The Romans therefore had the land behind them. Hannibal placed himself in such a dangerous position, because anyhow he was lost, if he did not win this battle. The Romans had 80,000 foot, and from 6 to 8,000 horse; among the latter, about 2,500 were Romans. The Carthaginians had 40,000 foot, and also about 8,000 horse, most of which, however, were Numidians; these were excellent for foraging, reconnoitering, and harassing the enemy, but by no means fitted to stand the shock of a battle, and of no use at all against heavy cavalry: if they were worth anything, it was against light infantry. The Romans left ten thousand men behind in the camp, and thus advanced against the enemy with only 70,000, from whom we are besides to deduct a large number for those who at all times, and especially in a summer campaign, are either sick, or remain behind from other causes. On their right wing, they had the Roman cavalry; on the left, was that of the allies. Hannibal had no elephants in this battle: he placed his best cavalry on his left wing, over-against the right one of the Romans; on his own right, he had the Numidians. Besides these, there were on the left wing the Libyans, and on the right, the Celts and Spaniards, but part of the Libyans and Celts were also in the centre. The Romans had not room enough for the whole of their army; so that they were drawn up unusually deep, many maniples being one behind the other, which in their system of warfare was of no advantage. The battle was opened by the cavalry on the left wing of the Carthaginians making an attack upon the Roman horse, who, although they fought with great bravery, were soon routed, as the whole battle lasted only a short time: it began two hours after sunrise, and was ended two hours before sunset. In the meanwhile, the Numidians on the right wing were engaged with the cavalry of the allies. Hannibal now divided his line in the middle, and ordered one half to advance with the right, and the other with the left shoulders forward; so that they advanced in the form of a wedge against the Roman centre. This was an employment of what is called the oblique line of battle, which in the seven years’ war was so fatal at Collin, wherein one of the two extreme points stands still, while the rest of the line moves forward: he did this here with two lines. The Romans advanced to meet them, and the fight was very bloody. The Carthaginian troops could not break through, so they retreated by the wings; and these, when the Romans were pressing on, wheeled half round and attacked them in the flanks. At the same time, the cavalry of the Carthaginian left wing had gone round that of the Romans, and having been joined by the Numidians, it had routed the cavalry on the Roman left: it could now freely fall upon the Roman infantry from the rear. Æmilius Paullus was mortally wounded, and in the dreadful confusion there was no longer any command; so that two hours before sunset the whole army was annihilated. The loss is not stated with precision. Polybius, contrary to his custom, gives the largest numbers: according to him, out of 80,000 men, 50,000 were killed, and 30,000 taken prisoners: but in this instance, we must deem Livy’s statement to be the more correct one. Not to speak of those who were saved by having remained behind in the fortified camp, there also escaped at least ten thousand men from the field of battle; the Romans consequently lost about forty thousand men. In Zonaras and Appian, we meet with the following story, borrowed in all likelihood from Fabius, which is characteristic, as it shows how the Romans tried to throw a vail over their disasters. It is said that in Apulia a breeze rises every afternoon from the east, that is to say, from the sea, which lifts up clouds of dust from the chalky soil; and that Hannibal on this had not only placed himself in such a position that the Romans had the dust blown into their faces, but also on the day before had caused the ground to be ploughed, so as to increase these clouds. That he took advantage of the wind, we may believe; the rest sounds somewhat unlikely. There is another idle tale of his having allowed Spaniards, with daggers hidden about them, to go over as deserters to the enemy, and that these, being stationed by the Romans in the rear of their army, had afterwards suddenly fallen upon them. This is quite a childish and pitiful fable. The day after the battle, the Romans in the camp surrendered, on condition that if the Roman people would ransom them, they should regain their liberty. Varro escaped with seventy men to Canusium, whither all those now collected, who had got away safe; and with these he betook himself to Venusia. Here Hannibal again shows how much he disliked sieges; for he let Canusium alone with its Roman garrison, and hastened to Capua, with which he had already before entered into negotiations.
