The triumph of Æmilius Paullus is the most brilliant of any which had been seen until then, owing to the quantity of costly things displayed in it. The life of Paullus by Plutarch is very well worth reading, and the account also of the triumph is very instructive: twelve millions of dollars in hard money were carried in the procession. Yet the people did not find itself the better for all these riches; its condition, on the contrary, became worse and worse: the bane of downright poverty was showing itself; the rabble and beggars were increasing fast. We likewise now see, and even somewhat earlier already, traces of a debased moral state: at times, a series of the most monstrous crimes makes its appearance. Even before the war with Perseus, frightful atrocities are met with, which have the most incredible ramifications. In the beginning of the seventh century, two Roman matrons of the highest rank, the wives of men who had been consuls, were accused of having poisoned their husbands, and were put to death by their cousins. Whilst the moral condition grew worse every day, the wealth of the republic became greater. During the war with Perseus, taxes had still been paid, which was done no longer, except, no doubt, in the Social War, when everything was turned into money. This is indeed mentioned nowhere. Historians talk as if the Macedonian booty, which Æmilius Paullus brought with him, had been inexhaustible; but the fact is rather, that the permanent revenues from Macedonia, Illyricum, and elsewhere, made it now quite superfluous to lay on direct taxes. The indirect duties only, as the customs for instance, were still paid: they were part of them rather high, at least in after times, and they had this peculiarity, that they were raised in a number of harbours as an excise, whilst in the interior of the country everything circulated quite freely.
The Rhodians, who had aroused the wrath of the Romans by their pride, were still left: to these the Romans now turned their attention, and declared war against them. They on the other hand, being well aware that resistance was impossible, stooped to the lowest humiliations to appease the Romans. Those who had actually corresponded with Perseus, made the negotiations more easy for the republic by laying hands on their own lives, on which their dead bodies were given up. Others fled, but could nowhere find a refuge, and were likewise forced to kill themselves. Polyaratus and Dinon, unfortunately, were really guilty; they were banished, and they fell into the power of the Romans. Dealing one blow after another, the Romans now took from the Rhodians all that they had formerly granted them; nay, even places of which they had long before been masters: Stratonicea had belonged to them for seventy years. With great difficulty, by the skill of the Rhodian ambassador, and through the intercession of Cato who interested himself for the Rhodians, the war was prevented. The Romans got Caria and Lycia, hardly leaving to them their nearest possessions on the coast; and the Rhodians, who for so long a time had lived in friendship with Rome, had to think themselves lucky in obtaining an alliance, in which they had to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome, and to support it in war. They, however, still kept their independent government; and they showed their sound judgment in confining themselves to their small but noble island, making themselves everywhere respected by their commerce.
Now follows a period, from the end of the Macedonian to the beginning of the third Punic war, which is quite barren of events. Polybius had concluded the first edition of his history with the destruction of the Macedonian empire, and the reconciliation of the Rhodians. When, after the fall of Carthage and of Corinth, he once more took his work in hand, he wrote the wars by which this was achieved, separately; but he prefixed to them an introduction connecting this account with his first history, which also contained in a short summary all that happened in the times between. They are therefore two different works, a fact which has been frequently overlooked.[51] We follow his example, giving only what is absolutely indispensable.
Towards the end of the sixth century, the Romans began to attack the Gauls in the Alps; and soon after the war with Perseus, they took the Massaliote colonies of Antibes and Nizza from the Ligurians. It now was their object to bring the coast as far as Spain under their own rule (601). About the same time, they also tried on the other side of the Adriatic to subdue the Dalmatians, from Zara to about as far as Ragusa. They compelled them to acknowledge their supremacy, though not for long. In Corsica likewise, they made some progress.
The two kings, Prusias and Eumenes, were each of them compromised, yet in a different way; the former, owing to his connexion by marriage with Perseus, the latter by his breach of faith. Prusias disgusted his contemporaries by his abject baseness. In Roman attire, with his head shaved, and wearing the cap of a slave made free, he came humbly to Rome, prostrated himself in the senate, and declared himself a freedman of the Romans. He attained his end so far, that the Romans did not curtail his territory: he had to give his son Nicomedes as an hostage, by whom he was afterwards to be overthrown. Eumenes was forbidden to come to Rome, when his brother Attalus implored for him the mercy of the Romans.
