The Captain being anxious to correct a statement so devoid of truth, and which impeached his loyalty to the South, wrote to the editor of the “New York Times,” but as the sequel shows he was not permitted to send the letter, and thus the ignorant of the North were led to believe this lie, as they have thousands of others circulated in the same way, and without the shadow of foundation in truth:
“Old Capitol Prison, Washington, D.C., June 20, 1862.
To the Editor of the New York Times,
Sir: A paragraph appeared in your edition of yesterday, headed “the Louisiana Tiger,” and I infer that the informer, who furnished matter for this paragraph, must have been made the dupe of a joker. I am no tiger, but the Captain of Company F, sixth regiment Louisiana volunteers. I have been on parole some days, anxiously awaiting an exchange. “Lionizing” is no amusement to me, but a great bore. My convictions, as well as my heart, are with my brethren, who are fighting in defence of my invaded country. I would that my strong right arm were there also. I trust this will be a sufficient answer to the New Orleans gentleman, who has dared to cast a stigma upon my loyalty and devotion to the South; and if further proof of the fact were necessary, it may be discovered in the act of Mr. Secretary Stanton, who has ordered me to be incarcerated in this place.
Respectfully your obedient servant,
WM. MONAGHAN,
Captain Company F, 6th Regiment Louisiana Volunteers,
Prisoner of War.”
This letter was sent to the Provost Marshal for approval, but was returned with the following note from Mr. William P. Wood, the superintendent of the prison:
”Old Capitol Prison, June 25, 1862.
The foregoing communication was placed in my hands by Captain Monaghan, to be examined at the Provost Marshal’s office, and has been returned to me marked “not approved,” and is returned to Captain M. by me, such being the usual procedure with letters “not approved.”
WM. P. WOOD,
Superintendent.”
Saturday, June 21st. P. C. H. called to see me to-day. He is a clerk in the Adjutant General’s office, but was formerly with me in the United States Patent office. A member of Company F, 35th Georgia, died in prison to-day, but I could not learn his name.
June 22d. The Rev. Father Boyle, (Catholic Priest,) called to see me to-day. He was allowed to come into my room alone, upon a promise not to talk about war matters. He brought me a copy of the “National Intelligencer” of June 12th, from which I extract the following:
“COTTON BURNING.”
The London Star of May 27th thus appreciates the Confederate policy of cotton burning:
“If it be true that thousands of bales of goods—incapable of being converted into munitions of war, and absolutely secure, as private properly, from confiscation by the Federals—are being burnt or rolled into the river, the Confederates are committing social as well as political suicide. It is an act that has no comparison in modern history. It is not, like the destruction of Moscow, an act of desperate patriotism, for it impoverishes the vanquished, without in the least injuring the victors. If all the cotton, tobacco and sugar between Richmond and Mobile were given to the flames, it would not retard by an hour the fall of those cities, nor enhance by a dollar the cost of the conquest. Neither can it be supposed, except by men whose offences and disasters have phrenzied their intellects, that these huge incendiarisms will attract the slightest favor to their cause from across the Atlantic. They must be mad, indeed, to reckon that England and France will come to the help of men who are wantonly injuring themselves and the subjects of those powers. The only kindness that Europe can show them, is to advise that they abstain from such barbarous outrages, and make their peace as quickly as they can with the government that is as superior in right as in strength, having both the right and the power to retaliate upon such atrocities by a splendid act of mercy to mankind.”
ANOTHER BATTLE WITH JACKSON’S ARMY.
Advices received at the War Department state that Jackson’s army attacked General Shields’s advance on Monday morning, near Port Republic. The conflict is said to have been maintained for about four hours by about two thousand of our men against the main body of Jackson’s army. The enemy’s force became so overwhelming in number that our advance was compelled to fall back, which it did in good order, until it met the main body of General Shields’s Command, near Conrad’s store. As soon as this was effected, the enemy in turn retired. The fighting is said to have been very severe, and the loss heavy on both sides. No further particulars have reached the department.
AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE.
Luray, Va., June 10, 1862.
