Government also sent San Martin his commission as Brigadier-General, the highest military grade in the Argentine service. He, in accordance with his previously expressed determination, declined the honour, but asked for further supplies of men, arms, and money, to carry on the campaign, and appointed himself General-in-Chief of the united Argentine and Chilian armies.
After arranging with the Chilian authorities for the formation of a naval squadron, and establishing in Santiago a Supreme Council of the Lautaro Lodge, half Chilians and half Argentines, he announced his intention of returning to Buenos Ayres to concert measures with Government for the prosecution of the war.
The Cabildo of Santiago offered him ten thousand ounces of gold for the expenses of his journey, which he declined to accept for himself, but devoted it to the establishment of a public library in that city.
One month after the battle he passed by the scene of his late victory, and saw there a mound of earth, under which lay the dead of the 12th February of the Patriot army, most of them negroes from Cuyo, liberated slaves. This mound was the first landmark of the War of Emancipation.
CHAPTER XV.
THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH OF CHILE.
1817.
AFTER the victory of Chacabuco, San Martin made three mistakes, two of mere detail, but one of importance, which had an evil influence upon his later operations. The campaign which ought to have finished immediately was thus prolonged, and he was compelled to fight four more battles to accomplish the reconquest of Chile, retarding by three years the prosecution of his great enterprise.
On the 12th February he remained encamped on the field of battle instead of pursuing the enemy at least to the end of the plain of Chacabuco. The following day, instead of marching upon the capital he ought to have pursued the fugitives to Valparaiso. By this mistake 1,600 veteran troops escaped to Peru, to act against him later on. But his great mistake consisted in his neglect to secure the fruits of his victory by an immediate campaign in the South. The military strength of Chile lay in the South—the people were warlike, the royal cause had there many partisans, and the country was full of strong military positions, in especial the fortress of Valdivia, backed by the islands of Chiloe, a sea-port by which reinforcements from Peru could be poured into the country. Looking far ahead, the victor of Chacabuco overlooked that which was close at hand.
Ordoñez was an officer of great talent, who up to that time had had no opportunity of distinguishing himself. He and San Martin had fought side by side against Napoleon. At the close of the war he was a colonel, and with this rank he came to America in 1815 as Governor of Concepcion. He was there still and now came forward as the most doughty opponent of his old comrade. He had no regular troops with him; but ably seconded by Sanchez, he summoned the militia, collected the soldiery dispersed to the north of the Maule, garrisoned the frontier of Arauco, fortified the Peninsula of Talcahuano, aided by the royal squadron, made large provision of supplies, and scoured the country from the Bio-Bio to the Maule with his light troops. For two months he was unmolested, and had time to organize a division of 1,000 men, and to receive a reinforcement from Lima of 1,600 regulars.
Freyre, after his success at Talca, had contented himself with intercepting communications, and his force was weakened by Rodriguez, who marched his guerillas to the North, while his instructions from San Martin to collect horses and cattle for the main army were neglected. At the same time several smaller parties of the Patriots were cut up by the Royalists.
San Martin did not totally neglect the South. On the 18th February a column of 1,000 men under Las Heras, left Santiago, and on the 4th March crossed the Maule and joined Freyre at Diguillin, but he marched so slowly that the enemy had plenty of time to prepare for him. O’Higgins, who was left in supreme command by San Martin, was greatly irritated at this delay, and in April marched himself to his assistance, with 800 men. But his progress was just as slow as that of Las Heras, who in the meantime, after calling a council of his officers to attest the meagreness of his equipment for such an expedition, marched resolutely on Concepcion, encamping on the 4th April at a farmhouse near to that city.