Brentano, returning in a measure to Descartes, constructs the doctrine of the three faculties in a different way, determining them as representation (to which he makes art and the æsthetic activity correspond), judgment (to which corresponds science), and love and hate (to which corresponds the practical). Feeling, therefore, does not find a place of its own in the psyche, and that which is wont to be called feeling is either representation, or love and hate. Brentano shows himself inferior to Krug in the philosophical demonstration of the inconceivability of this form of the spirit, but he has the merit of having substituted certain positive elements for the indeterminate word "feeling," although the function exercised by feeling in the development of philosophical thought is more important than Brentano succeeds in perceiving, for among other things he ignores and fails to recognize the relation of the concept of feeling to the demands of speculative thought.[31]
[1] Eutyphron, 10.
[2] The history of the enfranchising of Ethic from Religion has been done with especial care by Jodl, Gesch. d. Ethik als philos. Wissensch. vol. I2. (Stuttgart—Berlin, 1906). For Vico, cf. my book, The Philosophy of G. B. Vico (Bari, 1911).
[3] Phil. d. Rechts, § 4, Zus.; Gesch. d. Philos. ii. pp. 66, 169.
[4] Eth. Nicom. 1103.
[5] See above.
[6] Kritik d. prakt. Vern., ed. Kirchmann, pp. 7-8.
[7] Allg. prakt. Phil., ed. Hartenstein, p. 107.
[8] Memor. iv., c. 2, §§ 14-16. Schopenhauer also exhaustively, Gründl. d. Moral, in Werke, ed. Grisebach, iii. pp. 603-607.