Although this campaign ended without any lasting evil consequences for the Romans, yet they were very much weakened; the number of prisoners taken by Pyrrhus was far greater than at the battle of Heraclea. They therefore sent an embassy to treat about the ransom of these, or to exchange them for Tarentines and Italians. It was then that the celebrated conversation between Fabricius and Pyrrhus took place, which certainly the Romans have not been the first to record. Timæus has written a special work on the war of Pyrrhus; Pyrrhus himself left memoirs behind him, and from these, most likely, the accounts we have are derived: they show what a high opinion the Greeks had of the Romans. The embassy was unsuccessful; but Pyrrhus, owing to the greatness of his mind, and also to make an impression upon a people like the Romans, gave leave to the prisoners to go to Rome for the Saturnalia, on their taking an oath that they would return after the feast was ended. It is asserted that no man dared to break his oath, and also that the senate and consuls issued a strict edict against it. On both sides, this act affords a fine proof of the feelings of that age, and on the whole, the war, from the mutual respect of the combatants, is one of the finest in history; for although both parties fought for life and death, they yet carried it on with kindliness for each other. The embassy of Fabricius, Rufinus, and Dolabella, and the account of how Pyrrhus tried to get Fabricius to stay with him, and even to share his kingdom, has passed into an infinite number of moralizing books. I certainly believe in the fact that the king wanted to make Fabricius his friend and companion; the story tallies so exactly with Pyrrhus’ character, that we cannot but take it for true, though the details are flourishes of the rhetors, particularly of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. It is one of the traits of genius in Pyrrhus, that he had become an enthusiastic admirer of the Romans: he courted their friendship. Although we must give up some of the actions of his life as unjust, yet his whole soul is so great and noble, that we do not know of any period of history on which one may dwell with greater pleasure. He was desirous of peace, but of a reasonable one for his Italian allies, whom he did not choose to abandon.
But the peace was not obtained. Pyrrhus now saw very clearly, that he could not effect anything by such thrusts against the heart of Rome: the strongholds in Apulia—Venusia and Luceria—had to be wrested from the enemy. This was the object of the campaign which followed. In the meanwhile, an event fell out which made the war still more difficult for him, and did not allow him to draw any fresh reinforcements from Macedon. This was the invasion of that kingdom by the Gauls, which was fatal to Ptolemy Ceraunus by whom he had been hitherto supported. With his Italian allies also, he must have had some differences; so that he now carried on the war with nothing like the forces which he had before. The Romans with both their armies were in Apulia; that Pyrrhus was besieging a town there when one of the armies came up, is mentioned, but not the name of the place: very likely it was Venusia. Here follows the battle near Asculum, the only incident which we know of this year’s campaign, the different accounts of which in Plutarch are most perplexing: that of Hieronymus of Cardia, whose sources were Pyrrhus’ own memoirs, must be our guide. On the first day, there was a skirmish between the two armies, in which the Romans were afraid to go down into the plain, lest they should be exposed to the elephants and cavalry. As the phalanx with the sarissæ would have had to fight at great disadvantage on broken ground, Pyrrhus, with great skill, forced his enemy to take a position which was favourable to him; and here the Romans were beaten, and are said to have lost seven thousand men. Yet they were so near their camp, and had so well fortified it, that they retired to it in perfect order: it was not an overthrow, but merely a lost battle. It seems also that the Apulians in Pyrrhus’ army stopped the course of the victory; for when the Romans were beginning to fall back, they plundered the camp of their own allies, so that it was necessary to send troops to check them. That Pyrrhus did not gain anything beyond the victory, was already the same to him as a defeat. In the meanwhile, the winter was now setting in: among the Romans, the confident hope of victory was on the increase, whereas Pyrrhus had no more prospects. He could not recruit his own troops, as the Gauls were advancing into Macedon, and threatening the frontiers of Epirus; his kingdom was very limited, and his subjects displayed the most decided unwillingness to go and serve beyond the sea to gratify his ambition, when the barbarians were already showing themselves at their borders. Nor had he any trust in the Italians: to control them, he alternately placed an Italian moveable cohort which fought with the pilum, and a solid battalion of the phalanx,—a plan which may have been better in theory than it turned out to be in practice. That he had this system, is evident from Polybius; he employed it near Beneventum, perhaps also at Asculum.