Colonel Carroll, commanding the fourth brigade, consisting of the eighty-fourth Pennsylvania, the eleventh Pennsylvania, the seventh Indiana, and the first Virginia regiments, altogether about sixteen hundred strong, reached Port Republic on Sunday, and reconnoitered and found the enemy in the town. They had a skirmish, and concluded to hold the bridge. They ordered it not to be burned, and put guns in position commanding it.
At six o’clock on Monday this battery was opened upon by some twenty heavy guns, which were placed in position during the night. Our forces tried to reach the bridge repeatedly to destroy it, but were met by storms of bullets, and had to retire. A large cavalry force crossed and attacked our troops, while their infantry followed our men, opposing them at every step, after driving them back with heavy loss; but our numbers, after General Tyler’s third brigade arrived, were so much inferior to the enemy—theirs being at least five to one—that our position became so untenable, that it was impossible to hold it. We were therefore compelled to fall back, our boys fighting every foot of the way. After falling back some three or four miles, a body of cavalry were sent to attack us, but were received in such a manner as to compel them to retire, after which the engagement ended, having lasted about five hours.
Our loss in killed and wounded is not known, but it is large, as is also that of the enemy. We lost a large number of prisoners.
Colonel Carroll’s horse fell, injuring the Colonel badly, and Captain Kelly, of General Shields’s staff, was also much injured in the head. He received praise from all who witnessed his conduct in the action.
Colonel Buckley, of the 29th Ohio, was badly wounded. His men charged three times to obtain possession of his body, but it was carried off by the enemy.
General Ashby, of cavalry notoriety, was positively killed during the fight at the bridge over Middle river. Captain Keogh charged with a body of cavalry, and held the bridge some time during a terrible storm of grape.
This was one of the most hotly contested engagements of the whole war, as is indicated by the loss compared with the numbers engaged, who fought like demons.
Two regiments from the first brigade arrived in time to assist in covering the retreat. The pioneer corps also assisted. Colonel Buckley has arrived here wounded.
THE RETREAT OF GENERAL BANKS—HIS OFFICIAL REPORT.
Report of the march of the first division fifth corps d’armie from Strasburg, Virginia, to Williamsport, Maryland, on the 24th and 25th days of May, 1862.
Headquarters Army Shenandoah.
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
Information was received on the evening of May 23d, that the enemy, in very large force, had descended on the guard at Front Royal, Colonel Kenly, first Maryland regiment, commanding, burning the bridges and driving our troops toward Strasburg with great loss. Owing to what was deemed an extravagant statement of the enemy’s strength, these reports were received with some distrust; but a regiment of infantry, with a strong detachment of cavalry and a section of artillery, were immediately sent to reinforce Colonel Kenly. Later in the evening despatches from fugitives who had escaped to Winchester informed us that Colonel Kenly’s force had been destroyed, with but few exceptions, and the enemy, 15,000 or 20,000 strong, were advancing by rapid marches on Winchester.
Orders were immediately given to halt the reinforcements sent to Front Royal, which had moved by different routes, and detachments of troops, under experienced officers, were sent in every direction to explore the roads leading from Front Royal to Strasburg, Middletown, Newtown and Winchester, to ascertain the force, position and purpose of this sudden movement of the enemy. It was soon found that his pickets were in possession of every road, and rumors from every quarter represented him in movement, in the rear of his pickets, in the direction of our camp.
The extraordinary force of the enemy could no longer be doubted. It was apparent, also, that they had a more extended purpose than the capture of the brave little band at Front Royal.
This purpose could be nothing less than the defeat of my own command, or its possible capture by occupying Winchester, and by this movement intercepting supplies or reinforcements, and cutting off all possibility of retreat.
It was also apparent, from the reports of fugitives, prisoners, Union men, and our own reconnoitering parties, that the three divisions of the enemy’s troops, known to be in the valley, and embracing at least 25,000 men, were united and close upon us, in some enterprise not yet developed.
The suggestion, that had their object been a surprise, they would not have given notice of their approach by an attack on Front Royal, was answered by the fact, that on the only remaining point of attack—the Staunton road—our outposts were five miles in advance, and daily reconnaissances made for a distance of twelve hides towards Woodstock.
