A further advance to freedom was this, that about twenty years after the legislation of the decemvirs, the right of declaring war and peace passed from the curies to the centuries. That the curies originally had this right, we know from Dionysius; yet as the plebeians alone were bound to serve on foot, and the patricians withheld the booty from them, it was natural that the tribunes should have claimed for their order the right of deciding whether they would have war or not; and consequently the veto of the tribunes to a declaration of war is nothing else but a reservation of the rights of the Plebes. If the centuries had carried the resolution, the curies were of course obliged to confirm it; yet this was certainly not always the case, as the proposal originated with the senate, and it is not at all likely that the senate and the curies should not have agreed.
The existence of plebeian senators is now as clear as daylight, and it is expressly stated that P. Licinius Calvus sat in the senate. Whenever therefore an interrex was to be elected, it was no longer the decem primi who met together,—for, they had lost their importance by the admission of the plebeians,—but all the patricians in the whole of the senate. This is what is meant by Patricii coeunt ad Interregem prodendum, and it might have been based even on the laws of the Twelve Tables. One can quite understand that the ancients might have known the laws of the Twelve Tables by heart, and yet not have perceived, that something different was written in them from what was afterwards the rule.
Thus then we have seen, how from the legislation of the decemvirs down to the conquest of the city by the Gauls, the development of free institutions at home steadily kept pace with the expansion of the state abroad; and hence it is manifest that the two were necessarily linked together.
The history of the Italian nations we know almost exclusively through the Romans; and yet that history would in fact be the only means for correctly understanding the foreign relations of Rome, as the account of these is very often not only defective, but altered moreover in a lying spirit. The decline of the state after the expulsion of the kings may have partly arisen from the fermentations at home, and partly from the quarrel with the Latins. Afterwards, however, the spread of the Etruscans in the prime of their strength from the North, and at the same time that of the Sabines and their colonies, exercise their influence. The Romans call the latter Sabellians; for Sabellus is the general adjective-termination corresponding with Sabinus, like Hispanus and Hispellus, Græcus and Græculus, Pœnus and Pœnulus, Romus and Romulus; at a later period only the ending in -lus had a diminutive meaning given it. Sabellus is quite synonymous with Sabinus, except that according to usage, the name of Sabellians is given to the whole nation, and that of Sabines to the inhabitants of the small district. The spread of those nations was therefore the chief cause of the decline of Rome; otherwise the wars of Porsena would not have happened. If the Etruscans had spread in any other direction, and had not the Sabellians, inasmuch as they were pushed on themselves, been obliged to push on others, the Ausonian people also, particularly the Æquians, would not have been driven, as they were, to make conquests.
The period of the greatness of the Etruscans coincides with the middle of the third century of the city, according to a statement bearing the authority of Cato, that the Etruscan colony of Capua or Vulturnum was founded about the year 260, which falls within the time of that war in which the Romans were so hard pressed by the Veientines. At that time, the Etruscans, who by the Greeks are called Tyrrhenians, were the most formidable conquerors; yet a reverse came upon them when the people of Cumæ with the help of Hiero, towards the close of the third century (280), destroyed their naval power. The general fact only of that change can be asserted with certainty; the details of it are, alas! entirely lost to us; a considerable event in the world’s history here lies buried in darkness. About the same period also, their power on the banks of the Tiber is broken. On the other hand, the Sabines in the last half of the third century are often seen as enemies of the Romans; the earlier accounts of victories gained over them by Valerius are utterly apocryphal. Whether they were dangerous to the Romans, we will not decide here: yet undoubtedly wars took place with the Sabines, as well as with all the other people of the neighbourhood, though all the details about them are either fiction or poetry. Towards the end of the third century, however, the history becomes clearer and clearer, and we may discern the traces of the old annals. The last Sabine war is that which Valerius and Horatius victoriously carried on in the first year of the restoration of the consulship; it is told too circumstantially to be credited in all its parts; but certain it is, that from that time, for nearly a hundred and fifty years until Curius, the Sabines waged no war with the Romans. There must have been some very particular reason for this, and I find one in a treaty of which no other trace whatever is left, and in which isopolity was established between the two peoples: that isopolity existed between them, is attested by Servius on Virgil. About the year 310, we find a notice that the people of the Campanians was formed; that is to say, that at Vulturnum or Capua, the Etruscans received Samnites as ἔποικοι among them, and shared with them their territory. This is to us a proof of the advance of the Sabines in those parts, as the Samnites are a Sabine people. The Æquians and Volscians relax in their attacks on Rome; the Sabine wars are at an end; consequently we behold the period when the emigration of the Sabines towards the South leaves off, and the Ausonian mountaineers no more push forward. The Etruscans now at once stand still, which is natural in an oligarchically governed nation: when such a people has once settled down to rest, there is no example of its ever having been aroused again and gained fresh life. Thus we may link together all the facts which are confusedly told by the Romans.