Cato has told us that Maharbal, the commander of the Carthaginian cavalry, called upon Hannibal to follow him, saying that on the fifth day he would hold a feast as conqueror on the Capitol. Hannibal smiled, and said that it was a fine idea, but that it could not be carried out. Then Maharbal had answered, “Thou art able then to gain a victory, but not to make use of it!”—There is no saying indeed what impression it would have made in Rome, if, instead of any tidings from the field of battle, the Carthaginian cavalry had been seen on the Latin road. But even cavalry could hardly have done it: the distance in a straight line is from fifty to sixty German miles; so that they must have had relays of horses: for infantry, the thing was quite impossible. Against cavalry, the gates might have been shut. Nor would the Romans have felt so utterly defenceless as they did after the battle at the Alia. There were recruits in Rome, who were drilled, and in training for the naval service; nothing would have been achieved, and the Carthaginians would in the most pestilential time of the year have been lying before the walls of Rome. To burn the country round the city, would not have been of any use to Hannibal; whilst, on the other hand, it could not but have made the worst impression upon the Italians, had he returned with the cavalry without having done anything.
How soon Hannibal arrived at Capua, is more than we can tell, as, generally speaking, in such matters we have no precise dates given us by the ancients; yet in the same year he was master of Capua, much earlier than it would seem from Livy’s account. This town enjoyed isopolity with the Romans, and was under its own government; its nobility held itself equal to that of Rome, and was connected by marriage with the very highest Roman families, even with the Claudii. During its long alliance with the Romans, it had gotten great wealth and many demesnes, and it was therefore in a very prosperous condition. But owing to their riches and their luxury, its citizens had become utterly effeminate; so that they formed the strongest contrast to the moral and political energy of Rome. If such a town had dreamed of acquiring the leading rule over Italy after the downfall of that city, it was an inconceivable delusion. Were the nations indeed to shake off the yoke of Rome, only that they might put themselves under that of Capua! But the Campanians flattered themselves with the hope of getting this hegemony with the help of Hannibal, who fostered their day-dreams, but without promising them anything for certain. They therefore separated from Rome, formed a league with Hannibal, and received him into their city, which he forthwith made his arsenal. The terms of their alliance, taken literally, were very favourable. They were granted perfect independence; and it was stipulated that no single Campanian should be charged with any burden whatever; that they should not have to furnish any soldiers; and that, in short, they should be free from everything which had been irksome to the Tarentines in their alliance with Pyrrhus. The Romans had no garrison at Capua; but three hundred horsemen from that town served in Sicily, and as hostages for these, Hannibal gave them as many Roman prisoners. They seem to have been exchanged: Rome, at that time, was by no means so haughty. The description in Livy of the way in which Hannibal established himself in the town, of the banquet and the attempt to murder Hannibal, is wonderfully beautiful, but certainly a romance. The story of Decius Magus, the only man in Capua who raised his voice for remaining true to the Romans, may alone have some foundation, however much it be embellished: there is no reason for us to doubt, that Hannibal banished him as a friend of the Romans. On the part of Capua, it was indeed a foul ingratitude to fall off from Rome, and therefore the frightful vengeance of the Romans is very much to be excused. The Campanians had derived from their alliance with Rome nothing but benefit; and now they did not only show themselves ungrateful, but they also committed an act of useless barbarity. They put the Romans who were staying with them, to death in overheated bath rooms. Nothing is more sickening than the arrogance of the unworthy, when they array themselves against worth.