The Romans, in all likelihood, had for some time reduced the places on the Liris which had fallen away: public opinion declared for them in the whole of Italy. On both sides, negotiations were attempted. The Romans wished to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy, because its conquest was now sure; Pyrrhus, whose love of roving had been stirred, and who therefore longed to give up the enterprise, made the Romans repeated offers, to which, however, they would not listen so long as any foreign troops had a footing on Italian ground. Now we have new Roman consuls, one of whom was Fabricius. To this time belongs the story of a noble Epirote, or the physician, or cupbearer of Pyrrhus (the name also varies greatly, Timochares, Nicias, &c., being written), having offered the Roman consuls to poison the king. The thing is not incredible in itself; but it is so differently told in all the versions, that it cannot possibly have been publicly known. It seems to me to have been nothing else but a preconcerted farce, which Pyrrhus had got up, that he might have a pretext for retreating from Italy. One could hardly suppose this, had not something like it happened in modern times: the negotiation between Napoleon and Fox in the year 1806, is a case in point. They wanted to conclude a truce: Pyrrhus, when the Romans gave him up that physician, set all the Roman prisoners free without any ransom; and they, on their side, probably sent him an equal number of Tarentines and Italians. Pyrrhus now declared to his allies, that in the rich country of Sicily, which received him with open arms, he would find the means of aiding them effectually. Thus he now obtained from the Romans an advantageous truce. The latter did not, however, give up the right of continuing the war against the Italians: unfortunate Samnium was left to its fate. Pyrrhus had been in Italy two years and two months; in Sicily he remained until the fourth year.
The Greek population of Sicily had, owing to the death of Agathocles, been rent into factions. Tyrants dismembered the island; the Carthaginians also were spreading over it; and the Mamertines, who were Oscan mercenaries, had treacherously seized upon Messana. Pyrrhus was looked upon as a deliverer, especially as he had married Lanassa, a daughter of Agathocles: his son, whom he brought with him, received homage at Syracuse as king. He drove out the Carthaginians from every place but the impregnable stronghold of Lilybæum, and kept the Mamertines closely shut up within their walls. His friend Cineas must then have been already dead, as we find him surrounded by other men, who were his evil geniuses, and led him on to perdition. His own sound sense inclined him to make peace with the Carthaginians on splendid terms,—they wanted to keep Lilybæum only; but the cowardly Siceliotes would not do this, as they believed that they would not be at all better off, if the Carthaginians still remained in any part of the island. Their condition would, however, have been very much improved. Pyrrhus had conquered the Mamertines, and united the whole of Sicily under the settled rule of an Æacidas. But he now yielded to these unhappy counsels, which was so much the worse for him, as he was wanting in perseverance. The siege of Lilybæum was an immense undertaking; the fortifications of that town were one of the wonders of the ancient world, and the fleet of the Carthaginians was ever bringing fresh troops and provisions. The end of all this was, that Pyrrhus had to raise the siege. He thus lost his credit with the fickle Siceliotes, and was beguiled into tyrannical measures; so that it was good news to him when the Italian allies entreated him to return at any rate, as otherwise they would be forced by the Romans to make a most disadvantageous peace. He could not cross the strait, as the Mamertines were masters of Messana, and a mutinous Campanian legion had Rhegium; but he landed near Locri. While on his passage, he was attacked by the Carthaginian fleet, which destroyed very many of his ships; and having now scarcely saved any thing of the treasures which he had brought with him from Sicily, he arrived very much reduced in men and in money.
During his absence of more than three years, the Romans had carried on the war with the utmost cruelty. The inhabitants, as was the case in the last years of the Spanish war, could only form guerillas, which did much harm to the enemy’s army, but were unable to stand against it in a pitched battle: they were therefore always beaten. I shall not now speak of the single places which were destroyed at that time: old Croton, which was twelve (Italian) miles in circumference, now received its deathblow, and was entirely bereft of its population; the enemy took one town after another, and the country became a wilderness. Pyrrhus returned in the year 477, and restored his army in the most wonderful way. He had many old soldiers from the army of Agathocles, deserters also from the Carthaginians, and others; he now called upon the Tarentines and all the Italians: his army—but most likely this is an exaggeration—is said to have amounted to eighty thousand men. He encamped near Taurasia, not far from Beneventum, being opposed by Curius, who, it seems, had only one army. Pyrrhus was now already disheartened; he had lost all faith in his invincibility; dark forebodings and dreams haunted him;—not that he had entirely lost courage, but his spirit was no more what it had once been. His dispositions for attacking Curius were beautiful; too much, however, was left in them to chance, and his luck had forsaken him. His plan was, that a large body should go round the Roman camp, which was on the side of a hill, and storm it from above at day break, whilst he, at the same time, attacked it from below. But