| Jan. | ██ 130 |
| Feb. | ██ 138 |
| Mar. | ██████ 500 |
| Apr. | ███████████ 906 |
| May | ████████████ 1034 |
| June | ████████████████ 1319 |
| July | █████████████ 1051 |
| Aug. | ████████████████████████ 1984 |
| Sept. | ██████████████████████████████ 2548 |
| Oct. | ████████████████████████████████████ 3026 |
| Nov. | ███████████████████████████████ 2570 |
| Dec. | ████████████████████████ 2024 |
In artillery proper the war ended too soon for American industry to arrive at a great production basis. The production of heavy ordnance units is necessarily a long and arduous effort even when plants are in existence and mechanical forces are trained in the work. America in large part had to build her ordnance industry from the ground up—buildings, machinery, and all—and to recruit and train the working forces after that. The national experience in artillery production in the great war most like our own was that of Great Britain, who started in from scratch, even as we did. It is interesting, then, to know how Great Britain expanded her artillery industry, and the testimony of the British ministry of munitions may throw a new light on our own efforts in this respect. In discussing artillery in the war the British ministry of munitions issued a statement from which the following is an excerpt:
It is very difficult to say how long it was before the British army was thoroughly equipped with artillery and ammunition. The ultimate size of the army aimed at was continually increased during the first three years of the war, so that the ordnance requirements were continually increasing. It is probably true to say that the equipment of the army as planned in the early summer of 1915 was completed by September, 1916. As a result, however, of the battle of Verdun and the early stages of the battle of the Somme, a great change was made in the standard of equipment per division of the army, followed by further increases in September, 1916. The army was not completely equipped on this new scale until spring, 1918.
| Jan. | ██████ 73 |
| Feb. | █████ 68 |
| Mar. | ███████ 89 |
| Apr. | ███████ 86 |
| May | ██████ 76 |
| June | ████████ 106 |
| July | ███████ 85 |
| Aug. | ██████████████ 180 |
| Sept. | █████████████████████ 271 |
| Oct. | ████████████████████████████████████ 465 |
| Nov. | █████████████████████ 266 |
| Dec. | ██████████████████████ 279 |
Thus it took England three and a half years to equip her army completely with artillery and ammunition on the scale called for at the end of the war. On this basis America, when the armistice came, had two years before her to equal the record of Great Britain in this respect.
As to the production of gun bodies ready for mounting, the attainments of American ordnance were more striking. At the end of the fighting America had passed the British rate of production and was approaching that of the French. In totals for the whole war period (Apr. 6, 1917, to Nov. 11, 1918) the American production of gun bodies could scarcely be compared with either that of the British or that of the French, this due to the fact that it required many months to build up the forging plants before production could go ahead.
In completed artillery units the American rate of production at the end of the war was rapidly approaching both that of the British and that of the French. In total production of complete units in the 19 months of war, American ordnance turned out about one-quarter as many as came from the British ordnance plants and less than one-fifth as many as the French produced in the same period. Figure 8 represents visually America's comparative performances in the production of gun bodies and complete artillery units.
| AVERAGE MONTHLY RATE AT END OF WAR. | ||
|---|---|---|
| Gun bodies (new): | Per cent of rate for Great Britain. | |
| Great Britain | 802 | ██████████████████████ 100 |
| France | 1,138 | ███████████████████████████████ 142 |
| United States | 832 | ███████████████████████ 104 |
| Complete units: | ||
| Great Britain | 486 | ██████████████████████ 100 |
| France | 659 | ██████████████████████████████ 136 |
| United States | 412 | ███████████████████ 85 |
| TOTAL PRODUCTION, APRIL 1, 1917, TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918. | ||
| Gun bodies (new): | Per cent of rate for Great Britain. | |
| Great Britain | 11,852 | ██████████████████████ 100 |
| France | 19,492 | ████████████████████████████████████ 164 |
| United States | 4,275 | ████████ 36 |
| Complete units: | ||
| Great Britain | 8,065 | ██████████████████████ 100 |
| France | 11,056 | ██████████████████████████████ 137 |
| United States | 2,008 | █████ 25 |
Stress has sometimes been laid upon the fact that the American Army was required to purchase considerable artillery and other supplies abroad, the latter including airplanes, motor trucks, food and clothing, and numerous other materials. Yet, balanced against this fact is that every time we spent a dollar with the allied governments for ordnance, we sold ordnance, or materials for conversion into munitions to the allied governments to the value of five dollars. The interallied ordnance agreement provided that certain munitions plants in the United States should continue to furnish supplies to the allies, and that additional plants for the allies should be built up and fostered by us. Thus, while we were purchasing artillery and ammunition from the allies we were shipping to them great quantities of raw materials, half-completed parts, and completely assembled units, and such war-time commodities as powder and explosives, forgings for cannon and other heavy devices, motors, and structural steel. The following table shows the ordnance balance sheet between America and the allied governments:
| Purchases: By Army Ordnance Department from Allied governments | $450,234,256.85 |
| Sales: | |
| By Army Ordnance Department to Allied governments | 200,616,402.00 |
| By United States manufacturers other than Army Ordnance Department to Allied governments | 2,094,787,984.00 |
| Total | 2,295,404,386.00 |