The Samnites, as was mentioned before, consisted of four states, each of which had the imperium in its turn. This was an immense disadvantage. Whenever a general was chosen, the hatred and the jealousy there then was among the different leaders may be imagined: if a great man, like Pontius, held the imperium, and if it luckily happened that the other prætors were honest men, great results might be arrived at; but all was changed again the year after. Confederate states always have a heartfelt hatred against each other: thus it is in America; thus it was in the army of the empire, where one general was exceedingly glad, if another, who was his confederate, was beaten. Had the Samnites been unanimous, they would have been more than a match for the Romans; but the latter got the better of them, owing to the perfection of the institutions: for the most varied, and even conflicting elements, were all concentrated by the mere power of the Roman mind. In the practice of warfare, the Samnites were certainly equal to the Romans: according to Sallust, the Romans had adopted from them their arms, and perhaps the whole of their military science; at least, we find in the battles both armies formed quite in the same way, and they fought against each other as equals, which is proved by the accounts of the battles. And here I must give a flat contradiction to general Vaudoncourt, who asserts that the Italian, Spanish, and African nations fought in phalanx: their strength was in the sword. The Italians had cohorts, and in all likelihood used the pila, like the Romans. The Samnites, as it seems, had belonging to them subject commonalties, or dependencies: the country from Frentum to Luceria was either thus dependent, or formed into a canton of its own; but the connexion was so slight, that the inhabitants of Frentum entirely separated themselves in the course of the war. North of the Samnites, was the confederacy of the Marsians, Marrucinians, Vestinians, and Pelignians: of these, the Vestinians were friends to the Samnites; the others were quite neutral, or had even placed themselves under the protection of the Romans. Thus the Samnites were in a very bad plight; but if, as undoubtedly it was their plan, they had carried on the war along the Liris as far as Capua, they could certainly have kept the Romans at bay. The Romans, however, had a far bolder plan. Just as formerly in the Latin war, they described a semicircle round Samnium; but with much greater risk than at that time. The Samnites were intensely hated by the Apulians; the latter, the ruling tribes of whom were Oscan, may have partly overpowered, partly incorporated with themselves, and partly driven out the old Pelasgian inhabitants. The country of Apulia is a basin in the midst of mountains; it is like a theatre. The hills are ranged in the form of a horseshoe, and they likewise belong to Apulia; but the country directly below these mountains is a tableland, exceedingly hot, with a chalky soil, almost like Leon in Spain. They had two chief towns, Arpi and Canusium, both of which ruled over a large territory, and were very jealous of each other. At that time, the Samnites had conquered the eastern mountains of Luceria, and may also have harassed the plain. Tarentum was on their side; the Apulians therefore turned themselves to the Romans, and by their mediation may have gained much. It was a grand resolve, to transport the Roman army into Apulia. There were two roads; one, through the country of the Æquians (who were friendly with the Romans), from Tivoli upwards, by the lake of Celano, and by Sulmona, across the narrow district of Samnium; the other, through the country of the Sabines, in the direction of Reate, Civita Ducale, and through the terrible defiles of Antrodoco (the Interocrea of the ancients), the nature of which is such that a brave people may hold out there for an extraordinary length of time, although they were so disgracefully abandoned by the Neapolitans in 1821; then as far as Pescara on the eastern coast, and thus by an immense way round to Apulia. They may have taken both roads at different times; at first, the former one. Now, as long as the Romans were not sure of the Vestinians, and on the other hand were on friendly terms with the other nations, they might indeed have chosen the road first spoken of; as on the second, the Vestinians were the only one of the four northern Sabellian peoples whose country they were to cross, in order to get to Apulia, whilst they had besides to fight their way through the land of the Frentanians. But if they had chosen the first road, the Marsians and Pelignians would as certainly have withstood them, as the Vestinians on the other; for it was their interest, not to let the Romans advance into Apulia. As the Vestinians are now mentioned as being friendly, it is evident that the army marched by Antrodoco. If the Samnites had been united, they would indeed have made every exertion to support the Vestinians. This was not done, and therefore the Romans overthrew the Vestinians, and reduced them to subjection. They now got a firm footing in Apulia, and thus compelled the northern confederacy to keep on a good understanding with them. It was a great advantage, to be in possession of Apulia. The country of the four Sabellian peoples, and also the territories of the northern Samnites, Pentrians, Bovians, and even the Frentanians, are mountain districts and pasture lands on the Abruzzi; during winter, these tracts are covered with snow, and it is then impossible to keep the sheep there; they are therefore sent during that season into Apulia, which is then clothed with fine and excellent grass; in the spring, the shepherd again takes them to the mountains. These broad features, which belong to Nature herself, are necessarily lasting, and were the same in times of old as they are now. That in those days already there was much sheep-breeding, is proved by the wool-dying manufactories of Tarentum. When the Romans were now in possession of Apulia, they protected the pastures of their allies, and consequently obliged the Marsians, Pelignians, and others, to come to friendly terms with them: they also harassed the northern Samnites. This was therefore no blind undertaking, but one which was completely justified by the nature of the countries: the Romans for all that would not run the hazard, until they saw that it could not be avoided.