as in night marches people always arrive later than is calculated, the troops which had been sent, lost their way; the king was waiting for the preconcerted signal for him to advance while it was still night, and before it appeared, it became broad day. The Romans then learned that there were enemies behind them on the mountains; on which they quickly formed, and the camp was easily defended, whilst the main body faced the army of Pyrrhus. As they were now already trained to fight against elephants, they took burning arrows wrapped round with tow, which, when shot with sufficient force, penetrated into the hide of the beast with such friction, that the oakum and the pitch caught fire, and maddened it: they had tried this already at Ascalum, and they now practised it on a far larger scale. One dam, in particular, whose young one was wounded, became furious, and in her rage turned against her own masters. The Epirotes were overpowered, the phalanx utterly broken, and the rout complete; even the camp could not be maintained: Pyrrhus retired to Tarentum. The Romans, besides their other booty, had taken eight elephants. The affair was now decided. Pyrrhus’ only thought was to abandon the whole undertaking; yet he did not wish entirely to give up what he possessed in Italy. He therefore left Milo behind in Tarentum with a considerable force, which was strong enough to keep the enemy from a siege, but was a dreadful nuisance for the place itself. The Romans now turned against the several peoples which they had to subdue, while Pyrrhus made use of a stratagem to get off. For he caused the report to be spread among the Tarentines, that he intended, first to settle matters in Macedon, and then to come back again with the whole power of that country: and really he may have had some thoughts of the kind. He now returned with a feeble force to Epirus, after having been away for six years. There he found ample room for enterprises. Antigonus Gonatas, when scarcely raised to the Macedonian throne, was abandoned by his troops, and the whole of the land proclaimed Pyrrhus king; the Macedonians soon became exasperated by the excesses of his Gallic mercenaries, and again sided with Antigonus. Pyrrhus then transferred the war into the Peloponnesus, and undertook an expedition against Sparta, in which he well nigh succeeded; but the victory was snatched from him when the Epirotes had already entered the town. Fortune always showed him success very near, in order to wrest it from him again. From thence he marched to Argos, having been called in by the republican party against the aristocrats and the tyrant Aristippus, who had summoned Antigonus to their aid. In a fight with the latter, within the town itself, Pyrrhus was killed by a woman with a tile. The history of those times is so scanty, that we do not even know the year in which this great prince died.
Two years after Pyrrhus had left Italy, L. Papirius the younger and Sp. Carvilius completed the reduction of Samnium (480). It was indeed in the confident hope that they would effect this, that they were chosen: both of them, about five and twenty years before, in the third Samnite war, had fought the most decisive campaign. The Samnites saw that they could not struggle against fate, and they saved themselves by a peace, which, however painful it might be, could not, after all, be called disgraceful: it was in reality rather a subjection than a peace. We have no accurate knowledge of its conditions. Thus much is clear, that the confederacy, of which there were only three cantons left, was broken up, and that the Samnite peoples, as such, continued to exist singly. They were to bind themselves ad majestatem populi Romani comiter colendam.
The same Papirius, as consul, or proconsul, took Tarentum. In that town, Milo had remained behind with a few thousand Epirote troops. Milo behaved altogether like a rough general, in fact as a distinguished captain of brigands, like the Spanish generals in the Netherlands: the military thought themselves allowed to do anything; the term latro is most aptly applied to them. We must imagine Milo to have been a man like Ali Pacha of Janina and his followers: he was capable of the deepest dissimulation, no promise, no oath was sacred to him. We have no idea of what a φρουρά then was, even of friendly troops:—one must for this be acquainted with the thirty years’ war and that of the Netherlands;—it was just like a quartering of robbers, about the same as the soldiers of the “Catholic League” in the thirty years’ war: the Roman discipline was infinitely better. Milo was a thorough scoundrel. He gave the Tarentines to understand that he would negotiate the peace for them, and then leave the town; instead of which, he sold the town and surrendered the citadel to the Romans, the Tarentines fully believing all the time, that the peace was about to be proclaimed. One morning, they were most dismally awakened when Milo had opened to the Romans the gates of the Acropolis, and had himself embarked. The Romans must then already have carried off very many precious things. The walls were partly pulled down; all those who were still alive from the time of the outrage against Postumius were butchered. The Romans boast of having restored to the town its liberty, which means, that they left to it its existence, and allowed the inhabitants the possession of their landed property, and their own magistrates; but a Roman legion was long quartered at Tarentum, and the Tarentines had to pay a contribution, as did all the Greek towns, beginning with Naples, (unless, like Heraclea, they were treated with particular favour,) in contradistinction to the Italian ones, from which the Romans, on the other hand, exacted military service. Only ships were likewise furnished by the Greek towns.
