1869. CHANGES IN AUSTRIA.

The experience of the next three years showed how completely the new order of things was accepted by the great majority of the German people. Even in Austria, the defeat at Königgrätz and the loss of Venetia were welcomed by the Hungarians and Slavonians, and hardly regretted by the German population, since it was evident that the Imperial Government must give up its absolutist policy or cease to exist. In fact, the former Ministry was immediately dismissed: Count Beust, a Saxon and a Protestant, was called to Vienna, and a series of reforms was inaugurated which did not terminate until the Hungarians had won all they demanded in 1848, and the Germans and Bohemians enjoyed full as much liberty as the Prussians.

The Seven Weeks' War of 1866, in fact, was a phenomenon in history; no nation ever acquired so much fame and influence in so short a time, as Prussia. The relation of the king, and especially of the statesman who guided him, Count Bismarck, towards the rest of Germany, was suddenly and completely changed. Napoleon III. was compelled to transfer Venetia to Italy, and thus his declaration in 1859 that "Italy should be free, from the Alps to the Adriatic," was made good,—but not by France. While the rest of Europe accepted the changes in Germany with equanimity, if not with approbation, the vain and sensitive people of France felt themselves deeply humiliated. Thus far, the policy of Napoleon III. had seemed to preserve the supremacy of France in European politics. He had overawed England, defeated Russia, and treated Italy as a magnanimous patron. But the best strength of Germany was now united under a new Constitution, after a war which made the achievements at Magenta, Solferino and in the Crimea seem tame. The ostentatious designs of France in Mexico came also to a tragic end in 1867, and her disgraceful failure there only served to make the success of Prussia, by contrast, more conspicuous.

1869.

The opposition to Napoleon III. in the French Assembly made use of these facts to increase its power. His own success had been due to good luck rather than to superior ability: he was now more than sixty years old, he had become cautious and wavering in his policy, and he undoubtedly saw how much would be risked in provoking a war with the North-German Union; but the temper of the French people left him no alternative. He had certainly meant to interfere in 1866, had not the marvellous rapidity of Prussia prevented it. That France had no shadow of right to interfere, was all the same to his people: they held him responsible for the creation of a new political Germany, which was apparently nearly as strong as France, and that was a thing not to be endured. He yielded to the popular excitement, and only waited for a pretext which might justify him before the world in declaring war.

Such a pretext came in 1870. The Spaniards had expelled their Bourbon Queen, Isabella, in 1868, and were looking about for a new monarch from some other royal house. Their choice fell upon Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, a distant relation of William I. of Prussia, but also nearly connected with the Bonaparte family through his wife, who was a daughter of the Grand-Duchess Stephanie Beauharnais. On the 6th of July, Napoleon's minister, the Duke de Gramont, declared to the French Assembly that this choice would never be tolerated by France. The French ambassador in Prussia, Benedetti, was ordered to demand of King William that he should prohibit Prince Leopold from accepting the offer. The king answered that he could not forbid what he had never advised; but, immediately afterwards (on the 12th of July), Prince Leopold voluntarily declined, and all cause of trouble seemed to be removed.

1870. FRANCE INSISTS ON WAR.

The French people, however, were insanely bent upon war. The excitement was so great, and so urgently fostered by the Empress Eugenie, the Duke de Gramont, and the army, that Napoleon III. again yielded. A dispatch was sent to Benedetti: "Be rough to the king!" The ambassador, who was at the baths of Ems, where William I. was also staying, sought the latter on the public promenade and abruptly demanded that he should give France a guarantee that no member of the house of Hohenzollern should ever accept the throne of Spain. The ambassador's manner, even more than his demand, was insulting: the king turned upon his heel, and left him standing. This was on the 13th of July: on the 15th the king returned to Berlin, and on the 19th France formally declared war.

It was universally believed that every possible preparation had been made for this step. In fact, Marshal Le Bœuf assured Napoleon III. that the army was "more than ready," and an immediate French advance to the Rhine was anticipated throughout Europe. Napoleon relied upon detaching the Southern German States from the Union, upon revolts in Hesse and Hannover, and finally, upon alliances with Austria and Italy. The French people were wild with excitement, which took the form of rejoicing: there was a general cry that Napoleon I.'s birthday, the 15th of August, must be celebrated in Berlin. But the German people, North and South, rose as one man: for the first time in her history, Germany became one compact, national power. Bavarian and Hannoverian, Prussian and Hessian, Saxon and Westphalian joined hands and stood side by side. The temper of the people was solemn, but inflexibly firm: they did not boast of coming victory, but every one was resolved to die rather than see Germany again overrun by the French.