[19] In his remarks upon the present state of Logic, contained in his work Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts (Heidelberg 1904), i. pp. 163-186.
[20] See my remarks in the Critica, iii. pp. 428-433 (concerning the work of Messrs. Couturat and Léau); and cf. same, iv. pp. 379-381.
[V]
CONCERNING THIS LOGIC
Traditional character of this Logic and its connection with the Logic of the philosophic concept.
The Logic which we have expounded in this treatise is also in a certain sense traditional Logic. But it should be connected, not with the tradition of formalism, but rather with that of the Hegelian Logic, of Kantian transcendental Logic, and so of the loftiest Hellenic speculative thought. In other words, its affinity should be sought in the logical sections of the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant, or in the Metaphysic of Aristotle, and not in the Lessons in Logic or in the Analytics of the same authors. This traditional character endows it with confidence, because man has always thought the true, and it is to be doubted if he who fails to discover the truth in the past, possesses the truth of the present and of the future, of which in his proud isolation he thinks himself secure.
Its innovations.
But to be truly attached to tradition means to carry it on and to collaborate with it. Contact with thought is always dynamic and propulsive and urges us to go forward, since it is impossible to stop or to turn back. For this reason, this Logic presents some novelties, of which the fundamental and principal can be thus enumerated: