William Jay and the Constitutional Movement for the Abolition of Slavery

by Bayard Tuckerman

As opposition diminished and their path became easier, abolitionists began to differ among themselves as to the best means to attain their ends and as to the fundamental principles of their cause. In New York State a tendency was developed, under the leadership of Gerrit Smith, to adopt political methods. In Boston moral agitation remained the accepted means. But here novel theories on other subjects were being adopted by leading antislavery people and thus associated in the public mind with antislavery itself. Garrison adopted and recommended in the Liberator his no-government and non-resistance doctrines. He put forth new and not generally accepted views regarding the observance of Sunday. He took pains to declare that he adopted these theories in his private capacity, and not as an abolitionist. But he had many followers who did not discriminate so carefully. The public mind became confused and began to associate abolitionism with a variety of novel and unpopular opinions. The cause was thus obstructed and divisions occurred among those who laboured for the emancipation of the negro. Up to this time women had not taken part in public meetings, and to many persons the idea of their doing so was repugnant. The admission of women to membership and office in the same societies as men was determined in Boston in 1838, after a struggle and amidst much objection.

"I have observed," wrote Jay in a private letter in 1838, "frequent attempts to use abolition as a pack-horse to carry forth into the world some favourite notion having no legitimate connection with the antislavery cause; and have witnessed the dissensions caused in our ranks by such inconsiderate and dishonest assumptions. Thus I have known an official document, under the signature of a secretary of a State society, pass a high eulogium on a particular form of Church government; and I have seen an editorial article in an official antislavery periodical recommending a decoction of dried currants as a substitute for the fermented juice of the grape in the observance of the Lord's Supper! All such perversions of antislavery influence appear to me to be dishonest in their character, and dangerous in their consequences to the continuance and efficiency of our organization. No one is more strenuous than myself for the right of opinion and discussion; but common justice and fairness require that we should not make others responsible for our peculiar opinions, nor seek to propagate them by means entrusted to us for very different purposes.

"The practice of passing numerous resolutions at our antislavery meetings strikes me as a growing and pernicious evil. Too many seem to think that all our objects are to be effected by resolutions; and amid the vast multitude that are proposed and adopted with little reflection, it is not surprising, yet deeply to be deplored, that some are false in fact, more false in sentiment, and very many coarse and vulgar in expression. Falsehood is not the less immoral for being employed in a good cause, and it is very unwise to impair the charms of Truth by arraying her in vulgar attire. It is to be wished that our meetings may in future be less prodigal of their resolutions, and more circumspect as to the matter and language."

Judge Jay looked with dismay upon the novel doctrines on other subjects which were becoming associated with antislavery in the public mind. He deplored the loss of strength which must result from a departure from the singleness of purpose announced in the declaration of principles at the founding of the American Antislavery Society. And there were differences of opinion arising on the fundamental principles of the cause which troubled him still more. As has been shown in these pages, he had joined the American Antislavery Society only after a deliberate examination of its constitution and the conviction that its principles were in strict accordance with the Constitution of the United States. He was as strong an advocate of emancipation as lived, but to him the Constitution was the supreme law under which all benefits could be and must be obtained. Efforts to seek the abolition of slavery by arguments or conduct in violation of the Constitution seemed to him wicked in themselves and fatal to the cause. Such efforts he had now to combat.

At the sixth anniversary of the Massachusetts Antislavery Society, held in January, 1838, the business committee, composed of Messrs. Garrison, Phelps, May, and Fairbanks, reported the following resolution:

"Resolved, That in order to bring our coloured friends within the brotherhood of this nation, we will encourage them in petitioning to Congress, in their own names, for the redress of their grievances, and, if not successful, then we will lend them our aid in bringing their cause before the court of the United States to ascertain if a man can be held in bondage agreeably to the principles contained in the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of our country."

Judge Jay wrote a letter to Mr. Ellis Gray Loring, March 5th, asking for more definite information as to the true intent of the society in passing the resolution.

"Who are the coloured friends alluded to?" he asked. "Obviously slaves, because if Congress does not redress their grievances, then the society is to lead them into the court of the United States to ascertain whether a man can be held in bondage.

"What grievances are the slaves, under the encouragement of the society, to petition Congress to redress? Obviously those they suffer as slaves, because if Congress does not redress them, redress is to be sought in the court, by demanding if a man can be held in bondage, that is, as a slave.

"What slaves are intended by the resolution? No qualification or limitation whatever is expressed or implied. The Society, no doubt, recognizes the slaves of Georgia as its coloured friends as well as the slaves of the District of Columbia. The resolution is the tenth of a series of resolutions reported by the committee, and in none of them is any mention made of the District of Columbia, and, moreover, the question to be decided by the court is not whether an inhabitant of the District can be held as a slave, but whether a man can be held in bondage agreeably to the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of our country, and the tribunal to decide this question is not the court of the District but the court of the United States.