Another alliance, besides the Apulian, the Romans had with the Lucanians. These are called a Samnite colony, which is to be understood in a different meaning, from that in which a town-colony is so called: the Lucanians are most likely an offshoot of the Samnites, which had severed itself from the mainstock. They were dwelling amidst Œnotrians (the old Pelasgians), and Greeks; and even as the Samnites were Sabellians become Oscan, so were the Lucanians Œnotrians become Samnite. They had spread, from about Ol. 80, since the downfall of Sybaris, which opened these districts to the Italic peoples: in what relation the Lucanians and Samnites had formerly stood to each other, is uncertain. The territory of Lucania is larger than that of Samnium, yet there is never a corresponding proportion between the power of the two peoples; never, as we see from the rolls of the census, were the Lucanians strong, not even in later times, when the Samnites had been already considerably weakened; the number of their capita did not amount to any thing like half that of the Samnites, not to so many as thirty thousand. This shows, that the greater part of the Lucanian population had no share in the sovereignty: in single places only, as, for instance, in Petelia, it was more concentrated; it was a country rent by factions. A portion of them resolved upon uniting with the Romans; this must, however, have been a small majority, as a revolution soon followed, in consequence of which this league was broken up, and the Samnites were called in to garrison their strongholds. This alliance of the Lucanians and Romans is known to us from Livy: we are, however, considerably to modify what he states besides, that the Tarentines, frightened at the power of the Romans, had persuaded the chief men among the Lucanians to tell the people, that their ambassadors had been cruelly treated by the Romans; and that the Lucanians, exasperated by it, had thrown themselves into the arms of the Samnites. This is the same tale as that which is told of Zopyrus and of Sextus Tarquin. Traitorous party spirit is in Greece also but too prevalent in the later ages. The Samnites are therefore masters of Lucania, and turn its resources in men and money to their own account.
These wars, as far as we are able to get a view of them, are from the very beginning exceedingly interesting, owing to the resolution, skill, and steadiness with which the combats were fought. On both sides, it was a struggle for life and death; they aimed at each other’s hearts, like two good swordsmen in a duel: if Hannibal, after the battle of Cannæ, had shown the same determination; if he had not been too cautious, but had pushed his thrusts against the heart of Rome, even as the Samnites did, he would have won. Both parties reckoned much on the discontent of each other’s dependents. The Samnites had their frontier above Sora in the Abruzzi, Casinum being their chief town: from that mountain-range they seem always to have chosen the direction of their operations; from thence they also acted on the offensive, and in fact with the express purpose of stirring up a rising of the Latin peoples, who had been still independent so late as fourteen years before, and were therefore ripe for revolt. The traces of this partial insurrection are slurred over in Livy, notwithstanding which they may still be found,—especially those of a rising at Tusculum in conjunction with Privernum and Velitræ: but the Romans always put down these outbreaks, and in consequence, many of these Latin towns were ruined. All this is only to be guessed from detached intimations; for instance, from the motion of a tribune utterly to destroy the Tusculans, which, however, was not carried. To this we must also refer the story which sounds so strange in Livy, of people suddenly flocking together at night, as if the enemy were in the city; for as the armies were far removed, it was quite natural, that a rising of the Latins should spread terror to the very walls of Rome.
