You will not like a despatch I send you, and I am rather sorry to send it. But I do not see how we are to give France carte blanche.
I dislike barking without biting, but if the result of not barking (in contradistinction to all that was done under Louis Philippe and Napoleon, when English remonstrances certainly stopped the French) is the annexation of Tunis, or the creation of the great port of Bizerta impregnable by naval force and neutralizing Malta, we should look rather foolish.
Notwithstanding the present Chauvinism about Tunis, it would not be a sweetmeat for the French to have England, Italy and the Arabs inside and outside Algeria against her.
It is as well that she should not imagine that this is perfectly impossible.
But, of course, I wish to ruffle her as little as possible, and nobody will wrap up the warning of our doctrine as to the Ottoman Empire better than you will.
Undeterred by Lord Granville's just remonstrances and equally undeterred by the Sultan's assertion of his suzerainty claims, the French entered Tunis and occupied the capital on May 11, after little more than a mere promenade. On the following day the Treaty of the Bardo, which practically established a French Protectorate over the country, was extorted from the Bey, and declarations by the French Government made it clear that no intervention, direct or indirect, would be tolerated.
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, May 13, 1881.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire certainly foreshadowed the Tunisian Treaty accurately when he said that it would very much resemble a Protectorate. It is so like one that it would be difficult to point out a difference. The guaranteeing the execution of the Treaties of the European Powers is sufficiently impertinent. As in all these French expeditions, there is a vast amount of dirty pecuniary stockjobbing interests at the bottom, which have been the real motive power.
The whole affair is of very bad augury. It will inspire the French Public with a love of resorting to high-handed proceedings which can be indulged in without any real risk. Gambetta said to Dilke that his Cherbourg speech was the first glass of wine given to the Convalescent France, good for her but somewhat startling to her system. This Tunis expedition is the second. The patient has swallowed it so complacently that she may soon wish for another, and perhaps a stronger stimulant. They got Bismarck's leave for this, and it will perhaps be a long time before they do anything of the kind without his leave. But then he will be sure to push them on to any undertakings which will occupy their minds and their forces, and tend to put them on bad terms with other Powers. And this is disquieting, for there are not wanting all over the globe places and questions in which the French might make themselves very inconvenient and disagreeable to us, and might, if encouraged by Bismarck, come at last to a downright quarrel with us.
Add to this the state of feeling in the English manufacturing districts which is likely to be produced by the Commercial proceedings of the French, and their virulent Protectionism, and the prospect looks gloomy enough.
The actual proceedings of the French in Tunis were in reality of less importance as regards England than the spirit which they betrayed, for their reception by the French public indicated a state of feeling which might have dangerous consequences. The preparations for the expedition were not considered by impartial critics as particularly creditable to the skill or efficiency of the French military administration, and there had been nothing like serious fighting in the short campaign. The question had simply been one of bullying a defenceless ruler, and of carrying on a high-handed policy in the face of Europe. Nevertheless the whole affair was hailed with almost unanimous delight by the French people. Nor, apparently, was this delight diminished by the reflection that the expedition had not been undertaken without the approval and encouragement of the German Government, and that the favour had been acknowledged with almost humiliating gratitude.
Gambetta had represented that his object was to emancipate France from the humiliation of having to consult Bismarck confidentially beforehand upon every step she took, but this humiliating precaution was certainly not neglected in the case of Tunis, and if there had been the slightest suspicion that the expedition would have involved France in any difficulty with Germany, public opinion would at once have declared against it. From the German point of view this was satisfactory enough, but scarcely reassuring as far as other Powers were concerned.
The French had shown that they rejoiced in any high-handed proceedings which did not bring them into collision with Germany, and whilst it was not improbable that their rulers would seek popularity by gratifying this feeling, it seemed not unlikely that the policy pursued by Germany with regard to the Tunis expedition would be persevered in. To disseminate the forces of France and to divert the minds of the French from Alsace and Lorraine by encouraging them to undertake distant enterprises for the gratification of their vanity, was an obvious means of increasing the safety of Germany, and the more such enterprises tended to alienate from France the sympathies of other Powers, the more they would contribute to the security of Germany. Unfortunately there were scattered over the globe, numerous islands and other territories, the annexation of which by France might be prejudicial to English material interests or objectionable to English feeling; and there were, moreover, various countries in which the undue extension of French influence might be dangerous to England, and where France, if tempted or encouraged to resort to arbitrary proceedings, might, without deliberately intending it, become involved in a downright quarrel with England. These considerations made it desirable that especial caution should be exercised in the case of Egypt. The effect of the Tunis expedition upon Egypt had been twofold. On the one hand, it increased Egyptian suspicions of the insincerity and rapacity of European Powers; on the other hand, it increased the reputation of France in Egypt at the expense of the other Powers and of England in particular, and diminished any confidence in being effectively protected from French encroachments. The lesson of the Tunis expedition was obvious; it would clearly be folly, either by withholding the tribute or by any other step to weaken the connexion of Egypt with the Porte, for the French Government had taken elaborate pains to show that in dealing with Tunis it was dealing with an independent Power. This contention had naturally been resisted by the Porte, and there was little difficulty in proving that suzerainty had been effectually established by a Firman of 1871. But the Sultan of Turkey, who in the past had enjoyed the possession of more suzerainties than any other potentate, had seldom derived anything but embarrassment from this particular attribute, and in the case of Tunis it proved to be singularly inconvenient. Encountering no opposition from other Powers, the French flouted the claims of Abdul Hamid, and in order to signify their new position, announced that the French representative would thenceforth take charge of all foreign questions. In spite, however, of the flexibility of the European conscience with regard to the general principle of the Sultan's suzerainty, it was recognized that under certain circumstances that principle must be conscientiously upheld; and it was, therefore, intimated, more or less directly to the French Government, that although the Sultan's suzerainty in Tunis was a negligible quantity, the situation in Tripoli was quite different, and so, in a far greater degree, was that of Egypt.