During the time from 306 to 323, wars had almost entirely ceased. The account of the insurrection at Ardea in which the Romans had been called in, has something in it so strange, that we cannot build any thing upon it: it is nothing but a repetition of the story of the enemy’s army being surrounded by Cincinnatus. In the year 323, the war first breaks out again in good earnest. With regard to the Antiates, we do not know whether they took any share in it; as to the Ecetrans, we cannot doubt but that they did. The latter at that time joined the Æquians on the Algidus. Between Velitræ (which was Volscian), Tusculum, and the Alban Mount, the Roman armies, sent against them, lost a battle. A. Postumius Tubertus was therefore appointed dictator. This war is now described in a perfectly historical and accurate manner. Whether there be any truth in the tradition that A. Postumius heightened the power of his imperium on the minds of those who were under his command by his ruthless treatment of his own son, we may leave undiscussed. The more general opinion is this, that Manlius followed his example; From the phrase imperia Manliana no conclusion can be drawn; Livy’s argument against it is at all events worth nothing. Postumius led thither all the forces of the republic and the allies, he gave one army to the consul, and took the other himself: the former was posted on the road to Lanuvium, the latter, on that to Tusculum, below the point at which the two highways crossed each other. The Volscians and Æquians occupied separate camps: to the one the consul, to the other the dictator was opposed, the two hosts being, however, very near each other. The enemy during the night attacked the camp of the consul; in the meanwhile, the dictator, who was prepared for this, sent a detachment to seize the almost abandoned camp of the Volscians, and he himself led the greater part of his army to the help of the consul, and fell upon the enemy’s rear. These last were completely routed, all but one body, which cut its way through under the lead of the brave Vettius Messius.
This battle is one of those which are of importance in the world’s history. It broke the power of the Volscians of Ecetræ, and of the Æquians; the slaughter must have been frightful. The Æquians sued at once for peace, and were granted it for eight years; from that time, they were no more to be dreaded. After this, the Romans spread more and more; the places also which had been taken from them in the former wars by the Volscians and Æquians, were now recovered. Of these there are expressly mentioned, Lavici,[113] formerly one of the great Latin towns, Bolæ or Bola; Velitræ, Circeii, Anxur, Ferentinum, which had formerly been Hernican, and must now have been restored to the Hernicans, as it is always again met with among their places. Thus the Romans had advanced to the frontiers of Latium proper, even as far as under the kings. Moreover, at that time also, Setia, Norba, Cora, Signia, must have been retaken; and, as the Romans and Latins were now no more on an equal footing, they must likewise have come under the rule of the Romans alone. In the country of the Æquians, the Romans advanced as far as the lake Fucinus. The subjugation of the Volscians made it possible for them to carry on the terrible Veientine war. As in consequence of these conquests many indigent persons were provided for, Roman colonies were founded at Lavici and Velitræ, and restored at Circeii: in the latter place it was perhaps a Latin colony.
