Paris, June 20, 1882.
I do not hope much from the Conference: certainly I have very little expectation of its forwarding the strong measures which the Alexandria massacres seem to me to call for imperatively.
I think Germany will be very little inclined to urge the despatch of Turkish troops. Bismarck's great object appears to be to keep Freycinet in, and he fears, not without some reason, that when the first Turkish soldier sets his foot in Egypt, Freycinet will fall at Paris.
The Freycinet Ministry would probably be succeeded by a Cabinet in which Gambetta would not actually have a seat, but over which he would exercise very great influence. Bismarck very probably exaggerates the strength of that influence and looks for more direct hostility to Germany than it would really provoke. But he is perhaps right in thinking that, under Gambetta's influence, France would coquet with the Anti-German party in Russia, and would lose no opportunity of fostering enmity to Germany whenever she could find an opening for doing so. At all events, it would be impossible for Germany to feel as much at her ease as she does now, if Gambetta were the virtual director of French policy.
Freycinet's strength lies partly in the disinclination of the nation for anything like what it calls adventures, but mainly in the dread which the present Chamber has of Gambetta, the Scrutin de Liste and a dissolution.
Meanwhile general dissatisfaction with the whole state of things, and despondency do not diminish. People who looked to Gambetta as the man to set things straight are directing their eyes to other quarters, and there is even a sort of revival of Orleanism.
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A few hours after this letter reaches you, you will in all probability receive from me by telegraph the French answer to the proposal to them to concert measures with us for the protection of the Suez Canal. I don't think Freycinet likes the idea of anything which may tend towards sending French troops to Egypt. He seems to me to want to lean on the Conference in the hope that by so doing, he may be able to stand quite still. Strange to say, the Chamber and the public seem to be in the same mood. They like to think that it is more upon England than upon them that the discredit of putting up with the Alexandria massacre and the recent patch up in Egypt would fall. Their present pusillanimity seems so unnatural that I cannot think it will last. Gambetta will rouse them from it, if he has the chance.
They are full of suspicions of designs on our part to seize the Suez Canal with or without the assistance or connivance of Turkey. You will see by a telegram I have just sent, that Freycinet has asked me a question about this. I imagine the French would object very much less to our acting entirely alone than to our acting in any way with the Porte.
The Sultan seems to tell de Noailles all kinds of stories against England and Dufferin. It is not, however, from Freycinet that I hear this.
In Lord Lyons's opinion, the French, at this stage, were quite prepared for England acting alone in Egypt, but he considered that it was most important to be very frank with them, to afford them every opportunity of joining us, but to do it in such a way that other Powers should not be given too much time in which to raise objections.
It was not apparently until June 27, 1882, that the British Government seriously considered the probability of having to employ 'material force' in Egypt, whether alone or in concert with other Powers; but in consequence of the danger of the situation and of the necessity of acting quickly, they then applied to the War Office for information as to what forces were available for an expedition. In view of our alleged military capacity at the present time, it is of interest to learn what the War Office was prepared to do thirty-one years ago. The military authorities stated that they were prepared to embark within twenty-four hours, 3500 infantry, and 500 garrison artillerymen, with a small siege train, from Malta and Gibraltar, with necessary camp equipage and reserves of food and ammunition. These troops could be conveyed in the ships of the Channel Squadron now in the Mediterranean. A force of about 12,000 fighting men, complete in infantry, cavalry, and field artillery, with forty-eight field guns, was also available, to embark from England. The first 5000 of the infantry could sail within a week, and the whole force could leave England in a fortnight from the date of the order, with complete supplies for an army in the field. The force from England would be made up partially by the First Class Army Reserve, and a Brigade was also available to be sent from Bombay to Suez. Such was the purport of a most confidential communication to Lord Granville from the War Office, dated June 27, 1882.
On July 11, the bombardment of Alexandria by the British fleet took place; the departure of the French ships marking, in an unmistakeable form, the refusal of the French Government to incur further responsibility, and foreshadowing the permanent renunciation of the old French position in Egypt.
The news of the Alexandria bombardment, which, owing to the absence of troops for landing, could hardly be described as a very effective operation, was received without much excitement in Paris, and Freycinet stated that the Chamber would certainly not have sanctioned the co-operation of the French fleet. The main point on which sensitiveness was shown was the Suez Canal. The French seemed disposed to resent any landing of English troops alone at Port Said, and to insist, if not on joining with us, on sending a 'lateral' expedition of their own. It was important, therefore, that they should be given a bona fide invitation to join in anything we might determine to do, and the French were accordingly invited by Lord Granville to concert measures at once for the protection of the canal; questions of detail being left to the Conference at Constantinople. Upon the whole the bombardment of Alexandria had tended to improve rather than to impair Anglo-French relations, and the chief danger seemed to lie in the projected Turkish intervention, which would alienate public opinion and provoke strong opposition from Gambetta and his followers. Extraordinary French Naval Credits were voted and Lord Granville appears to have thought that joint action was secured after all, at least as far as the Canal was concerned.
Lord Granville to Lord Lyons.
July 19, 1882.
I wish you and ourselves joy of the renewed entente cordiale. It will not be popular in many quarters here, but it is an immense national advantage, and ought to relieve us from many dangers.
I am not in the least jealous of the dual action in the Canal, though I should prefer its being triangular. But I own I dread it, if we are obliged, as is probable, to intervene in Egypt itself.
I hope they do not think we are pressing them too fast. I believe the Cabinet will settle to send 15,000 men to Malta. If so, I will let you know.