At the same time, Antiochus Epiphanes waged war against the two infant princes of Egypt, Ptolemy Philometor and Euergetes II. (Physcon), and their sister Cleopatra: Cœlesyria was lost; they still possessed only Egypt, Cyprus, and Cyrene. All these likewise, Antiochus made successful attempts to conquer; he had advanced as far as Memphis, and, as the Egyptian towns were nearly all of them open places, he was all but sure of victory: Alexandria alone could have withstood him. But the Romans did not wish to let him grow powerful; they sent the celebrated embassy of M. Popillius, who with his staff drew a circle round the king, within which he forced him to decide upon evacuating Egypt. The Romans now mediated between the two princes, giving to Physcon, the younger of the two, Cyrene, and afterwards Cyprus also, on which he made up, and then again quarrelled with his brother, who had all the rest. The details do not belong to Roman history.
In the meanwhile, the Parthians had begun to spread. They had taken the country east of the desert, and ancient Hyrcania which bordered on the Caspian sea; nor did the Syrian kings keep Media, Susiana, and Persia long (until 620). The great Parthian empire was then founded, and in the year 630, the Parthians had already taken Babylon.
In Spain, the wars still lasted. Most of the undertakings there were directed against the Celtiberians, whom the Romans tried to bring under subjection. The terms granted by Gracchus were not kept with them, and thus insurrections and wars sprang up, the history of which is a dismal one. The Romans had laid upon the Celtiberians the condition not to build any new towns; at the end of the sixth century therefore, the war broke out anew, because they had considerably enlarged the circuit of the walls of Segida, that they might gather together thither. With this the Romans interfered, and thence the first Celtiberian war arose. The Romans at first made some progress; but on many occasions they were also soundly beaten. The small tribes in the mountains of eastern Castile, and western Aragon, were on the whole an heroic race; there were four peoples altogether, of which the Arevaci were the most important: in former days they might indeed have been dangerous also to their neighbours; but now, all their efforts were only put forth for the maintenance of their independence. Yet the Romans had so much the superiority in force, that the wars generally turned out in their favour, although they did not bring on any final decision. A Roman general, M. Claudius Marcellus,—the grandson of the great Marcellus of the second Punic war, and well worthy of him, who also was thrice consul, a thing which is without example in those times,—in some measure brought back to the Spaniards the days of Gracchus: he was quite a man of the old virtue and humanity, and he honoured and respected these people who were struggling for their freedom, and tried to mediate for them. But the senate would have it, that the honour of the republic did not allow of a peace being made with them as with equals: they must surrender at discretion; then only could one deal mildly with them. Marcellus, who well knew that a successor might treat these poor creatures much more harshly, won their confidence in a way which is so often seen in ancient Spanish history. He concluded a very fair peace, making them send hostages to him whom he gave back: they were merely bound to furnish the Romans with horsemen for their wars in Spain, and perhaps also in Africa. Other generals followed quite a different course, as, for instance, L. Lucullus, who, after Marcellus, commanded in Spain: he had flattered himself with the hope of conquering the Celtiberians, and as he was now hindered from doing this by the peace of Marcellus, he picked up a war against the Vaccæans who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Salamanca. He carried it on with varying success. Had the Spanish nations trusted each other, and had they chosen to go forth as one man to fight the Romans, they might have stood their ground against them, and have pent them to the sea-coast. But they were utterly wanting in unity. So long, for instance, as the Lusitanians were not attacked, they were glad to be able to till their fields, nor did they mind if the Romans waged war against another people. Hence it was, that the Romans gradually made their way. With the Lusitanians also, a war had arisen about the same time as that with the Vaccæans: these did not inhabit the whole of Portugal, as they had only a little land to the north of the Tagus, but the southern part, all but Algarve; and they were in a league with the Vettones in Spanish Estremadura. The Lusitanians were a race of robbers, and were just as troublesome to the ancient Spaniards themselves as to the Romans; but they had not yet the great leader, who soon afterwards arose among them. They plundered the subjects of Rome in Andalusia, and thereby drew down upon themselves the vengeance of the Romans. How horribly the Romans were wont to act in those times, is shown by the fate of Cauca. The men of that town had been bidden by Lucullus, as a condition of his pardon, to yield up their arms; and when they relied upon his word, all were put to the sword. This breach of faith made the resistance of the Spaniards so desperate. The Lusitanians, who were excellent light troops, were, owing to their forays, very dangerous to the Romans; nothing, however, can justify the conduct of the latter towards them. Sulpicius Galba, a distinguished rhetorician and lawyer, who belonged to one of the first patrician houses, and was a pillar of the aristocracy, by such behaviour sullied his own fair fame, and that of his forefathers. He vanquished the Lusitanians, and they sought for mercy, gave hostages, and surrendered their horses: they were not, however, the whole of the nation, but only part of it, and as they were inclined for peace, he declared to them, that he was quite aware that distress had driven them into war, and that therefore he would assign them abodes in more fruitful lands. They agreed to this, on which he made them gather together in three bodies into three different places; then, under a lying pretext, he got them to deliver up their weapons, which were to be returned to them in their new dwellings; and now, whilst they were divided and unarmed, he had them massacred, perhaps from sheer ferocity, or indeed because he did not trust them. Among those who escaped was Viriathus, who, by a war of several years in which they had nothing but shame, made the Romans smart for their faithlessness. This, however, belongs to a later period. Unhappily, the crime of Galba had not at Rome the consequences for him which it deserved. Honest old Cato brought an impeachment against him, and he was tried for his life, and would have been condemned, had he not raised the pity of the people by leading forth his own infant children and those of a cousin.