The Samnites tried to advance immediately to Rome by the Apennines, at the sources of the Liris; at the same time, the Romans passed the Vulturnus, and endeavoured to make an inroad into Campania by Saticula, and from thence into Samnium. Both parties little heeded where the blows of the enemy might fall, if they could only successfully deal their own. They both of them found their advantage in this mode of warfare; the Romans, that while the Samnites only laid waste the territory of the allies, they for their part struck at the Samnites themselves; on the other hand, this could not have had any thing like the mischievous effect which the devastations of the Samnites had upon the feelings of the allies. We merely know by the greatest chance, that the seat of that war was in the neighbourhood of the present abbey of Subiaco, on the frontier of the Æquians and Hernicans, in the high mountain-ridges which divide the valleys of the Liris and the Anio. Livy says that they faced each other near Imbrinium in Samnium; but even the Italian commentators, as Sigonius and Hermolaus Barbarus, rightly take this to be Imbrivium, and recognise it as the place, in the country of the Æquians, near Subiaco, from which the emperor Claudius led his aqueducts. Livy shows such little proof of care and exactness, that we cannot but decide for this emendation, which is recommended not only by probability, but even by necessity. The Samnites took up a strong position here; and thus cut off the Romans from the road which leads by Sora to Apulia, so that they were obliged to keep up their communication by Antrodoco: the spot is marked out with all the accuracy of a military history. The state of things was so serious, that in the third year of the war the Romans made L. Papirius Cursor dictator. The consul L. Furius Camillus was ill. Papirius Cursor is still remembered as one of the greatest generals of his nation; by his side was M. Valerius Corvus, who was of the same age with him, and Q. Fabius Maximus, who was younger, but yet was in all likelihood outlived by Valerius Corvus.
M. Valerius Corvus was the most popular man of his day: in politics he stands quite aloof from all party strife. He loved the people, and was beloved by it; the soldiers had unbounded confidence in him, and when he was among them in his leisure hours, it was just as if he were in his own family; he shared with them their toils and their amusements: his popularity was the heir-loom of the Valerii. It was this character which enabled him to allay the insurrection in the year 413. L. Papirius Cursor was a rough man, a downright savage, who had something in him of the nature of Suwarow, except that the latter was certainly far more educated: he had huge bodily strength, and kept it in condition by eating and drinking by rule, like the athletes, as did the emperor Maximin. He teased and worried the soldiers by his terrible strictness, making their duty as irksome as he could, in the belief that by this means they were rendered more efficient. He was just as harsh towards the officers and commanders of the allies: it was his pleasure, to strike terror into all about him; he never pardoned the least neglect, and he was capable of inflicting corporal and even capital punishment for it. He was hated; yet at the same time he was regarded as quite an unearthly being, as an immense treasure for the republic, as a last refuge in time of need, Q. Fabius was of a different stamp from Valerius Corvus; he seems not to have had such a cheerful, loving, joyous soul: yet for all that, he was comis, being a kind master, a mild and wise man. His wisdom and good luck were much reckoned on; Papirius had not so much success. He was also most popular; yet not in the same way as M. Valerius, but rather, it would seem, from a feeling of respect than of love. He was looked upon as the first man of his age, and therefore the surname of Maximus was given him; he was no less a statesman than a general, being as it were a point of union for all parties. He was an aristocrat by birth and position; yet a most judicious one: he was able in many cases, when an umpire, to bend the stubbornness of the oligarchy. We see from his life, how earnest he was in every thing; how he could control his own feelings, and sacrifice them for the common good.