Whether it be true that the winter-quarters in luxurious Capua made the troops of Hannibal effeminate and dissolute, or whether this be a mere rhetorical flourish, cannot now be decided any longer; but it is evident that the Romans made a better use of the winter. When after long and extraordinary exertions, men come into an easy life, they often fall into a state of lassitude; they are then very apt to lose the proper tone of mind, and the power of finding their way back to their former condition, and it returns no more. This is a rock on which many great characters have split. What, however, has not been taken into account, is that Hannibal was not able to recruit his army from Spaniards and Libyans. Every one of his battles cost him many men; little skirmishes, and diseases in foreign climate, swept away a great number; and he was only able to make up his losses from the Italians, which we know with certainty as for the Bruttians. This circumstance is quite enough to account for the demoralised state of his troops. The Prussian army of 1762 was much inferior to that of 1757, and likewise the French one of 1812, which fought in the Russian campaign, was not so good as that of 1807. Another difficulty for him was that the Romans, after the battle of Cannæ, had not let their courage droop: they would not even receive Carthalo, the Carthaginian ambassador. He found himself in the same plight as Napoleon was in Russia, after the battle of Borodino, when the peace was not accepted. It is true that part of southern Italy declared for him, and that he might have reinforced himself from thence; but all the Latin colonies throughout its whole extent remained faithful, and were not to be conquered. He was master of the country, but with a number of hostile fortresses in it. If he wanted to advance by Campania, he was obliged to subdue the whole chain of fortified colonies, or to break through them, and reduce the Latin and Hernican towns in the neighbourhood of the city. These places were entirely in the interest of Rome, and indignant at the faithlessness of Capua. It was especially Cales, Fregellæ, Interamnium, Casinum, Beneventum, Luceria, Venusia, Brundisium, Pæstum, Æsernia, and others, which paralysed the peoples there; these could not fairly gather their forces, because they had to fear the sallies of the Romans. They therefore in most instances blockaded those towns, and were no increase of strength to Hannibal. Thus his position was far from being an easy one. He reckoned upon support from Carthage and Spain; the former he got, as Livy states in a few lines (probably from Cœlius Antipater), although in his view of the matter, it is always as if the Carthaginians had deemed the whole undertaking of Hannibal to be madness. According to Zonaras (from Dio Cassius), the reinforcement was considerable; but it only came in the following year, or even later: from Spain he received none at all. If dearth of money had exercised as decisive an influence among the ancients, as it does with us, the Romans indeed could no more have done anything. But they made every possible sacrifice; and thus it happened that by the battle of Cannæ they only lost those districts which yielded themselves to the enemy, whilst they had no danger to fear with regard to the rest. The Marsians, Marrucinians, Sabines, Umbrians, Etruscans, Picentines, and others, remained faithful to them.
In the list of the peoples which fell off after the battle of Cannæ, as given by Livy and Polybius, no distinction is made between what took place at different times: the course of defection was but gradual, and there was no general rising,—so strong was the belief in the unshaken might of Rome. Immediately after the battle, a part only of the Apulians, Samnites, and Lucanians, fell away; so did afterwards the Bruttians, and at a much later period, the Sallentines; but none of the Greek towns as yet. It seems that the Ferentines, Hirpinians, and Caudines declared for Hannibal, whilst he was still on his march to Capua: Acerræ was taken after a long siege. Hannibal’s object, while he was abiding in Campania, was now to gain a sea-port; so that he might keep up a direct communication with Carthage. He found himself in the strangest position; for though the general of a first-rate power, which was mistress of the seas, he did not possess one single harbour. An attempt against Cumæ and Naples was repulsed. Near Nola, for the first time, the current of his victories was checked; Marcellus threw himself into this important town, put down the party which wanted to go over to the Carthaginians, and drove Hannibal back; which is described by the Romans as a victory, but was not so by any means, although it was now something great, even to have delayed the progress of Hannibal. Marcellus showed here considerable talent as a general, and once more inspired the Romans with confidence.
The Bruttians, after having themselves fallen off, now succeeded in gaining over Locri, the first Greek town, which declared for Hannibal. Croton was taken by force of arms; and this completed the ruin of that place, which, though once so great and prosperous, was still inhabited only about the centre, as Leyden is now, and still more so, Pisa; so that the deserted walls could easily be stormed. Every attempt on the part of the inhabitants to defend the town was impossible; for after the different devastations by Dionysius, Agathocles, and the Romans under Rufinus, in the war of Pyrrhus, their number had become very small. Thus Hannibal had now seaports; and he received by Locri that reinforcement of troops and elephants from Carthage, which was the only one which he ever had from thence in a large mass: its amount is unknown to us.
