On the 9th the broken bridge was repaired by the sappers, and while the whole army crossed, a squadron of grenadiers under Melian advanced to the hill of Chacabuco, and were there met by advanced parties of the column under Las Heras. Beltran had lost 6,000 mules out of 10,000, and two-thirds of his horses, but he brought all his guns with him.
Thus the preliminary operations were crowned with success. A strategic combination of movements over a frontage of 1,300 miles was completed in every point on the day prefixed by the author of the plan. He had reason to be proud of the exploit, but neither then or at any later date was he ever known to boast of it. He had at that time much else to think of, his cavalry horses were for the most part foundered by the passage of the rugged defiles, and he had no time to lose if he was to fight a decisive battle on the 15th as he had promised.
The judgment of posterity is unanimous in respect to the importance of the passage of the Andes by San Martin, not alone as a great military feat, but also for the influence it had upon the final result of the struggle for emancipation. Spanish historians speak of it as the turning-point of the contest between Spain and her colonies. In German military schools it is cited as an example of the importance of discipline in an army, and of the value of foresight and attention to details on the part of a general.
The passage of the Andes by San Martin was a feat requiring greater strategy and skill than the passages of the Alps by Hannibal and by Napoleon; it was unequalled till Bolívar repeated the exploit on the equator. If compared with the two former, it is seen to be a much greater achievement than either of them from its effects upon the destinies of the human race. In place of vengeance, greed, or of ambition, San Martin was animated by the hope of giving liberty and independence to a new world. The passage of the Andes by San Martin resulted in Maipó; the passage of the Andes by Bolívar resulted in Boyacá; two decisive victories which liberated entire peoples from the slavery of foreign despotism; the passages of the Alps by Hannibal and by Napoleon resulted only in the sterile victories of Trebia and of Marengo.
CHAPTER XIV.
CHACABUCO.
1817.
FROM San Felipe, San Martin sent off a trusty spy to Santiago with instructions to bring him back, on the third day, information of the movements of the enemy. He then set himself to work to prepare for battle, mounting his artillery and concentrating the different divisions. On the 10th February all the army was united on the open plain at the foot of the slope of Chacabuco.
On the 10th and 11th the engineers, protected by skirmishers, reconnoitred the roads and passes leading across the Sierra. On the 11th the spy returned, bringing answers to San Martin from his agents in the capital, and copies of the secret orders of Marcó. The spy had visited the barracks of the Royalist troops, and had counted those on the march for Chacabuco. San Martin then summoned a council of war.
The Sierra of Chacabuco rises to a height of 4,300 feet above the level of the sea. About three miles before reaching the summit, the main road from Santa Rosa to Santiago divides into two paths. That to the left, which is the shortest but also the steeper of the two, is still only a bridle-path; the other is now the main road, but was at that time little known. Both lead to the plain of Chacabuco, but the points at which they descend from the heights are nearly two miles distant one from the other. The left-hand path first reaches the lower ground near the head of a valley about three miles long, down which it winds until it joins the other path at the farmhouse of Chacabuco, which stands at the head of the plain.
From the summit of the Sierra the whole country is seen spreading out as a beautiful panorama. The plain at the foot, extending southwards some seven miles in the direction of Santiago, is shut in by the hills of Colina, through which there is a path. Behind lie the great masses of the Cordillera, to the west the spur runs on till it joins the coast range, as yet unseen.
San Martin informed his officers that he had determined to advance without waiting for the rest of his artillery, and to fight the decisive battle before the enemy had time to concentrate his forces. The army was to march in two columns by the diverging paths, which columns should debouch simultaneously upon the plain beyond, and attack the Royalist position in front and on the flank. The column of the right was put under command of Soler, and consisted of 2,100 men, with seven light guns. That of the left, under command of O’Higgins, consisted of 1,500 men, with two guns. The latter was to engage the attention of the enemy in front, without attacking the position, while Soler marched upon his left flank and rear, when a general advance would decide the day.