In the neighbourhood of Subiaco, the dictator faced the Samnites; nevertheless there was also an army stationed near Capua, to guard against the inroads into Campania. The dictator had remarked that the auspices had not been observed correctly; nor could he take new ones where he was, as the auspices were different in different places, some being good in Rome, others in the country of the enemy; he had therefore to go back to Rome, that he might take fresh ones in the Capitol. From this, or some other reason, he went to Rome, leaving the Magister Equitum, Q. Fabius, in command, with express orders not to act on the offensive. This prohibition may have been well grounded; but perhaps also he did not trust the younger man, or he may indeed have grudged him everything. The Samnites very soon discovered that the Romans were not allowed to fight, and they teased and harassed them the more; besides which, the inactivity of the Romans was dangerous, as the Latin peoples in their rear were ever ready to rise, if the Samnites would only lend a helping hand. On this, Fabius, with all the confidence of youth, resolved upon giving battle to the Samnites, and he won the victory; according to some, he even conquered twice. As the prohibition was looked upon in the army to have been an act of mere envy and jealousy, the Magister Equitum sent in his report, not to Papirius Cursor, but to the senate direct. The booty he burned, to deprive the dictator of the spolia for his triumph. In the city, people were certainly not less alarmed at the consequences, than they were glad of the victory. Papirius immediately returned to the camp, his quick journey being also a proof that the army could not have been far from Rome. Surrounded by his twenty-four lictors, he summoned the Magister Equitum before his tribunal, and only asked him whether he had fought against his orders, or no? Everything was in readiness for the execution of Fabius; but the whole army put on such a threatening attitude, and men’s minds were so roused against Papirius, that he himself began to waver, and at the earnest prayer of the soldiers granted a respite until the following day. During the night, Fabius fled to Rome, and there he betook himself to the senate. But when the senators were met together, and Fabius was in the midst of them, Papirius himself made his appearance and wanted his victim. The senate showed more than once in after days, that it was not fond of Fabius; but at that time, the sympathy for the youthful hero was still general, and it was resolved to protect him. Papirius did not dare to use force. The matter indeed was not now so desperate, as Livy describes it; for the patricians had the free right to appeal from the dictator to the curies, a fact which we know from Verrius Flaccus. What Livy tells us about calling upon the tribunes, is either a mistake arising from the expression provocatio ad populum, or it meant the confirmation of the decree of the curies by the Plebes; so that, of course, the whole people had granted an amnesty to Fabius. Even then, Papirius was unwilling to give way; but the resolution of the two orders snatched his victim from him. That he was reconciled to Fabius, as Livy makes out, is impossible: Fabius laid down his office, and Papirius took another Magister Equitum. He returned, loaded with hatred, to the army; and to this circumstance the unlucky issue of a battle is attributed. This happened in the year 430.
Fabius is said to have gained the victory very much owing to his having ordered the frena to be taken off the horses, and the cavalry to rush in this manner against the enemy. If we take frena to mean bridles, this would indeed be absurd: the thing may, however, be explained from the bits found at Pompeii and Herculanum. The curbs and bits which the Romans use for their horses were exceedingly cruel; so that if, instead of these, they had now put on the more humane ones of the Greeks, which Xenophon describes, the horses, being thus eased, would naturally have pressed forward full of spirit and energy.
