Historical materialism and the economics of Karl Marx

by Benedetto Croce

On reading the little paper, which you were courteous enough to send me, on how to state the problem of pure economics,[93] I at once felt a desire to discuss the subject with you. Other occupations have obliged me to defer the satisfaction of this wish until now; and this has been fortunate. The extracts from your new and still unpublished treatise on pure economics, which came out in the March number of this Review,[94] have obliged me to abandon in part the scheme of thought which I had in mind; for I saw from them that you had modified some of those points in your thesis, which seemed to me most open to dispute.

I have on several occasions heard something like a feeling of distaste expressed for the endless discussions about value and the economic principle which absorb the energies of economic science. It is said that if this splitting of hairs over the scholastic accuracy of its principle were abandoned, the science might throw light on historical and practical questions which concern the welfare of human society. Apparently you have not allowed yourself to be alarmed by the threatened distaste of readers; nor indeed am I. Can we silence the doubts which disturb us? Could we have assurance whilst silencing these doubts that we were not endangering just those practical issues which the majority have at heart? Issues which we ourselves have at heart since we are certainly not able, like the monks of old, to free ourselves from interest in the affairs of the age. May not science be, as Leibniz said, quo magis speculativa, magis practica? We must then go our way, and endeavour to satisfy our doubts, with all the caution and self-criticism of which we are capable; since they cannot be suppressed. On the other hand we should endeavour also not to offer our solutions to the public except when our knowledge,—wide if it may be so (yet necessarily imperfect)—of the literature on the subject, gives us some confidence that we are not repeating things already stated. Unless indeed, other considerations make us think it opportune to repeat and to impress things which have been stated, but without sufficient emphasis.

The new school of economic thought, of which you are such a worthy representative, has a merit of no small significance. It has reacted against the anti-scientific tendencies of the historical and empirical schools, and has restored the concept of a science of pure economics. This means indeed nothing more than a science which is science; the word pure, unless tautologous, is an explanation added for those who are ignorant or unmindful of what a science is. Economics is neither history nor discussion of practical issues: it is a science possessing its own principle, which is indeed called the economic principle.

But, as I had occasion to remark at another time,[95] I do not consider that this principle whose fundamental character is asserted, has hitherto been grasped in its individuality, nor conveniently defined in relation to other groups of facts, that is to the principles of other sciences. Of those conceptions of it which seem to me erroneous, the chief ones can be reduced to four which I will call the mechanical, the hedonistic, the technological and the egoistic.

You have now rejected the first two, because you think that mechanical and hedonistic considerations belong to metaphysics and psychology. But I acknowledge that I am dissatisfied with your method of arriving at this praiseworthy rejection.

You no longer say, indeed, as in your previous essay: 'L'économie pure n'est pas seulement semblable à la méchanique: c'est, à proprement parler, un genre de méchanique.' But you still say that 'Pure economics employs the same methods as rational mechanics, and has many points of contact with this science.' Although you do not pause over the mechanical considerations, it is not from a clear conviction that a datum in economics, as such, is quite different from a datum in mechanics; but merely because it seems to you convenient to omit such considerations, of which you do not deny, but rather admit, the possibility.

Now I on the contrary, say decisively that the data of economics is not that of mechanics, or that there is no transition from the mechanical aspect of a fact to the economic aspect; and that the very possibility of the mechanical point of view is excluded, not as a thing which may or may not be abstracted from, but as a contradiction in terms, which it is needful to shun.

Do you wish for the simplest and clearest proof of the non-mechanical nature of the economic principle? Note, then, that in the data of economics a quality appears which is on the contrary repugnant to that of mechanics. To an economic fact words can be applied which express approval or disapproval. Man behaves economically well or ill, with gain or loss, suitably or unsuitably: he behaves, in short, economically or uneconomically. A fact in economics is, therefore, capable of appraisement (positive or negative); whilst a fact in mechanics is a mere fact, to which praise or blame can only be attached metaphorically.

It seems to me that on this point we ought easily to be agreed. To ascertain it, it is sufficient to appeal to internal observation. This shows us the fundamental distinction between the mechanical and the teleological, between mere fact and value. If I am not mistaken, you assign to metaphysics the problem of reducing the teleological to the mechanical, value to mere fact. But observe that metaphysics cannot get rid of the distinction; and will only labour, with greater or less good luck, at its old business of reconciling opposites, or of deriving two contraries from one unity.

I foresee what may be advanced against this assertion of the non-mechanical nature of the economic principle. It may be said: What is not mechanical, is not measurable; and economic values, on the contrary, are measured. Although hitherto the unit of measurement has not been found, it is yet a fact that we distinguish very readily larger and smaller, greater and least values and construct scales of values. This suffices to establish the measurability and hence the essentially mechanical nature of economic value. Look at the economic man, who has before him a series of possible actions a, b, c, d, e, f, ...; which have for him a decreasing value, indicated by the numbers 10, 9, 8, 7, 6 ... just because he measures value, he decides on the action a=10, and not on c=8 or f=6.