Under this interposition of the enemy’s plans, our position demanded instant decision and action. Three courses were open to us: First, a retreat across Little North Mountain to the Potomac river, on the west. Second, an attack upon the enemy’s flank on the Front Royal road. Third, a rapid movement direct upon Winchester, with a view to anticipate his occupation of the town by seizing it ourselves, thus placing my command in communication with its original base of operations, in the line of reinforcements by Harper’s Ferry and Martinsburg, and securing a safe retreat in case of disaster.
To remain at Strasburg was to be surrounded; to move over the mountains was to abandon our train at the outset, and to subject my command to flank attacks, without possibility of succor; and to attack the enemy in such overwhelming force could only result in certain destruction. It was, therefore, determined to enter the lists with the enemy in a race or a battle, as he should choose, for the possession of Winchester, the key of the valley, and for us the position of safety.
THE MARCH.
At three o’clock, A.M., the 24th instant, the reinforcements, infantry, artillery and cavalry, sent to Colonel Kenly, were recalled; the advance guard, Colonel Donnelly’s brigade, were ordered to return to Strasburg. Several hundred disabled men, left in our charge by Shields’ division, were put upon the march, and our wagon train ordered forward to Winchester under escort of cavalry and infantry. General Hatch, with nearly our whole force of cavalry, and six pieces of artillery, was charged with the protection of the rear of the column, and the destruction of army stores, for which transportation was not provided, with instructions to remain in front of the town as long as possible, and hold the enemy in check, our expectations of attack being in that direction. All these orders were executed with incredible alacrity, and soon after nine o’clock the column was on the march, Colonel Donnelly in front, Colonel Gordon in the centre, and General Hatch in the rear.
The column had passed Cedar creek, about three miles from Strasburg, with the exception of the rear guard, still in front of Strasburg, when information was received from the front that the enemy had attacked the train, and was in full possession of the road at Middletown. This report was confirmed by the return of fugitives, refugees and wagons, which came tumbling to the rear in fearful confusion.
It being apparent now that our immediate danger was in front, the troops were ordered to the head of the column, and the train to the rear, and, in view of a possible necessity of our return to Strasburg, Captain James W. Albert, Topographical corps, who associated with him the Zouaves D’Afrique, Captain Collis, was ordered to prepare Cedar creek bridge for the flames, in order to prevent a pursuit in that direction by the enemy. In the execution of this order Captain Albert and the Zouaves were cut off from the column, which they joined at Williamsport. They had at Strasburg a sharp conflict with the enemy, in which his cavalry suffered severely. An interesting report of this affair will be found in the reports of Captain Albert and Captain Collis.
THE FIRST CONFLICT.
The head of the reorganized column, Colonel Donnelly commanding, encountered the enemy in force at Middletown, about thirteen miles from Winchester. Three hundred troops had been seen in town, but it soon appeared that larger forces were in the rear. The brigade halted, and the forty-sixth Pennsylvania, Colonel Knipe, was ordered to penetrate the woods on the right and dislodge the enemy’s skirmishers. They were supported by a section of Cochran’s New York battery. Five companies of the enemy’s cavalry were discovered in an open field in the rear of the woods, and our artillery, masked at first by the infantry, opened fire upon them. They stood fire for a while, but at length retreated, pursued by our skirmishers. The twenty eighth New York, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, was now brought up, and under a heavy fire of infantry and artillery the enemy were driven back more than two miles from the pike. Colonel Donnelly being informed at that point by a citizen, in great alarm, that four thousand men were in the woods beyond, the men were anxious to continue the fight; but as this would have defeated our object by the loss of valuable time, with the exception of a small guard, they were ordered to resume the march.
This affair occurred under my own observation, and I have great pleasure in vouching for the admirable conduct of officers and men. We lost one man killed and some wounded. The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained.
This episode, with the change of front, occupied nearly an hour, but it saved our column. Had the enemy vigorously attacked our train while at the head of the column, it would have been thrown into such dire confusion as to have made a successful continuation of our march impossible. Pending this contest, Colonel Broadhead, of the first Michigan cavalry, was ordered to advance, and, if possible, to cut his way through and occupy Winchester. It was the report of this energetic officer that gave us the first assurance that our course was yet clear, and he was the first of our column to enter the town.
THE SECOND COMBAT.