Of organic changes in the constitution, none can be mentioned as having taken place at this period: it remains quite the same in its outward form as it had been since the first Punic war. Some laws are given, and some little attempts made to remedy existing evils, but without any effect. Thus the lex Voconia was passed, which forbids the leaving of property to females either by will or by legacy, except in the case of an only daughter and child: this clause respecting the only daughter (ἐπίκληρος) had its reason in the relations of the clans, such a daughter being bound, just as in Attica, to marry within her own gens, so that the fortune did not go out of it. Yet the law proves that the spirit of family had already died away: Cicero, in his Republic, is wrong in judging of it according to the standard of his own times. The Romans had already gone so far downhill, that no single law, like the lex Voconia, could any longer have staved off the impending crash. It was then, as forty years ago in England, a time in which a thorough-going, deep-searching legislation might still have checked the wayward course of the state. But such timely and thorough reforms are very rare indeed in history. Fate leads states onward towards their downfall; and thus I prophesy of the English state, that within fifty years it will be radically changed.[52] In Rome also, single laws were now brought in, which were carried against the wishes of individuals; yet one always made shift to find some quibble by which it might be evaded. The lex Ælia et Fufia is another remarkable law: when, and how it was passed, is very obscure; it is generally considered as one law, but according to Cicero, it is probable that there were two: they must have been of great importance. As far as we know of its contents, it enacted that the proceedings of the tribunes might be interrupted by auguries which had been observed. This shows in what estimation, even at that time, the old forms still were. To us, who, of course, look upon the whole system of auguries as a tissue of lies, this has only the appearance of an extension of priestcraft, and we wonder how this could have been done in an enlightened age. Yet it was meant as a mere form. The power of the tribunes had risen to a fearful height, and now that the augurs received authority to set forth what might break up an assembly of the people called together by the tribunes, no one thought in this of signs given by the powers above: it was only a means for the optimates, to check the unbounded encroachments of the tribunes. By the Lex Hortensia the tribunes might have laws passed without the consent of the senate; but now the augurs, who were chosen, half of them from the patricians, and the other half from the plebeians, but from the most eminent families, might oppose these enactments, and restrain that unbridled power. The form indeed is unworthy and offensive, as the augurs evidently were obliged to tell a lie; yet the meaning of the law, to create a counter-tribunate in matters of legislation, was a good one. The law is to be met with in Cicero only; Clodius repealed it.
Among the events which show how greatly the state of things at Rome had changed, is the circumstance that in the year 600, either a tribune, or the whole college, ordered the consuls to be led to prison for having been guilty of unfairness at the enlistment, particularly L. Licinius Lucullus.[53] Such a decree of the tribunes is so much against the spirit of the ancient constitution, that this is of itself enough to show the completeness of the change. This change is a proof that personal conscientiousness could no more be relied upon. In early times, the consuls designated every one singly who was to serve in war, and this had continued to be the custom ever since: at first, nearly all were taken; afterwards, those who were most able-bodied, and who were already well trained in war, were picked out. As the legions were now stationed longer and longer in distant provinces, the burthen of military service grew more and more oppressive, and many tried to screen themselves from it by making interest; for the tribunes would, without giving any reason, get off those whom they favoured. Moreover, the enlistments, owing to the wide extent of the empire, must have been fraught with still greater difficulties, as the men had to appear in person. The system of selection was now done away with, and the general conscription so managed, that the lot decided the obligation to serve, and the grounds for exemption were to be considered afterwards. This was not a change for the worse, but it was still a change. The tribunes, however, on this demanded that each of them should have the right of liberating ten, and when the consuls would not allow this, they arrested them.[54] Still more significant is the fact, that even before the end of the sixth century, it became necessary to make laws against canvassing which were directly aimed at venality; for the form of the organization by centuries was now changed, and attempts at bribery had become possible. Whether the Lex Cornelia against ambitus is that of Cornelius Cethegus, or of Sulla, cannot be ascertained, although it has been held to be the former beyond a doubt; certain it is, however, that as early as in the year 570 a law was passed against ambitus, a circumstance which has become somewhat better known from the Milan scholia on Cicero.[55]