With the taking of Capua, ends the first period of the war of Hannibal, which here reaches its culminating point. From 537 to 541, five years elapse to the fall of Capua, which is the second period. The Romans make now already the most astonishing efforts. Their legions were continually increased. Allies we hear no more about: the bravest had most of them fallen away; Etruscans, Umbrians, &c., are not even spoken of. Perhaps they incorporated the allies for the time of that war with the legions, so as not to let them stand isolated. Instead of confining themselves to the lowest scale, the Romans conceived the grand idea, of redoubling their exertions everywhere, and of raising an entirely new army. They refused to ransom the prisoners, and therefore Hannibal sold these for slaves, and they were scattered all over the world: many of them may have been butchered. This conduct of the Romans must not be judged of too severely. One should bear in mind, that in the first moment of dismay, after the battle of Cannæ, they were completely stunned: in such moments, those who belong to a mass, will act quite without any will of their own. It may also be well imagined that Hannibal demanded ready money, and that the Romans were not able to pay it. This may have been a principal motive. Those also who had escaped from the battle of Cannæ, were treated with undeserved severity; just as the unfortunate Admiral Byng was shot by the English. The whole of the young men were enlisted; nevertheless there was a scarcity of freemen able to bear arms. Many, from utter despondency, tried to shun the service. All who had not been able to pay a delictum, and likewise all the addicti, were discharged on the bail of the state, that they might serve; eight thousand slaves were bought on credit from their masters, and two regiments formed of them; even gladiators and their weapons were taken, as there was also a want of arms. Of the warlike races, there still remained on the side of the Romans only the Marsians, Marrucinians, Vestinians, Frentanians, Pelignians, and Picentines. Their greatest strength lay in the many Latin colonies, which extended from Bruttium to the Po. Such were the resources of Rome, and notwithstanding Livy’s account, there is no denying that the danger was very great. He describes the rich individuals who advanced money to the state, as excellent patriots, although we know for certain that they were guilty of the most infamous fraud: they had the supplies for Spain ensured against danger at sea, and had then caused ships laden with the worst articles, to be wrecked. The price of corn had risen to ten times its ordinary rate. The town of Petelia alone among the Lucanians kept true to the Romans, for which it was destroyed by the Carthaginians and the rest of the Lucanians; Bruttium, the greater part of Samnium, and many Greek towns went over to the enemy; the Romans had the ground shaking under their feet. It is surprising that, under these circumstances, not only had Hannibal no lasting success, but the Romans also raised their head more and more. Their troops gradually became well trained, as their foes did not fight any great battles, which of course gave them time for practice; and thus they got an army which was certainly better than the one they had before the battle of Cannæ. Hannibal left Capua, and stayed in Apulia and Lucania, where he marched backwards and forwards, and made little conquests, so as to keep the Romans in constant excitement: we cannot quite trace his designs. In the following year, he made two unsuccessful attempts upon the Roman camp near Nola. Marcellus and Fabius were here opposed to him; the operations of the latter were slow, but highly felicitous. Hannibal is stated to have said, that he considered Fabius as his tutor, and Marcellus as his rival; that Fabius was teaching him to guard against blunders, and Marcellus how to develope his good ideas. This saying is certainly authentic; it displays Hannibal’s great soul.
As early as in 539, the Romans again established themselves in Campania with a decided superiority. The Campanians showed themselves to be pitiful cowards. They appeared in the field but once, near Cumæ, and were beaten; then they allowed themselves to be pent up like sheep, and Hannibal made several attempts to relieve them. One Hanno is routed near Beneventum by Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, which is the first decisive victory of the Romans; it was chiefly gained by the slaves (volones), and these had their freedom given them for it. In the following year, Arpi returned to the side of the Romans, and in this way they gradually got many a little town. These small undertakings, which led to encounters of which the success was various, fill up the time until 540, when Tarentum delivered itself over to Hannibal; the secession of Metapontum and Thurii followed shortly afterwards, and it was perfectly justifiable in a moral point of view. When the hostages which these places had given to the Romans had made their escape, and had been retaken, the latter caused them to be indiscriminately put to death; and therefore, as so many had lost a son or a brother, and the very first families in these towns had been thus deeply wronged, they naturally sought for revenge, and gave themselves up to Hannibal. Yet the citadel of Tarentum remained to the Romans, and into it the garrison of Metapontum also threw itself. The negotiations with Philip of Macedon, which took place at this time, may have detained Hannibal in the east of Italy. Whilst he was waiting till matters improved, he reduced the Sallentine towns, and tried to keep the allies which he still had true to him; for the Lucanians and the neighbouring peoples changed, like weathercocks, with every wind. The Romans now set to work in good earnest to take Capua. Hanno was still carrying on operations in that neighbourhood; but they had already for two years established themselves near Suessula, and had been laying waste the whole country, so that famine had raged for a good while in Capua. I cannot understand, why Hannibal, who now had got reinforcements, did not make every exertion to relieve Capua which the Romans had invested with a double entrenchment. He ought to have attacked them in their entrenchments, and driven them out. At the urgent request of the Campanians, he made in 541 an attempt, the meaning of which, however, is not to be accounted for by our history, and there are many contradictions in this undertaking. If we follow the most unpretending account, Hannibal attacked the Romans, but was not able to break through their lines: a few Numidians only got through, and opened a communication with the town. But this could not be followed up, and so he determined to make a diversion.
