In the territory of the Rhine-Bund, there was, however, very little real patriotism among the people: in Austria the latter were still kept down by the Jesuitic rule of the Hapsburgs: only in the smaller Saxon Duchies, and in Prussia, the idea of resistance was fostered, though in spite of Frederick William III. Indeed, the temporary removal of the king was for awhile secretly advocated. Hardenberg and Scharnhorst did their utmost to prepare the people for the struggle which they knew would come: the former introduced new laws, based on the principle of the equality of all citizens before the law, their equal right to development, protection and official service. Scharnhorst, the son of a peasant, trained the people for military duty, in defiance of France: he kept the number of soldiers at 42,000, in accordance with the treaty, but as fast as they were well-drilled, he sent them home and put fresh recruits in their place. In this manner he gradually prepared 150,000 men for the army.
GERMANY under NAPOLEON, 1812.
1811.
Alexander I. of Russia had by this time lost his sentimental friendship for Napoleon. The seizure by the latter of the territory of the Duke of Oldenburg, who was his near relation, greatly offended him: he grew tired of submitting to the Continental Blockade, and in 1811 adopted commercial laws which amounted to its abandonment. Then Napoleon showed his own overwhelming arrogance; and his course once more illustrated the abject condition of Germany. Every ruler saw that a great war was coming, and had nearly a year's time for decision; but all submitted! Early in 1812 the colossal plan was put into action: Prussia agreed to furnish 20,000 soldiers, Austria 30,000, and the Rhine-Bund, which comprised the rest of Germany, was called upon for 150,000. France furnished more than 300,000, and this enormous military force was set in motion against Russia, which was at the time unable to raise half that number of troops. In May Napoleon and Maria Louisa held a grand Court in Dresden, which a crowd of reigning princes attended, and where even Francis I. and Frederick William III. were treated rather as vassals than as equals. This was the climax of Napoleon's success. Regardless of distance, climate, lack of supplies and all the other impediments to his will, he pushed forward with an army greater than Europe had seen since the days of Attila, but from which only one man, horse and cannon out of every ten returned.
After holding a grand review on the battle-field of Friedland, he crossed the Niemen and entered Russia on the 24th of June, met the Russians in battle at Smolensk on the 16th and 17th of August, and after great losses continued his march towards Moscow through a country which had been purposely laid waste, and where great numbers of his soldiers perished from hunger and fatigue. On the 7th of September, the Russian army of 120,000 men met him on the field of Borodino, where occurred the most desperate battle of all his wars. At the close of the fight 80,000 dead and wounded (about an equal number on each side) lay upon the plain. The Russians retreated, repulsed but not conquered, and on the 14th of September Napoleon entered Moscow. The city was deserted by its inhabitants: all goods and treasures which could be speedily removed had been taken away, and the next evening flames broke out in a number of places. The conflagration spread so that within a week four-fifths of the city were destroyed: Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin and escape through burning streets; and thus the French army was left without winter-quarters and provisions.
1812. THE RETREAT FROM RUSSIA.
After offering terms of peace in vain, and losing a month of precious time in waiting, nothing was left for Napoleon but to commence his disastrous retreat. Cut off from the warmer southern route by the Russians on the 24th of October, his army, diminishing day by day, endured all the horrors of the Northern winter, and lost so many in the fearful passage of the Beresina and from the constant attacks of the Cossacks, that not more than 30,000 men, famished, frozen and mostly without arms, crossed the Prussian frontier about the middle of December. After reaching Wilna, Napoleon had hurried on alone, in advance: his passage through Germany was like a flight, and he was safe in Paris before the terrible failure of his campaign was generally known throughout Europe.
When Frederick William III. agreed to furnish 20,000 troops to France, his best generals—Blücher, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau—and three hundred officers resigned. The command of the Prussian contingent was given to General York, who was sent to Riga during the march to Moscow, and escaped the horrors of the retreat. When the fate of the campaign was decided, he left the French with his remaining 17,000 Prussian soldiers, concluded a treaty of neutrality with the Russian general Diebitsch, called an assembly of the people together in Königsberg, and boldly ordered that all men capable of bearing arms should be mustered into the army. Frederick William, in Berlin, disavowed this act, but the Prussian people were ready for it. The excitement became so great, that the men who had influence with the king succeeded in having his Court removed to Breslau, where an alliance was entered into with Alexander I., and on the 17th of March, 1813, an address was issued in the king's name, calling upon the people to choose between victory and ruin. The measures which York had adopted were proclaimed for all Prussia, and the patriotic schemes of Stein and Hardenberg, so long thwarted by the king's weakness, were thus suddenly carried into action.
1813.