A detachment of the Patriot army had been defeated near Lima; Chile remained inactive; but Bolívar, still undaunted, collected such forces as he could assemble at Pativilca, and urgently requested a further reinforcement of 6,000 men from Columbia in aid of Sucre, whose position was very precarious.
Bolívar also returned to his old project of an American Congress, summoning it to meet on the 7th December at Panama, as the most central point for all the world, and addressed circulars to that effect to the Governments of Mexico, Columbia, Guatemala, Buenos Ayres, Chile, Brazil, and later on to the United States.
While occupied in these dreams, he heard that the Royalists had advanced from Cuzco, manœuvring to cut off the retreat of Sucre; then there was silence. Eight days afterwards the fate of America was decided at Ayacucho.
Upon one point only Bolívar and Sucre were not agreed. Bolívar had left instructions with Sucre to keep his army together at all risks; but he, thinking his position a dangerous one, spread his troops over the whole district, and advanced himself, with a light division, as far as Mamará on the road to Cuzco, and from there sent Miller on with the grenadiers to reconnoitre. When Bolívar heard of these manœuvres he wrote to Sucre impressing upon him his maxim that—
“Union is strength. You expose yourself to the loss of a battle for the sake of occupying some more leagues of territory. The liberty of Peru will not be won by occupying land, but by a victory upon it.”
Sucre replied, saying that he would obey orders; but had only just sent off the letter when he received advice from Miller that the enemy was advancing in mass, and only twenty-five miles distant. His army was spread over an extent of ninety miles; before he could concentrate the Royalists were in his rear. As he retreated he received a further despatch from Bolívar authorising him to fight if he thought it necessary.
Sucre had under-estimated the strength of the Royalists. By calling in the outlying divisions La Serna had, on the 24th October, assembled 10,000 men, in three divisions of infantry under Canterac, Valdés, and Monet, and one of cavalry, which he commanded himself, with ten guns. Sucre had only 7,000 men and two guns.
La Serna manœuvred to cut off Sucre from his base, moving in a semicircle of which the Patriots held the centre. Sucre was thus enabled to concentrate his forces, and choose for himself the field of battle. He retreated on Huamanga, but on the 24th November, at the river Pampas, he found that the enemy by forced marches was there before him. The river lay between them. Three days were spent in manœuvres, after which Sucre crossed the river, but on the 2nd December found the heights of Matará in his front already occupied by the Royalists. Wheeling rapidly to his right, he passed by a gorge towards the valley of Acrocos, but his rearguard under Lara was overtaken in the pass by Valdés. One Columbian battalion was cut to pieces, and two more were dispersed with the loss of a gun on the 3rd December; but the further advance of the Royalists was checked by the main body stationed on the heights beyond. The two armies encamped for the night with the gorge between them.
The next day Sucre gained the valley of Acrocos and offered battle. But La Serna, anxious to cut him off from Jauja, marched round the left flank of the Patriots and again gained their rear, cutting all the bridges and closing the defiles to prevent their retreat. The people of the valleys rose in favour of the Royalists. A Patriot column, advancing from Jauja to join Sucre, was driven back; his sick were killed in the hospitals; and he had lost 600 men in the retreat. For him it was now victory or death.
He drew up his army in the valley of Ayacucho, his flanks resting on the mountain ranges to the east and to the west, while the Royalists occupied the heights in front. Cordoba commanded on the right, Miller in the centre, and La Mar on the left, and a reserve of three battalions was commanded by Lara.