After a long interval, the agrarian law begins again to give rise to serious discussions in the year 345; before that, in the years between 30 and 40, it is once spoken of, but only slightly. The cause of this silence during the preceding years is not sufficiently explained. Some assignments of colonies indeed take place; but always in common with the Latins and Hernicans, and without any consequences for those who did not wish to give up their Roman home and their rights as citizens. The times of contentedness and discontent in history do not by any means correspond with the growth of political rights, but rather indeed with the stages of general prosperity: when things are decidedly flourishing, man enjoys life without troubling himself much about the state of political affairs. In Germany there was such a period just before the thirty years’ war; every kind of property improved in value, and matters at home went on very quietly: this was also the case in France under Henry IV. Such on the whole was then the condition of Rome; and hence we may perhaps best explain, why it was that for so long a time no violent internal commotions took place there. Yet when in such a state of things new energies have developed themselves, new claims also spring up, which then at once are fiercely urged. And thus it was now with the agrarian law. Hitherto the patricians had with great cunning kept the plebeians out of those honourable offices to which they had a right; often were consuls elected instead of the military tribunes, and these last again with less than their full number. But now decided claims began to be insisted upon. Rome’s humiliation abroad, owing to the wars of the Etruscans and Volscians, had ceased, the city had quickly risen by its conquests to a very high position, and under these circumstances the tribunes raised their voices for the men of their own order. The first occasion for this, the consequences of which must have been much more violent than Livy represents them, was afforded by the conquest of Lavici: a colony was demanded there, but the Roman senate refused it. The question is now no more about the Lex Cassia, but there is a special lex tribunicia agraria brought by the tribunes before the tribes: it was demanded that a division of the ager publicus should be made, and a tax again imposed on the patrician demesne. The latter clause was originally in all the agrarian laws; but the patricians had succeeded in evading their obligations. These warnings had directly no effect beyond this, that colonies of citizens were several times founded: these were exclusively Roman, and therefore called coloniæ Romanæ. After the conquest of Bolæ, an ill-fated military tribune, M. Postumius, had caused all the booty to be sold by auction for the benefit of the publicum (in publicum redigere, for publicum is the separate exchequer of the curies). This excited such an outburst of rage, that the soldiers rose against the quæstor and slew him. The military tribune, who had to judge the case, drove them to such despair, that they mutinied also against him, and stained their hands with his blood; which is the only instance of the kind before the times of Sylla. The senate chose to connive at a deed of which the guilt was but too evident. The consequences of this outbreak must have been very great, though Livy says nothing on the subject; for from that time only it never happens that there are less than six military tribunes, and the election seems to have been now transferred from the centuries to the tribes, as otherwise it would have been very thoughtless in Livy to have spoken of a tribus prærogativa. The curies conferred, as usual, the imperium, after the election had been made.
Rome now turned her arms against Veii, which was about two German miles and a half distant, and nearly one German mile in circumference: its boundary must have reached as far as the Janiculum. This city was a thorn in the side of Rome, and until she had overthrown this rival, she could never be great. Fidenæ, which is called an Etruscan town, but was a Tyrrhenian one, is represented from the earliest times, even under Romulus already, as being involved in war with Rome: it lay one German mile above Rome on the Tiber. It was either in 320 or 329, that the Fidenates rose against the Roman coloni and expelled them. Two wars are related here, according to all appearances put in the wrong place: the detailed account occurs at least once too much; probably it belongs to the year 329. In 320, hostilities may likewise have taken place; this is at all events the time fixed upon by Diodorus, whom we may follow. We must look upon these coloni as a garrison of settlers who had their own hides of land. Three Roman ambassadors appeared at Fidenæ; and the inhabitants were called upon to justify themselves, and to reinstate the coloni. This seemed to them so unreasonable, that they slew the ambassadors, and threw themselves into the arms of the king of Veii, Lars Tolumnius; for all the Etruscan towns had a regal government, the king being elected for life. Tolumnius came across the Tiber to their assistance; and since the Romans, as the conquerors of the Æquians and Volscians, were now formidable to the neighbours, the Capenates and Faliscans, Oscan tribes, who had maintained themselves in those parts against the Tyrrhenians, hastened likewise to help the Fidenates. This host struck terror into the Romans; it lay one mile from Rome, being separated from it by the Anio only. A dictator was appointed, and he chose the military tribune A. Cornelius Cossus as Magister Equitum. The battle was a lucky one, and Cornelius Cossus slew the Veientine king Tolumnius, to whose charge, no doubt unjustly, the murder of the ambassadors was laid. The emperor Augustus with regard to it made the remark to Livy, that Cossus, on the strength of these spolia opima, had taken upon himself consular dignity; for on the armour he had called himself consul. This is a later addition in Livy, which, however, is left quite detached, or otherwise he must have placed the event seven years later. After this victory, Fidenæ was taken and razed to the ground; the ager Fidenas became ager publicus. With the Veientines a truce was made, which was quite seasonable for the Romans, as it enabled them to begin by completely crushing the Æquians and Volscians. Towards the end of the armistice, the Veientines sent to the other Etruscan peoples for aid against the Romans. Yet it was refused them, inasmuch as from another side, on the Apennines, a far more dangerous enemy had appeared, which like a horde of invading Turks destroyed every thing before it, namely the Gauls. The Etruscans advised the Veientines to try by all means to maintain the peace with the Romans: the demands of the latter may, however, have been too high,—perhaps they wanted the sovereignty over Veii, so that the Veientines were obliged to choose war as unavoidable. If we compare the account of the first Veientine war, seventy years before, the Veientines were then supported by the whole power of the Etruscans; but now their only remaining champions are the Capenates[114] and the Faliscans: in one single campaign indeed the people of Tarquinii come to their help. The Cærites were friends with the Romans, and therefore kept neutral: the Etruscans, it is true, were in the ascendant there; yet in the main the population may still have been Tyrrhenian. Rome was obliged to make the strongest efforts when arming herself for this struggle, and was supported in it by the Latins and Hernicans.
