The Emancipation of South America

by Bartolomé Mitre

Happily for America, and for Spain also, the reinforcements expected from Europe never arrived. They could but have prolonged the struggle. The revolution of 1820 prevented them from leaving the mother country. The new policy of Spain was felt as much in the north as in the south of the Continent. At the same time that San Martin broke up the armistice of Miraflores, Bolívar signed one with Morillo at Trujillo. When negotiations for peace recommenced as Punchauca, hostilities were renewed in Venezuela.

The armistice signed by Bolívar and Morillo on the 25th November, 1820, was of great service to the Patriots, giving them much-needed breathing time, in which the country recovered somewhat from the exhaustion produced by the long continuance of the struggle, and the institutions of the new Republic became to some degree consolidated. Now that the establishment of constitutional government in Spain gave hopes of a possible reconciliation, commissioners were sent to the mother country to treat for peace, and Morillo, despairing of ultimate success, resigned his command and returned to Europe, leaving La Torre as General-in-Chief of the Royalist armies.

The armistice was badly observed by both parties, more especially so by the Patriots. While it was still in force, and while the commissioners from Columbia were at Madrid, on the 28th January, 1821, the Province of Maracaibo declared itself independent, and made overtures for a union with the Republic of Columbia. La Torre declared that he should look upon the occupation of this province by the Patriots as an act of hostility. Bolívar acknowledged that such would be the case, but stated that the Revolution itself was an accomplished fact, and as such he had a right to support it. The armistice was accordingly declared to be at an end on the 28th April, 1821.

During this interval of repose the Patriot armies had been considerably strengthened. While the armistice still lasted Montilla had taken Rio Hacha and Santa Marta, and was now besieging Cartagena with 3,000 men. Bolívar had 5,000 men at Barinas, and Paez was in his rear with 4,000 more. Bermudez with 2,000 men threatened Caracas from the East; the army of New Granada held the valley of the Magdalena. La Torre had 9,000 men besides the garrisons of the towns on the coast, but his communications were interrupted by the revolution in Maracaibo.

Bermudez after retaking Caracas and meeting with varied fortune in desultory skirmishes, was compelled to retire, but his operations were of great effect in occupying the attention of a considerable portion of the Royalist army. Bolívar established his head-quarters at San Carlos, where he was joined by Urdaneta’s division and part of the cavalry of the Army of the Apure, and then marched with 6,000 men in search of the enemy. La Torre had 5,000 men under his immediate orders, including a strong body of cavalry commanded by Morales, but, uncertain of Bolívar’s intentions, he detached two battalions of infantry and one squadron of cavalry to reinforce a Royalist division which was stationed at Barquisimeto, thus materially weakening his force on the eve of a decisive action. The rest of his army he drew up on the wide plain of Carabobo, at the foot of the passes leading through the Cordillera.

Bolívar, after surprising the principal pass, on the 23rd June, occupied the heights looking down upon the plain. He could only descend at the risk of having his troops cut up in detail before they could deploy on open ground. As Bolívar hesitated, a guide told him of another road which would lead him to the flank of the enemy. The next morning he detached Paez, with 1,500 horse, the Apure battalion, and the British legion, to attack the right flank of the Royalists, while he with the bulk of the army remained on the heights ready to descend by the main pass when the coast was clear.

The exit from the smaller pass was through a belt of woods and across a stream, commanded by a hillock which was occupied by a detachment of Royalists. The Apure battalion was in front, led by Paez in person. La Torre, with three battalions and under cover of a heavy fire of artillery, attacked this battalion as it left the pass, and threw it into disorder, but the British legion, led by Colonel Ferrier, came quickly to its assistance, deployed in line, and with the front rank kneeling poured in so heavy a fire that the advance of the Royalists was checked. The Apure rallied, and the cavalry charged on the right flank. Ferrier, having burned all his cartridges, led on his men with the bayonet and drove the enemy before him, while the Llanero horse rode them down, and their ranks were disordered by the flight of their own cavalry. One battalion stubbornly kept its formation, and repulsed every charge made upon it during a retreat of twenty miles until it rejoined the rest of the routed army, which took refuge in Puerto Cabello.[20]

This battle, the complement of that of Boyacá, which has been called the Columbian Waterloo, secured for ever the independence of Venezuela and New Granada, as Maipó and the expedition to Peru had secured that of the South; the three battles combining to prepare the definitive triumph of the emancipation of South America.

Bolívar entered Caracas for the second time in triumph; no one could now deny him the glory of being the Liberator of his country. His retention of the supreme power, both civil and military, was more than ever a necessity. This was exactly the moment he chose for another resignation; but there was a reason for it.

The Constituent Congress was convened at Cúcuta on the 6th May. It was composed entirely of civilians, of whom the greater number were lawyers, and was radically republican, opposed both to the abuses of military rule and to the anti-democratic theories of the Liberator. His resignation was thus at once a protest against accusations made against him, and an indirect way of influencing public opinion.