| Smokeless powder: | Pounds. | Per cent of rate for Great Britain. |
|---|---|---|
| Great Britain | 12,055,000 | ██████████ 100 |
| France | 17,311,000 | ██████████████ 144 |
| United States | 42,775,000 | ████████████████████████████████████ 355 |
| High explosives: | ||
| Great Britain | 30,967,000 | ██████████ 100 |
| France | 22,802,000 | ███████ 74 |
| United States | 43,888,000 | ██████████████ 142 |
| TOTAL PRODUCTION, APRIL 6, 1917, TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918. | ||
| Smokeless powder: | Pounds. | Per cent of rate for Great Britain. |
| Great Britain | 291,706,000 | █████████████████ 100 |
| France | 342,155,000 | ███████████████████ 117 |
| United States | 632,504,000 | ████████████████████████████████████ 217 |
| High explosives: | ||
| Great Britain | 765,110,000 | █████████████████ 100 |
| France | 702,964,000 | ███████████████ 92 |
| United States | 375,656,000 | ████████ 49 |
In the 19 months of our participation in the war our production of unfilled rounds in ammunition was 38,623,000 rounds, while that of France was 156,170,000 rounds and that of Great Britain 138,357,000 rounds. In that time we had produced 17,260,000 complete rounds, while France had produced 149,827,000 rounds, and Great Britain 121,739,000 complete rounds.
The entrance of the United States into the war found the existing American explosives manufacturers operating to the very limit of their capacity in production for the allied governments and for general commercial purposes.
Since the outbreak of the war in 1914 the explosives business in this country had increased enormously and the trained men familiar with manufacturing operations and conditions in this highly specialized and extremely dangerous industry had fallen short of meeting demands.
When we entered the war, therefore, it became necessary at once to distribute this limited force of experts as equitably as possible and to put chemists, engineers and other specialists in the various plants under the supervision of this trained personnel so as to produce in as quick a time as possible a vastly enlarged force of competent operators and supervisors for the production of explosives.
Summed up, the problem that faced the Ordnance Department was, while maintaining the current great production of explosives, to expand enormously the facilities for further production, to provide personnel for operating these expanded facilities, to build up entirely new manufacturing plants for making both propellants and high explosives, and in addition to all of this, to bring into existence huge loading plants.
In all, 53 new plants for making explosives and propellants and for loading these were undertaken at a cost of approximately $360,000,000. When the armistice was signed a very large part of this construction work had been completed and was in an efficient state of operation.
How creditably this reflects upon America can be understood when it is made plain that in addition to the development of production there was also to be worked out the very intricate question of design, not only of the plants themselves but also of their products, which required an exceptional degree of technical skill and thorough control.
Prior to our entry into the war the Ordnance Department had depended upon ammonium picrate, known in the Army vernacular as explosive "D," as a bursting charge for our high-explosive shell.