The war took such a turn, that the Samnites were in great distress, and repented of having taken up arms. They obtained a truce on engaging to furnish a sum for the pay and clothing of the Roman troops; and then began to treat, believing that they might have a peace, if they agreed to the first demands of the Romans, which were the occupation of Naples, and the recognition of the colony of Fregellæ. But there is no doubt that the Romans now put forth very different claims: they also required the evacuation of Lucania and Apulia, stipulating, as they always did in such a peace, that the other party should place themselves in the same disadvantage, as if they had been quite beaten. This was one of the maxims which made the Romans a great nation. The peace was not brought about: the war was renewed; and the Romans now carried it on with great vigour. Fabius became consul, led his army into Apulia, and conquered Luceria and many other towns of the Apulians and Samnites; his repeated victories forced the Samnites to retreat from Fregellæ, and to make a stand against him. The other Roman army also had good luck; so that the whole of the following campaign was crowned with success, and the Samnites at length came to the resolution of seeking for peace at any price. They now turned their wrath against the man who was looked upon as the life and soul of the whole campaign, Papius Brutulus, of the very clan from which, two hundred years afterwards, C. Papius Mutilus sprang. The Romans again granted a truce, for which the Samnites had to make great sacrifices. We are indebted to the excerpta from Dionysius for our knowledge of these transactions. The Samnites offered to do all they could; they would punish those who had been the authors of the hostilities. The Romans, however, had indeed demanded the giving up of Papius Brutulus. The resolution which the latter conceived, shows him to have been a great man: he had lived for his people, so long as they wanted to be great; life had no more value for him when their hearts had failed them, and he made away with it, that his fellow-citizens might be able to say, that the author of the war had atoned for it. This is one of the greatest deeds which were done of old, greater than that of Cato. The Samnites, to their shame, sent his corpse to Rome.—As the Romans had the first time already gone further than in their demands before the war; so they now again went beyond the conditions which had then been made, and asked the Samnites to acknowledge their hegemony, as Appian expresses it, that is, majestatem populi Romani comiter colere. The ambassadors of the Samnites had appealed to their clemency; they had declared that they would agree to everything, if the Romans really would not abate any of their pretensions; but as for the acknowledging of Rome’s supremacy, that alone they could not decree; it was only their community which could. The consequence of such an acknowledgment of supremacy was a sort of pupilage with regard to other states: the Samnites would therefore have had to give up their alliance with the Tarentines and the Lucanians; Roman commissioners would have had the power of visiting them, and enquiring whether the treaty was duly kept. This was more than the Samnite people would put up with. They had now lost their leader, had suffered shame, had suppliantly prayed for an honourable peace, and all in vain: it was resolved with one consent, to die rather, than to make such a peace. Thus the Romans had this time carried their maxim too far. The consequence of this was, that the Samnites exerted their might to the utmost, and actually began the war in Apulia on account of the importance of that country in a physical point of view. Luceria, with the Roman garrison, was besieged by the Samnites: it had originally been a town of their own, but had been taken from them by the Apulians. The Romans also now changed their mode of warfare: as the chief force of the Samnites was stationed at Apulia, they too resolved to concentrate the whole of their might. They had already before that betaken themselves to Apulia, and indeed had gained allies there, but without acquiring a firm footing. They were therefore obliged to force their way through the Vestinians; yet this they deemed hazardous, as they ran the risk of getting likewise into a war with the Marsians, Marrucinians and Pelignians. But here the unhappy jealousy which these had of the people of their own race would have come to their aid; and even other nations also to whom the Romans were obnoxious, such as the Æquians, and the Campanians themselves, wished well to the Samnites, but did not want them to gain a decisive victory. These petty nations imagined that the Romans and the Samnites would wear themselves out against each other, and that this would be an advantage to them. At the tidings that Luceria was besieged, the two consular armies forthwith prepared to march into Apulia, and resolved upon taking the nearest road; that is to say, they intended to cut their way through Samnium, the Samnites having become contemptible to them. The way they went was perhaps the same as that by which A. Cornelius Cossus had marched, being the road from Capua to Luceria by Beneventum. The general of the Samnites, C. Pontius, one of the greatest men of ancient times, had foreseen this. He left before