When it was first reported that the enemy had pushed between us and Winchester, General Hatch was ordered to advance with all his available cavalry from Strasburg, leaving Colonel De Forrest to cover the rear, and destroy stores not provided with transportation. Major Vought, fifth New York cavalry, had been previously ordered to reconnoitre the Front Royal road to ascertain the position of the enemy, whom he encountered in force near Middletown, and was compelled to fall back, immediately followed by the enemy’s cavalry, infantry and artillery. In this affair five of our men were killed and several wounded. The enemy’s loss is not known.
After repeated attempts to force a passage through the lines of the enemy, now advanced to the pike, General Hatch, satisfied that this result could not be accomplished without great loss, and supposing our army to have proceeded but a short distance, turned to the left, and moving upon a parallel road, made several ineffectual attempts to effect a junction with the main column. At Newtown, however, he found Colonel Gordon holding the enemy in check, and joined his brigade. Major Collins, with three companies of cavalry, mistaking the point where the main body of the cavalry left the road, dashed upon the enemy until stopped by a barricade of wagons, and the tempestuous fire of infantry and artillery. His loss must have been severe.
Six companies of the fifth New York, Colonel De Forrest, and six companies of the first Vermont cavalry, Colonel Tompkins, after repeated and desperate efforts to effect a junction with the main body—the road now being filled with infantry, artillery and cavalry—fell back to Strasburg, where they found the Zouaves D’Afrique. The fifth New York, failing to effect a junction at Winchester, and also at Martinsburg, came in at Clear Spring, with a train of thirty two wagons and many stragglers. The first Vermont, Colonel Tompkins, joined us at Winchester, with six pieces of artillery, and participated in the fight of the next morning. Nothing could surpass the celerity and spirit with which the various companies of cavalry executed their movements or their intrepid charges upon the enemy.
General Hatch deserves great credit for the manner in which he discharged his duties as chief of cavalry in this part of our march, as well as at the fight at Winchester, and in covering the rear of our column to the river; but especially for the spirit infused into his troops during the brief period of his command, which, by confession of friend and foe, had been equal if not superior to the best of the enemy’s long trained mounted troops.
From this point the protection of the rear of the column devolved upon the forces under Colonel Gordon.
THE THIRD COMBAT.
The guard having been separated from the column, and the rear of the train having been attacked by an increased force near the bridge between Newtown and Kearnstown, Colonel Gordon was directed to send back the second Massachusetts, Lieutenant Colonel Brown to rescue the rear of the train and hold the enemy in check. They found him at Newtown, with a strong force of infantry, cavalry and artillery.
The second Massachusetts was employed in the field, supported by the twenty-eighth New York and twenty-seventh Indiana, and ordered to drive the enemy from the town, and the battery was at the same time so placed as to silence the guns of the enemy.
Both these objects were quickly accomplished. They found it impossible to reach Middletown, so as to enable the cavalry under General Hatch to join the column, or to cover entirely the rear of the train. Large bodies of the enemy’s cavalry passed upon our right and left, and the increased vigor of his movements demonstrated the rapid advance of the main body. A cavalry charge made upon our troops was received in squares on the right and on the road, and in the line of the left, which repelled his assault, and gained time to reform the train, to cover its rear, and to burn the disabled wagons. This affair occupied several hours—the regiments having been moved to the rear about six o’clock, and not reaching the town until after twelve.
A full report by Colonel Gordon, who commanded in person, is enclosed herewith. The principal loss of the second Massachusetts occurred in this action.
THE FIGHT AT WINCHESTER.
The strength and purpose of the enemy were to us unknown when we reached Winchester, except upon surmise and vague rumors from Front Royal. These rumors were strengthened by the vigor with which the enemy had pressed our main column, and defeated at every point efforts of detachments to effect a junction with the main column.
At Winchester, however, all suspicion was relieved on that subject, all classes—Secessionists, Unionists, Refugees and Prisoners—agreed that the enemy’s force at or near Winchester was overwhelming, ranging from 25,000 to 30,000. Rebel officers, who came into our camp with entire unconcern, supposing that their own troops occupied the town, as a matter of course, and were captured, confirmed these statements, and added that an attack would be made on us at daybreak. I determined to test the substance and strength of the enemy by actual collision, and measures were promptly taken to prepare our troops to meet them. They had taken up their positions on entering the town after dark, without expectation of a battle, and were at disadvantage, as compared with the enemy.
