Confirmations of this character in the ingenuous consciousness.
But the impossibility of absorbing rights into Ethic altogether and without leaving residues is proclaimed or confessed, not only in the theories of philosophers, but by simple thought, and especially by the consciousness we have of the real world being governed, not by abstract morality, but, as is said, by force, or by the will in action. "Disarmed prophets" will be efficacious in poetry, but ridiculous in practical reality: la force prime le droit, precedes it and is always of greater value than an unreal and contradictory ethical right and aspiration, afterwards dissolved in the empty and arbitrary. We will not recall proverbs, maxims, historical examples, though this would be easy; that little story of Franco Sacchetti which preserves "a fair speech" of Messer Ridolfo da Camerino, will suffice for all. One of his nephews had been at Bologna studying law for a good twelve years, and when, having become an excellent lawyer, he returned to Camerino, he went to pay a visit to Messer Ridolfo. When he paid the visit, Messer Ridolfo said, "And what didst thou do at Bologna?" He replied, "My Lord, I have learned reason." Said Messer Ridolfo, "Thou hast spent thy time ill." The young man replied that the saying seemed to him to be very strange. "Why was it ill spent, my Lord?" And Messer Ridolfo said, "Because thou shouldst have learned force, which is worth two of the other." The youth began to smile, and thinking it over again and again, both he and the others that heard, perceived that what Messer Ridolfo had said, was true.[1]
Comparison between right and language. Grammars and codes.
And here too we are at last able to establish a parallel between the practical and theoretic activity, between the problems of the Philosophy of right and those of Logic and Æsthetic. The comparison of right and language has been several times attempted, with very great correction of thought, although necessarily defective execution, since it was customary to conceive both language and right in an abstract and empirical manner. Whoever should wish to take up the inquiry again would do great service, were he to insist upon the fact that since it has been impossible to understand what language really is, so long as grammars and vocabularies were taken as its reality, so it is impossible to understand anything of rights, so long as the eye is fixed upon laws and codes, or what is even worse, upon the commentaries of jurists, or upon the abstract volitional fact, or altogether upon what is not a true and proper volitional fact, but the elaboration of formulæ and of general concepts.
Logic and language; morality and rights.
Only when rights appear as individual and continually new work of individuals, only when the attention is directed to the spectacle of real life and not to the abstractions of legislators and dispenses with the dissertations of jurists, is it possible to state the problem: how does this juridical work coincide with, and how does it differ from moral work? And here too the comparison with language is fitting, although language be not logicity, yet logical thought cannot become concrete, save in speaking; so moral activity cannot live, save by translating itself into laws and institutes, and in the realization of laws and institutes, that is, in the juridical and economic activity.
Finally, just as the history of a language is always arbitrary and abstract, so long as it is considered alone, outside the works in which the language is incarnate and the true history of a language is its poetry and literature, so the true history of the rights of a people (of the rights that have really been executed and not merely formulated in laws and codes, be often proved to be a dead letter) cannot but be altogether one with the social and political history of that people: an altogether juridical or economic history; a history of wants and of labour.
[1] Novelle, xl.