned—is that the whole movement is meant to operate on English internal politics, and not on European politics at all: and this view is supported by the use which has actually been made of the controversy here. The incident is common enough in diplomatic history: but it has always been bitterly resented by the Government which is the subject of that species of attack. But in this case there is some doubt as to how far Waddington is implicated. Nothing is more difficult to deal with than a 'Marionette Government,' because the marionettes are not responsible, and you cannot get at the man who pulls the strings. There is one spot in the diplomatic battlefield—almost the only one—where we have been exposed to risk, and have consequently been anxious—the Balkan Peninsula: and on this we have been systematically opposed by France. Ring, Coutouly and Fournier have played us every kind of trick. But all the time, nothing could have been more unexceptionable than Waddington's language and instructions. So it is with this newspaper warfare. The secondary agents, who are popularly supposed to act from inspiration are undisguisedly hostile. Waddington's demeanour all the time is imperturbably friendly. Is it helplessness, or bad faith? The question is one of considerable practical importance: for if we are to measure the co-operation of France by the action of Fournier and Gambetta, we shall do wisely to retire, gently but effectually, from a perilous partnership. And it is impossible to ignore this aspect of the case in considering the precise line to be pursued in the two pending questions of Greece and Egypt.
Our object in Egypt, ever since we promised some four years ago not to take it, is to see that our own interests are not injured and that French interests receive adequate, but not excessive consideration. If, however, Gambetta means mischief, it may be wise for us to seek the protection of English interests only, and leave the French to take care of themselves. This would be done by pushing forward the other Powers. Their interference would be fatal to Egyptian solvency, and consequently to French bondholders. But it would be as fatal a bar to French preponderance as the plan of duplicating all appointments, and as none of these great Powers are naval, we could look after the Canal just as easily if they were masters in Egypt, as under the present Anglo-French system. If the French are really friends, the Anglo-French system may be maintained in spite of many inconveniences in order to cement that friendship. But if Gambetta and Fournier are to be taken as the directing force in French politics, the Anglo-French system is merely a make-believe, and will only draw us into a succession of crises in which we shall probably be outwitted. This dilemma merits very careful consideration. Greece is a less important and more transitory affair. In order to avoid division in the Congress we went rather further than we thought quite wise; and we have no wish to go further still. Of course, abstractedly, it would be much better that all the Hellenic populations should be under a Hellenic ruler. But Turkey is still a fact of which account must be taken; and the danger of Turkey resisting is very serious. The fact that Greece has not won this territory as prize of war, nor earned it as the consideration of any service done, but is to gain it merely by her skill in singing diplomatic dithyrambics, appears to irritate the Turks intensely. It is not our present policy to adopt a course which shall induce the Sultan to listen to the Russian proposals which are so freely placed before him. We would not therefore, in any case, take a leading part in pressing the cession on him. But we doubt extremely the wisdom of exciting anew the Moslem fanaticism, by demanding a town to which the Albanians attach so much importance as Janina. However, in this question we should have been a good deal influenced by the wishes of France, if we could have thought that by exalting the influence of Fournier we were strengthening a friend. But can we do so?
There was, in reality, no foundation for Lord Salisbury's suspicions that Gambetta and his allies were seeking to interfere in British internal politics. The objectionable articles were written under an erroneous impression that France had been outwitted, and that Mr. Vivian, in pursuance of secret instructions from his Government, was working for the failure of the joint Anglo-French administration in Egypt and for the establishment of exclusive British influence. But as the attacks in the French press mainly took the form of abusing England for not agreeing to energetic proposals made by the French Government, it was a legitimate grievance against M. Waddington that he never took any steps whatever to contradict this perfectly baseless accusation. As for the conduct of French agents who were continually intriguing against their English colleagues, it is probable that M. Waddington was able to exercise little or no control over them, and it has already been mentioned that some of them were in the habit of corresponding directly with Gambetta behind the back of their official chief. Lord Lyons, who naturally was anxious to make things as easy for the French as possible, recommended that the vanity and susceptibility of French diplomatists abroad and of the public at home, should be studied as much as possible, since there was a universal feeling that France was now too strong to play a secondary part anywhere, and that sacrifices on our part were preferable to allowing her to throw herself into the arms of Russia. Lord Salisbury therefore persevered in the difficult task of endeavouring to co-operate cordially with the French Government, and M. Waddington applied himself to elaborating the scheme of Dual Control which was eventually adopted. Meanwhile it had become apparent that, in order to obtain anything like a successful result, the Khedive Ismail must be got rid of somehow, a course which was urged not only by Gambetta, but by the French Agent at Cairo. Joint efforts were made by the French and British Agents to induce him to abdicate in favour of Prince Tewfik, which were seconded by the representations of Germany and Austria; but these were of no avail, and the Gordian knot was not cut until the Sultan suddenly intervened on June 26. On that day a telegram arrived from Constantinople, deposing Ismail by Imperial Iradé, and conferring the Government of Egypt upon his eldest son Prince Tewfik, who was at once proclaimed Khedive without any disturbance of tranquillity.
The action of the Sultan was not only sudden but unexpected, and Lord Salisbury at once took steps to assure the French Government that it was not due to the instigation of Her Majesty's Government.
Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons.
June 26, 1879.