The rolling of musketry was heard during the latter part of the night, and before the break of day a sharp engagement occurred at the outposts. Soon after four o’clock the artillery opened its fire, which continued without cessation till the close of the engagement.
The right of our line was occupied by the third brigade, Colonel George H. Gordon commanding. The regiments were strongly posted, and near the centre covered by stone walls from the fire of the enemy.
Their infantry opened on the right, and soon both lines were under heavy fire.
The left was occupied by the third brigade, Colonel Dudley Donnelly commanding.
The line was weak, compared with that of the enemy, but the troops were posted, and patiently awaited, as they nobly improved their coming opportunity. The earliest movements of the enemy were on our left, two regiments being sent to move, as with the purpose of occupying a position in flank or rear. General Hatch sent a detachment of cavalry to intercept this movement, when it was apparently abandoned. The enemy suffered very serious loss from the fire of our infantry on the left. One regiment is represented by persons present during the action and after the field was evacuated as nearly destroyed.
The main body of the enemy was hidden during the early part of the action by the crest of the hill and the woods in the rear.
Their force was massed apparently upon our right, and their manœuvres indicated a purpose to turn us upon the Berryville road, where it appeared subsequently they had placed a considerable force, with a view of preventing reinforcements from Harper’s Ferry. But the steady fire of our lines held them in check, until a small portion of the troops, on the right of our line, made a movement to the rear. It is but just to add that this was done under the erroneous impression that an order to withdraw had been given. No sooner was this observed by the enemy, than its regiments swarmed upon the crest of the hill, advancing from the woods upon our right, which, still continuing its fire steadily, withdrew towards the town.
The overwhelming force of the enemy, now suddenly showing itself, making further resistance unwise, orders were sent to the left by Captain De Hauteville to withdraw, which was done reluctantly, but in order, the enemy having greatly suffered in the wing. A portion of the troops passed through the town in some confusion, but the column was soon reformed, and continued its march in order. This engagement held the enemy in check five hours.
The forces engaged were greatly unequal. Indisposed to accept the early rumors concerning the enemy’s strength, I reported to the department that it was about 15,000. It is now conclusively shown that not less than 25,000 men were in position, and could have been brought into action. On the right and left their great superiority of numbers was plainly felt and seen, and the signal officers, from elevated positions, were enabled to count regimental standards, indicating a strength equal to that above stated.
My own command consisted of two brigades of less than four thousand men, all told, with nine hundred cavalry, ten Parrott guns, and one battery of six-pounders, smooth bore cannon. To this should be added the tenth Maine regiment of infantry, and five companies of Maryland cavalry, stationed at Winchester, which were engaged in the action. The loss of the enemy was treble that of ours in killed and wounded. In prisoners ours greatly exceeded theirs.
Officers, whose word I cannot doubt, have stated, as the result of their own observation, that our men were fired upon from private dwellings in passing through Winchester; but I am credibly informed, and gladly believe, that the atrocities said to have been perpetrated upon our wounded soldiers by the rebels are greatly exaggerated, or entirely untrue.
Our march was turned in the direction of Martinsburg, hoping there to meet with reinforcements—the troops moving in three parallel columns, each protected by an efficient rear guard. Pursuit by the enemy was prompt and vigorous, but our movements were rapid, and without loss.
A few miles from Winchester the sound of a steam whistle, heard in the direction of Martinsburg, strengthened the hope of reinforcements, and stirred the blood of the men like a trumpet. Soon after two squadrons of cavalry came dashing down the road with wild hurrahs. They were thought to be the advance of the anticipated support, and were received with deafening cheers. Every man felt like turning back upon the enemy. It proved to be the first Maryland cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Metschky, sent out in the morning as a train guard. Hearing the guns, they had returned to participate in the fight.
Advantage was taken of this stirring incident to reorganize our column, and the march was continued with renewed spirit and order. At Martinsburg the column halted two and a half hours, the rear guard remaining until seven in the evening in rear of the town, and arrived at the river at sundown, forty-eight hours after the first news of the attack on Front Royal. It was a march of fifty-three miles, thirty-five of which were performed in one day. The scene at the river when the rear guard arrived was of the most animating and exciting description. A thousand camp fires were burning on the hill side; a thousand carriages of every description were crowded upon the banks of the broad river between the exhausted troops and their coveted rest.
