The Political Institutions of the Ancient Greeks

by Basil Edward Hammond

The first species was a form of government adopted by some Greek peoples after the fall of the heroic monarchies. In that age distinctions of class depended on military efficiency, and military efficiency on wealth. The only effective warriors were those who fought on horseback or from a chariot (we do not know whether chariots were still used in fighting, and Aristotle's words are ambiguous): those men who possessed horses, whether they served in war themselves or placed their horses at the disposal of other warriors, helped to furnish the effective part of the army; and, because they rendered this service to the community, they became the ruling class. In the Polity thus constituted the ruling class was not a large one, though larger than the ruling class in a mere oligarchy: and this species of Polity, though it was not oligarchy, had a somewhat oligarchical character. The second species of Polity was constructed on much the same lines as the first, but in a later age, when the effective warriors included not only the horsemen but also a much larger force of heavy armed infantry or hoplites. In this case, as in the other, military efficiency was dependent on property: the panoply, or complete suit of armour and set of weapons which a hoplite required, had to be skilfully wrought, and was a possession beyond the means of the poor, though it cost far less than the breeding and keep of a horse. The ruling class included every man who furnished, either for his own use or for use by another, either a war-horse or the equipment of a hoplite: and the ruling class was so large that the Polities of the second species were known in the times when they existed, though not in Aristotle's time, as democracies[233]. There were also many other varieties of Polities. In all of them, political power was shared by a class or classes which included a large part of the free men, and therefore the classes that were neither very rich nor very poor were of great political importance. The importance of the upper and middle classes might be secured by various methods: by conceding political rights only to those who had a certain amount of property, the amount being so fixed that those who had political rights were slightly more numerous than those who had them not; by giving political rights to all free men but compelling those who had property to be regular, under pain of a fine, in attendance at the assembly; or by other like devices.

The one feature common to all Polities was that they were made by a fusion of oligarchy and democracy. They were in one way democratic because they conceded political rights to a large body of free men: but in another sense they had a trace of oligarchy in their composition, because they gave more power to a man with property than to one who was very poor[234].

From what has been said it is clear that the second species of Polity is well exemplified in the system of government which existed in most of the German tribes in the time of Cæsar or Tacitus: a system in which the assembly of the warriors, including both horsemen and foot soldiers, determined the action of the community. The name Polity may also be applied to the government established at Athens by Solon, in which the power granted to the common people was only just so much as to prevent them from being disaffected[235]: and to the constitution of Cleisthenes, in which the assembly of the citizens was supreme, but did not hold its meetings very frequently, and showed no undue favour toward the poorer citizens. And, finally, all modern governments with popular representative institutions, though they differ from Aristotle's Polity in many important features, yet have more in common with that kind of government than with any other that Aristotle recognises.

(4) We turn to the three perverted forms of government. Democracy, the rule of the many (or rather of the poor, since the poor are always the most numerous) for the selfish interest of their own class, will be considered first, because it is the least strongly contrasted with the right polities which have been already examined. The word democracy, as has been noticed above, did not always denote an extreme democracy, for there was a time when it was applied to those moderate governments which Aristotle calls Polities: and Aristotle himself is not perfectly constant in his use of the word, since there is a passage[236] in which he makes it comprehend both moderate and extreme popular rule. The democracy however which we now have to consider is the extreme or thoroughgoing democracy.

From many passages in the Politics we learn what Aristotle regarded as the distinctive features and tendencies of complete democracy.

Democracy was a form of government which arose in cities with a large population and a large revenue: the whole of the citizens not only were theoretically admitted to a share in the work of governing, but actively and habitually exercised their powers, and those citizens who could not otherwise afford the time to attend assemblies were enabled to do so by receiving remuneration out of the state treasury. And indeed such a population had more leisure than any other for attendance at the assemblies and for serving on juries: for, as their private property was small, their time was not used up in attending to the management of it. The consequence was that under this form of government the ultimate authority in the state was not any established constitution but the mass of the poor citizens[237].

Again in another striking passage Aristotle says that there are democracies in which the ultimate authority is not the established constitution but the mass of the people and the resolutions which the people chooses to make.... In these democracies the common folk becomes a monarch, a monarch composed of many men, a multitude reigning collectively.... The common folk, being a monarch, determines to rule as a monarch owing no obedience to the constitution, so that, becoming a despot, it esteems most highly those men who flatter it the most: and this kind of democracy holds the same place among popular governments as tyranny among kingly governments. The same temper and character is found in this democracy as in tyranny: both of them are arbitrary rulers of the better citizens, only the one rules by resolutions, the other by decrees, and the one is influenced by demagogues, the other by personal adulators[238].

In yet other passages we are told that democratically governed cities are beyond all others anxious to ensure equality among their citizens, and that the use of ostracism for the expulsion of any man, who from wealth or personal popularity or from any other cause has unusual political influence, is a result of this anxiety[239]: and when we find that the practice of appointing to offices by drawing lots is democratic[240], we may observe (though Aristotle does not say so) that this also is a striking exemplification of the same guiding principle. When we read that the principle of democracy is freedom[241] we must, considering the tenor of two passages which have been already quoted, understand that the freedom that is meant is not the freedom of the individual but the freedom of the assembly to do whatever it pleases.

The marks then of a pure democracy as conceived by Aristotle are these: (1) All the citizens, and more especially the poor citizens, actively and habitually control the business of government, and come together in frequent general assemblies for that purpose: (2) The assembly of citizens is free to do whatever it pleases, not being bound to conform to any law, precedent, or established constitution: (3) Every citizen has, as far as the nature of things permits, an equal share with every other citizen of political power and the enjoyment of office.

It is certain that Aristotle regarded the Athenian constitution as an example of the genuine or extreme species of democracy, since that constitution cannot be brought under any of the other species which he defines: moreover he says explicitly that it is only in the extreme form of democracy that demagogues are to be found[242], and we know from history that demagogues were plentiful and powerful at Athens. But much of what he says about extreme democracy cannot be taken as referring to Athenian democracy: at any rate it does not accurately depict the democracy under which the Athenians lived. In support of these statements, I may adduce two facts. Firstly, the Athenian assembly was not in practice free to do whatever it liked, and was not above the law and the constitution. It could indeed decide in favour of an unconstitutional measure whenever it chose, and its decision was carried into effect: but the proposer of the measure acted at his peril. In case the people after accepting his proposal continued for a whole year to think it good and useful, he was safe: but if within the year his measure became unpopular, he was certain to be condemned under a Graphê Paranomôn, and to suffer heavy penalties. And secondly, the passage, in which Aristotle denounces extreme democracy for turning the common folk into an arbitrary ruler who defies law and precedent and oppresses the wealthier citizens, can only refer to cases in which the poorer classes take pleasure in reckless changes and in robbery of the rich: at Athens the assembly, though the poor citizens predominated in it, disliked changes and was considerate towards the wealthy citizens[243].