Luceria just what was necessary for the blockade, and encamped on the road by which the Romans were advancing near Caudium, the capital of the Caudine Samnites: this town afterwards vanished from the face of the earth, in order that the shame of the Romans might be buried. The Romans descended by a defile into the valley; on the other side, another defile rose high and steep: having nowhere encountered any enemy, as yet, they marched on quite carelessly. The army had come down the first defile in a long column; but when the head of it had begun to ascend the opposite pass, they found it blocked up with stones and felled trees. It is probable that the Samnites had prepared themselves in the same way as the Tyrolese in 1809, who fastened large trunks of trees with ropes, and laid masses of rock behind them, so that when the enemy were in the valley, they cut the ropes, and the rocks crushed the army. With this the mention of the stones in Livy seems to tally. According to his account, the Romans then behaved in the most cowardly manner: he says that they endeavoured to retrace their steps, but that when they found that the defile on the other side was now likewise stopped up, they sat down and encamped in the valley. This is absurd. Those who are thus hemmed in, try and cut their way through like madmen. Surely a great battle was fought and lost by the Romans, as Cicero tells us in plain words (cum male apud Caudium pugnatum esset); Appian, of whom we have here only fragments, says that those superior officers, who besides the consuls had remained alive, signed the peace. He mentions twelve tribunes; but, as in a complete army there were twenty-four, it would follow that twelve had been killed, or at least, badly wounded. Zonaras also speaks of a lost battle, and of the taking of the camp. Livy, with incomprehensible vanity, positively insists upon it as a fact that no battle was fought near Caudium: he describes the Romans as cowards, in order to disguise the disgrace of a defeat. What further happened, is shrouded in great darkness; the results of my inquiries are as follows. According to Livy’s story, the consuls merely promised that the Roman people would make peace, and nothing had been done besides; it is evidently his wish not to represent the Romans as faithless; he states, that half of the Roman knights (six hundred) were given as hostages. But the true state of the case is quite different. Appian, who borrows from Dionysius, tells us that the hostages had been given, ἕως ἅπας ὁ δῆμος τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπιψηφίσῃ, that is to say, until the curies and the tribes had decreed the peace. The conditions were reasonable. C. Pontius, in the heyday of his success, not knowing how to make use of it, invited his father, Herennius Pontius, a friend of the people of Tarentum, and of Archytas[141] in particular, to the camp, that he might ask him how he should treat the Romans. The old man answered that he ought to butcher them all; and when the son replied, that this would indeed be too barbarous, he is said to have been told by his father, that he ought to let them go, without touching a hair of their head, so as to lay the Romans under obligations by this kindness. But the Romans would at that time have laughed at such εὐήθεια. This account can only have had this meaning. Herennius wanted to say, “The only thing to be done is extermination. How can you ask? If you ask, why then, dismiss them at once!” But Pontius was a highminded man, he had a strong Italian feeling, and it was impossible for him to annihilate the army of a people which protected Italy against invading foreigners, particularly the Gauls and Carthaginians: he doubted not but that a lasting peace might be made with the Romans, if one could only lay hold of them. By great good luck, we know the conditions of it from the fragments. The consuls and all the commanders pledged their word of honour that the people would ratify the peace; until then, the knights, who were sons of the first families, remained as hostages. The status quo ante bellum was to be restored; all the places which had belonged to the Samnites were to be given back to them; the colonists were also of course to be withdrawn from Fregellæ; and the old alliance of equality between the Romans and Samnites was to be renewed. There is no trace of any indemnification in money, or of disgraceful conditions: the Romans might themselves march off; but they were to leave their arms, all their stores, their military chest, their baggage, their waggons, horses, &c., behind. This is the common Italian international law. That the Romans passed under the yoke, is related as a superbia of the Samnites; but this is quite accounted for by the circumstances of the case. The Samnites had fairly surrounded them with pallisades, some of which were now pulled down, and a gateway made of them, through which the Romans passed singly and unarmed. This had often been done, and was a thing of course. Pontius, however, was so far from being cruel, that, according to Appian, he gave the Romans, when they marched off, beasts of burthen for their wounded, and provisions enough to last for their journey home. Never was a great victory used more fairly. Now comes the question, whether the peace was ratified by the Roman people; and thereupon is