The Lucanians, Bruttians, Sallentines, Picentines, Sarsinates, Umbrians, now gradually acknowledged Rome’s supremacy; but in most cases, not before they had kicked against the pricks, and thereby made their fate worse. The conditions were various. Bruttium had to yield to the Romans half of the forest of Sila, which is of great value for shipbuilding; and thus the Romans acquired revenues, as well as supremacy, in all these countries. They now built a new chain of fortresses, as the first one of the Samnite war was no longer sufficient; on the Adriatic, Brundusium; and also on the lower sea, the sea-port towns of Pyrgi and others. Ten years after the departure of Pyrrhus, Rome was already mistress of the borders of the Romagna, Ferrara, Ravenna, the marshes of Pisa, and the river Macra, as far as the Japygian promontory; and thus she became the most powerful and compact state in all the world then known. She had also a great number of free allies, and she so conducted herself, that we clearly see that there must have been at that time a general law which settled the position of the Italian socii: the object of this is plain, it being gradually to form out of them one Roman people. The allies had indeed to blame themselves for having so long struggled against the will of fate. The different nations managed their own affairs themselves; they had their own laws, languages, and dialects; only Rome was their centre, and they were in due time to rub off whatever was incongruous with it. Italy was divided with reference to taxation, and placed under a certain number of quæstors, who collected the revenue. Hence their number was increased from four to eight, as the farmed revenues of the republic had to be gathered in. Isopolity seems to have been introduced for nearly all the peoples of Oscan and Sabellian stock: the Etruscans had a law of their own. In this system, the share was fixed which each of the nations had to take in every war. There must have been a sort of rotation for the military service, although discretionary power was given to the consuls, to state on entering into office to the commissaries of the allies, who had then to find themselves at Rome, how many auxiliaries each had to furnish. The rules in which it is laid down, how much of the ager publicus of the Romans should be allotted to them, in what proportion they should be allowed to share in the colonies which were founded, date likewise from this period. It was settled with regard to all the allies of Rome, how they should be capable of acquiring the rights of Roman citizens; and, that too many might not be withdrawn from their homes, the rule was made, that whoever migrated to Rome was to leave one member of his family behind in the land of his birth. Every thing that belonged to the burthen of military service, was regulated by general laws. If we compare the relation of the allies in other countries of antiquity to the state which held the hegemony, the result is most favourable to the Romans. Their allies were placed on a very honourable footing: for instance, they had to furnish for their soldiers nothing but the pay; their food was provided by Rome. No new legislation took place: the old constitution was merely consolidated, and some particular points defined.
The most important event of that time, is the chastisement which the Romans inflicted on the legion of Rhegium. The Campanians had furnished a legion for the Roman service, and, properly speaking, in rank they stood quite equal to the Romans, as they still had the old right of the municipium: Rome had the superiority de facto only. When the Romans had got up eight legions against Pyrrhus, there was among them a Campanian one. This was placed as a garrison in Rhegium, to keep that Greek town in submission, which indeed at a former period had placed itself under the protection of the Romans, but now wanted to unite with Pyrrhus. Several of the Greek cities had already freed themselves by treachery from such garrisons: a like charge was also brought against the people of Rhegium. The Campanian general, Decius Jubellius, formed the resolution of making himself master of the town, and to overcome all the scruples of his troops, he caused forged letters of the people of Rhegium to Pyrrhus to be read, as if they intended to betray the garrison to the king; whereupon the soldiers engaged in a dreadful massacre, butchering the male inhabitants, and seizing upon the women and children, just as eight years before, the Mamertines had done at Messana. The Romans had nothing to do with this foul crime; and at the end of the war, when these men had already held the town ten years, they marched to Rhegium. The soldiers had put themselves out of the pale of all the rights of man, and did not consider any pardon to be possible; they therefore, reckoning perhaps on the help of the Carthaginians, tried to stand their ground. The Carthaginian general in Sicily ought to have acted here with determination; yet this was too hazardous, owing to the state of feeling in Carthage: had fortune been unpropitious, he would have been sacrificed. The siege lasted a long while, and the Carthaginians did not interfere with it at all; at last the town was taken by storm. Out of the four thousand, there were three hundred still alive: these were carried to Rome, and beheaded there.
The treaty between the Romans and the Carthaginians had more than once been renewed and modified according to circumstances, especially with regard to the rule of Carthage in Sicily and Sardinia; at last, before the peace of Pyrrhus, they had concluded a formal alliance, and had bound themselves not to make any separate peace. When, however, Pyrrhus was in Sicily, both nations became exceedingly jealous of each other; and when in the second year of the war with Pyrrhus, a fleet of a hundred and twenty Carthaginian ships arrived before Ostia, and placed itself under the disposition of the Romans, the latter sent it back, though with the utmost courtesy. Afterwards, a Carthaginian fleet appeared in the roadstead of Tarentum to negociate with Milo for the surrender of the town. This evidently made the Romans hasten their speed; and they concluded their bargain in a hurry, and paid more than they would otherwise have done. This is the first misunderstanding between Rome and Carthage; yet strange to say, not even a hint of it is given by Polybius, although other writers mention it: and this is the more wonderful, as nothing could have induced Polybius to conceal it; for he is a most honest historian.