It signifies nothing to say that such a case could not occur, as the Americans do not impress seamen; for all who have attended to such subjects know well enough, that if they come to be engaged in a protracted war, especially at a distance from their own shores, there is no other possible way by which they can keep their armed ships manned. This, however, is not the point now in discussion. I merely wish to put the general case broadly before our own eyes, in order that we may bring it distinctly home to ourselves, and then see whether or not the Americans had reason for their indignation.
The truth is, they had very good reason to be annoyed; and if the guiding practical maxim amongst nations be, that ‘might makes right,’ as I conceive it always has been, and ever will be, so long as powder and shot exist, with money to back them, and energy to wield them,—then we really cannot pretend to find fault with the Americans, because they took advantage, or tried to take advantage, of that moment when, our ‘right’ being the same, our ‘might’ appeared to be waning. I allude to their declaring war against us in 1812, when we, fighting single-handed, in the cause of European independence, were so hard pressed by Napoleon and others. For the Americans to have taken an earlier share in the struggle against us, when we were lords of the ascendant, would have been the extremity of Quixotism. But when John Bull was pressed on all hands by numbers, and his strength exhausted by long contests, albeit in the cause of liberty, which his brother Jonathan professes to adore, he, Jonathan, would have been a fool, a character which he certainly never was accused of enacting, if he had not taken advantage of the moment to try his strength. The provocation we gave was certainly considerable, and the retort, it must be owned, very dexterously managed. The result, I trust, is, that things are on a better footing than before; both parties have learned civility and caution, and they will not agree the worse on that account. To forgive and forget, is the old English maxim, as our friends well know. Let them imitate us in this respect, and they will be all the happier, and not a whit less powerful.
In putting a parallel case to ours off New York, and supposing Liverpool to be blockaded by the Americans on the ground of their watching some French ships, I omitted to throw in one item, which is necessary to complete the parallel, and make it fit the one from which it is drawn.
Suppose the blockading American ships off Liverpool, in firing a shot ahead of a vessel they wished to examine, had accidentally hit, not that vessel, but a small coaster, so far beyond her, that she was not even noticed by the blockading ships. And suppose, further, this unlucky chance-shot to have killed one of the crew on board the said coaster: the vessel would, of course, proceed immediately to Liverpool with the body of their slaughtered countryman; and, in fairness, it may be asked, what would have been the effect of such a spectacle on the population of England—more particularly if such an event had occurred at the moment of a general election, when party politics, raging on this very question of foreign interference, was at its height?
This is not an imaginary case; for it actually occurred in 1804, when we were blockading the French frigates in New York. A casual shot from the Leander hit an unfortunate sloop’s main-boom; and the broken spar striking the mate, John Pierce by name, killed him instantly. The sloop sailed on to New York, where the mangled body, raised on a platform, was paraded through the streets, in order to augment the vehement indignation, already at a high pitch, against the English.
Now, let us be candid to our rivals; and ask ourselves, whether the Americans would have been worthy of our friendship, or even of our hostility, had they tamely submitted to indignities which, if passed upon ourselves, would have roused not only Liverpool, but the whole country, into a towering passion of nationality?
CHAPTER XII.
THE SCHOOLMASTER AFLOAT.
The union of abstract or theoretical study with actual practice, is one of the most important characteristics of a naval life; and the distinction is rendered still more remarkable, from its extending throughout the whole range of an officer’s career, from the very hour he enters the service as a midshipman, till he ends his life in battle, like Nelson, or worn out, like Collingwood, in command of a fleet. Every officer in the Navy, in short, who really cares about his business at all, may be said to be perpetually learning his profession, and as perpetually putting in practice what he learns; for by no exertion of talents or industry, can he ever expect to reach the top of his knowledge, or that point where further instruction will no longer prove useful to himself and his country. A naval man, therefore, however professionally employed, is kept constantly alive and active, as far as the pursuit of information is concerned. For there is a permanent and high bounty, as it were, upon every fresh acquirement; and the advantages of each new attainment are so great, and generally so soon felt, that, with a little address on the part of the higher authorities, there can never be wanting opportunities for bringing such information into useful operation. As, therefore, there is very seldom any want of stimulus amongst the young men on board a well-regulated ship; it becomes of great consequence, not only to create and keep alive this impulse, but also to give it a right direction, and so to guide its energies, that the result may be productive of benefit, not merely to the officers themselves, but to their country.
The nature of the sea service is such, that it must be entered at an early age, otherwise its duties are sure to disgust. But unless a boy happens to be one of those prodigies, (who, in the long run, seldom turn out worth sixpence!) he must almost necessarily be very ignorant when he commences his sea life. Once afloat, however, the occupations of the ship are quite sufficient to keep his body in healthful exercise, and the variety of new objects he sees will generally prevent his mind from ever wearying. Yet unless some consistent, uniform means be taken to cherish his nascent mental energies, and to give a right direction to that desire for knowledge which belongs to his age, and, above all, to found and regulate his principles; the chances are but too great that he may speedily run to weeds and waste, in spite of the best possible disposition on his part to do right.
Persons who have not had the means of becoming acquainted with the dangers that beset a young man, on his first going to sea, and even for some time afterwards, can form no adequate conception of the risk which he incurs of having his taste and morals corrupted, and the best faculties of his mind not only neglected, but often irretrievably shaken. Nor must people hope, that by sending a boy under the protection of the captain, or one of the officers, these evils will always be warded off. The danger may be lessened, it is true; but it cannot be effectually guarded against, and for a very plain reason. In ships actively employed, hardly any officer has leisure to devote the requisite amount of time to the superintendence of a boy under his charge; and still less frequently has he either capacity or temper for the arduous task of education. To which it may be added, that, even under favourable circumstances, the duties of an officer, and his assigned position in the ship, generally keep him too much apart from the midshipmen to enable him to exercise, to the extent we could wish, that degree of watchfulness over his protégé’s habits, without which the utmost care may often prove ineffectual in maintaining his young friend in the right path.