[1] Summonte, Historia di Napoli, ed. 1675, iv. 205, "Miracle caused by fear."
[2] Dante, Parad. iv. 76.
[3] Einleit. in die Phil. § 128, trad. Vidossich, p. 169.
II
FREEDOM AND ITS OPPOSITE. GOOD AND EVIL
Freedom of action as reality of action.
Since, then, the volitional act is freedom, the question as to whether in a given case an individual has or has not been free, is equivalent to this other question: Has there really been volition (action) in that case? This question can have and has (as any one who lends an ear to such discussions as are frequently heard can verify) but two meanings. The first is, whether the case under discussion be action or event, and, therefore, if it be or be not accurate to present it as an individual act. For example:—Was Jacobinism the crime or the glory of Voltaire and Rousseau? Was the defeat of Waterloo the fault of Marshal Grouchy? The second is, if it be really a question of action, what, precisely, has that action been? For example:—What were the respective parts of Voltaire and of Rousseau in the propaganda of the revolutionary spirit and of the Jacobin mode of thought? What did Marshal Grouchy really know and will when, instead of listening to Exelmans and to others of his generals and marching whither the cannon was thundering, he obeyed to the letter the order he had received and attacked the Prussian army corps of Thielman?
Inconceivability of the absolute absence of action.