Of the two conflicting statements as to which road he took, we are to consider that of Cœlius as the most improbable. The point in dispute is, whether he came before the Porta Collina from the north, through the country of the Pelignians, and on his retreat started from the Capena, or the reverse. The former account is the more worthy of belief; the other line would be too great a way round. This determination of his seems to have taken the Romans by surprise; so that there was hardly time enough for half of the troops from Capua to reach Rome by the Appian road before him,—he was some days march in advance,—although he moved along the arc of that chord by which they went, namely, across the Vulturnus, through the district of Cales towards Fregellæ, which was a very strong place. The people of Fregellæ, like brave men, had broken down the bridges over the Liris, and while he had to wait there till they were rebuilt, he wasted their country: he then marched by the Latin road, and through Tusculum, to the gates of Rome. But before his arrival, the consul Fulvius had come up by the Appian road, and was at the Porta Capena. Whilst Hannibal was already on the Esquiline, the former marched through the city by the Carinæ at the very nick of time, and by a sudden attack hindered the Carthaginian general from surprising the city on that spot. This was also what Hannibal had wished; but he had hoped that both the armies would be called away from Capua: the general, whom he had ordered either to relieve the place, or else carry off its population, must not have been able to do it. Hannibal encamped before the Porta Collina, on the Monte Pincio, beyond the low grounds of the gardens of Sallust. Here history again appears poetical. Twice did Hannibal march forth to offer battle to the Romans, who also went out against him; but both times a thunderstorm is said to have broken out just then, and when the two armies withdrew, the brightness of the sky returned. These portenta, we are told, convinced Hannibal that he could do nothing against Rome. Other stories sound very fine; but they likewise are idle tales. The Romans, it is said, at the very moment that Hannibal was encamped before their city, were sending out reinforcements to the army in Spain; and the field which was occupied by the enemy, was sold at just as good a price as in the height of peace. It was not advisable for Hannibal to accept a battle: he had no stronghold whatever in his rear, while the Romans had behind them the unscaleable walls of the city. When he had stayed eight days before the town, and the Roman allies far and wide had not stirred, he broke up again, and retired by Antrodoco and Sulmo to Samnium and Apulia, going through the midst of hostile countries in which all the towns were shut against him, like a lion chased by the hunters, but unhurt. The object of his undertaking had been baffled; he was in that dismal plight, that with great objects and great means, he still wanted the very thing, however trifling it might have been, which could have brought about the result of those objects and means.
In Capua, the distress had risen to the highest pitch, and the town wanted to capitulate; but the Romans demanded, that it should surrender unconditionally, on which the heads of the hostile party, Vibius Virrius and twenty-seven other senators, resolved to die. And indeed the result showed that they were right; for the Romans behaved with the most frightful cruelty. The whole senate of Capua, without any exception, were led in chains to Teanum, and the proconsul Q. Fulvius Flaccus wished not even to leave the decision to the Roman senate. But the proconsul Appius Claudius, to whom, as well as the other, the city had been yielded up, wished to save as many as he could, and he wrote to the senate, requesting them to institute a causæ cognitio. Flaccus however, foreseeing this, went to Teanum, and leaving unopened the letters received from the senate, ordered all the senators of Capua to be put to death. Jubellius Taurea, the bravest of the Campanians, whose heroism was acknowledged even by the Romans, killed his wife and children, and himself awaited his execution by the Romans. When the gates of Capua were opened, there is no doubt but that the inhabitants suffered all that the citizens of a town taken by storm have to suffer from the fury of the soldiers. Destroyed it was not; but all Campanians of rank were banished, most of them to Etruria; a great number of them were still executed as guilty, and even without any direct charge against them, they lost their property; the whole of the ager Campanus, all the houses and landed estates were confiscated; so that there remained nothing but the common, nameless rabble, and not a magistrate, besides foreigners and freedmen. The city was afterwards filled again with a new population of Roman citizens and others; a Roman præfect was sent thither to administer the law. Atella and Acerræ, the periœcians of Capua, had a like fate. From one of the Campanian towns, the whole of the population went over to Hannibal.