based such a serious charge, that Livy throws it into the shade. The proof of the ratification is the fact that the tribunes of the people were given up to the Samnites; they either had confirmed the resolution of the curies concerning the peace, or they had brought a motion in due form before the Plebes. A tribune of the people could not pass one night outside the precincts of the city; so that they could not have been among those, who, being with the army, had settled the peace. The only other possible way of accounting for it would be, that the tribune had by an express resolution been sent to the army; yet even this could only be supposed to have taken place with a view to the ratification. The peace was necessary, in order to get back the hostages. For this reason, the perfidy was committed of ratifying the peace, which was afterwards to be broken under the pretext, that the consuls and the tribunes who had moved it before the senate and the Plebes, were traitors, and should be given up to the Samnites. This is the most infamous transaction in the Roman history, and the Romans had indeed good reasons to disguise it. To slur it over, Livy has falsified the account of the whole of the following year, stating, that the Romans had then recovered the hostages at the conquest of Luceria; for in such a violation of the peace they would certainly have been killed long before. The peace is also plainly to be seen from its consequences: the next year, we find the Samnites in possession of Luceria and Fregellæ. We are indeed told that the latter was conquered; yet this may be false, or the colonists were not willing to relinquish their abodes, and the Romans left the Samnites at liberty to make the conquest. At all events, they got possession of the place, which was of great importance in case of the war breaking out anew. Fregellæ covers the Latin road which leads from Tusculum through the country of the Hernicans to the upper Liris and Campania: in this manner, the Romans had now only the road by Terracina, Lautulæ, and the lower Liris, near Minturnæ; moreover, if a Roman army was posted in Campania, and another marched by Subiaco to Apulia, the communication between the two hosts was thus cut off. Still more important was the occupation afterwards of Sora by the Samnites; as well for the reasons just mentioned, as because they thereby acquired a base for their operations. The disaster at Caudium dates from the year 433 according to Cato. Here ends the first period of this war.[142]
The Romans now cancelled the peace, giving up to the Samnites the consuls and the other commanders who had sworn to it. By doing this, they strove to free themselves from the penalty of perjury; and it was with this view perhaps, that they had even the hypocrisy to cause the resolution concerning the peace to be passed by the tribes, and not by the centuries, so as to exclude the auguries, and to withdraw the case from the cognisance of the sacred law. Livy, on the giving up of the tribunes, takes the opportunity of making a most silly declamation. They, not less than the consuls, were to meet their fate; and when so deep was the disgrace of their nation, they could hardly look upon this as such a great calamity. Moreover, we are told that the consul Postumius had kicked the fetialis who is said to have given him up to the Caudinians, with the remark, that the Romans might now carry on the war with justice, as he was a Samnite citizen, and had violated the international laws. This sounds quite absurd; yet the thing is possible. We know from Velleius Paterculus, that isopolity had been concluded with part of the Samnites before the war; perhaps, they were these very Caudinians, and as now, on being exiled, every Roman might assume the right of citizenship in such a state, Postumius, according to the forms of international law, might have claimed the right of citizenship among them for himself. By means of such a detestable farce, he thinks to call down the vengeance of heaven upon the Samnites. However this may be, the peace was faithlessly broken; in opposition to which the generosity of C. Pontius stands out in noble contrast, who let all the prisoners go free, saying, that in that case the Romans ought to send all the legions back to Caudium, that the affair might be restored in integrum; individuals were not his enemies. This shows C. Pontius to have been an extraordinary man, and the Samnites a people of high moral feeling.
The Samnites maintained great advantages, although not any lasting ones; the Romans, on the other hand, made immense exertions, and fell back upon their former plan of operations in attacking Samnium on the side of Apulia, and on the western frontier. Q. Publilius Philo and L. Papirius Cursor became consuls. The latter went to Apulia; the former is said to have successfully given battle again on the road which had been so disastrous in 433, and to have fought his way through to Papirius, who was stationed near Arpi. This is not very likely; yet we cannot decide on it. The Romans took up a position at Arpi, which was friendly to them, and from thence besieged Luceria. There, it is stated, Pontius was shut up with seven thousand Samnites, and the six hundred hostages; being obliged to capitulate, he had to pass under the yoke. This account is evidently a mere figment of vanity.