The derision with which Florus speaks of the bella suburbana, when saying, De Verulis et Bovillis pudet dicere, sed triumphavimus, is the sneer of a rhetorician, and we cannot find fault with him for finding these events rather uninteresting. Wars indeed which were fought within a narrow field, have not the same claims to our interest as one like that of Hannibal; still it was in these that the powers of Rome developed themselves. We will not treat this Veientine war with contempt, nor yet will we describe it with as much prolixity as Livy does; but we shall give a sketch of it in very brief outlines. To us, the spirit is of importance with which the Romans began it; inasmuch as they undertook it amid difficulties, which under the circumstances were not less than those of the first Punic war, for instance, and it was only by long perseverance that they could hope to bring matters to an issue. A city like Veii, which lay so near, and was so strong, could not be taken but by a blockade or a siege: when the Veientines were too weak in the field, they withdrew within their walls, against which the Romans could do nothing. One was now obliged, either to invest the town and force it to yield by hunger, or if needs be, by works, by mines; or else to try and reduce it by distress, fortifying a place in the neighbourhood (ἐπιτείχισις), as Decelea near Athens, and from thence devastating the country far and wide, and preventing its cultivation, so that the enemy are brought into such a strait of misery that they must strive by every possible means to get out of it. But to do this, inasmuch as they had to fear the neighbouring places, as Capena, Falerii, the Romans had to change their former mode of war. They had until then only undertaken short expeditions during a few of the summer months,—not unseldom but ten to twelve, nay even five to six days, especially in the times of the republic: under the kings it must have been different. There were from the earliest ages certain months of war, in which they mutually ravaged each other’s fields; thus it was among the Greeks, and so it is to this day among the people of Asia. On the frontiers of Georgia, Russia and Persia make war against each other for a couple of months every year; in the laws of Charlemagne the period is fixed during which the people are bound to service. During the intervals, the intercourse was more or less free; the time of the festivals especially was quite free, as, for instance, the common festivals of the Etruscans near the temple of the Voltumna, or that of the Ausonian people near the temple of Feronia. It was only for the stated period that the soldiers could be kept in the field, and as soon as it was over, they dispersed. The means of Rome for keeping up a large force were very much lessened since the Etruscan and Volscian wars: in former times the army was paid from the tithes which the possessors of the ager publicus had to give. But since the ager publicus was lost, every one marched out to war οἰκόσιτος, the men brought their stock of provisions from home, and what they wanted besides they tried to get by foraging: if this could not be done, the army had to return home again. It was owing to this that so very few sieges took place. But as it was now intended to carry on the war in right earnest, and not to lay down their arms until Veii were conquered, the army was to receive pay. This decree was perhaps connected also with a proposition for levying the tithes again from the ager publicus, and thence defraying the expense of the pay. There is some ground for the supposition, that in the earliest times already a stipendium was very generally paid, in a statement that in the census of Servius Tullius the equites received two thousand asses; without doubt, therefore, the pedites also got something. I suppose that it was a hundred asses, whether the war lasted a longer or a shorter time; and that for this sum, the soldier had to find himself in arms and provisions. With such a system wars of conquest were incompatible, as in these the soldier must be entirely kept by the state; and this is the arrangement which was intended, when it is said that the Roman soldiers now first received a stipendium. It would be incorrect to take it for granted that formerly they had nothing given them; but there is a very great difference, between their receiving a small sum at once and their being paid by the day. It may be assumed, that the ærarians, as they were not obliged to serve in war, had always had to pay a war tax for the pedites, as the orbi orbæque had for the equites; for, the plebeian could not have been loaded with the double burthen of serving with his body and with his goods.