The ford was too deep for the teams to cross in regular succession; only the strongest horses, after a few experiments, were allowed to essay the passage of the river before morning. The single ferry was occupied by the ammunition trains, the ford by the wagons. The cavalry was secure in its form of crossing. The troops only had no transportation. Fortunately the train we had so sedulously guarded served us in turn. Several boats belonging to the pontoon train, which we had brought from Strasburg, were launched, and devoted exclusively to their service. It is seldom that a river crossing of such magnitude is achieved with greater success. There never were more grateful hearts in the same number of men then when at midday on the 20th we stood on the opposite shore.
My command had not suffered an attack and rout, but accomplished a premeditated march of nearly sixty miles in the face of the enemy, defeating his plans and giving him battle wherever he was found.
Our loss is stated in detail, with the names of the killed, wounded and missing, in the full report of Brigadier General A. S. Williams, commanding division, to which reference is made. The whole number in killed is 38, wounded 155, missing 711. Total loss 905.
It is undoubtedly true that many of the missing will yet return, and the entire loss may be assumed as not exceeding seven hundred. It is also probable that the number of killed and wounded may be larger than that above stated, but the aggregate loss will not be changed thereby. All our guns were saved.
Our wagon train consisted of nearly five hundred wagons. Of this number fifty-five were lost. They were not, with a few exceptions, abandoned to the enemy, but were burned upon the road. Nearly all of our supplies were thus saved. The stores at Front Royal, of which I had no knowledge until my visit to that position on the 21st instant, and those at Winchester, of which a considerable portion was destroyed by our troops, are not embraced in this statement.
The number of sick men in the hospital at Strasburg, belonging to General Williams’s division, was 189, 125 of whom were left in the hospital at Winchester, under charge of surgeon Lincoln R. Stone, second Massachusetts, or were left in hospital at Strasburg, including attendants, under charge of surgeon Gillespie, seventh Indiana, and assistant surgeon Porter, United States army.
Eight of the surgeons of this division voluntarily surrendered themselves to the enemy, in the hospitals and on the field, for the care of the sick and wounded placed under their charge. They include, in addition to those above named, brigade surgeon Peale, at Winchester; surgeon Mitchell, first Maryland, at Front Royal; surgeon Adolphus, Bests’s battery, United States army; surgeon Johnson, sixteenth Indiana; and surgeon Francis Leland, second Massachusetts, on the field.
It is seldom that men are called upon to make a greater sacrifice of comfort, health and liberty, for the benefit of those entrusted to their charge. Services and sacrifices like these ought to entitle them to some more important recognition of their devotion to public duty than the mere historical record of the fact.
The report of the medical director, surgeon W. S. King, exhibits the disposition of nearly one thousand sick and disabled men left at Strasburg by Shields’s division upon its removal to the Rappahannock valley.
My warmest thanks are due to the officers and men of my command for their unflinching courage and unyielding spirit exhibited on the march and its attendant combats. Especially to Brigadier General A. S. Williams, commanding the division, General George S. Greene, and General L. W. Crawford, who had reported for duty, but were yet unassigned to separate commands. They accompanied the column throughout the march, and rendered me most valuable assistance.
My thanks are also due to the gentlemen of my staff—Major D. D. Perkins, chief of staff; Captain James W. Albert, of the Topographical Engineers; Captain Wm. Sheffler, Captain Frederick Munther, and Captain Frederick De Hauteville—for their arduous labors.
It gives me pleasure also to commend the conduct of Colonel Donnelly and Colonel Gordon, commanding the two brigades. I would also respectfully ask the attention of the department to the reports of the several officers commanding detachments separate from the main column, and to the officers named in the report of General Williams, as worthy of commendation for meritorious conduct.
The signal corps, Lieutenant W. W. Rowley commanding, rendered most valuable service on the field and in the march. There should be some provision for the prompt promotion of officers and men so brave and useful as those composing this corps. The safety of the train and supplies is, in a great degree, due to the discretion, experience, and unfailing energy of Captain S. B. Holabird and Captain E. G. Beckwith, United States army.
I have the honor to be, with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
N. P. BANKS,
Major General Commanding.