Proof.- I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore (IV:lxiv.Coroll.) he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.
Note.- It is evident, from IV:iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.
This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions (III:xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above (IV:xxxii.).
Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
Proof.- Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (IV:vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally great (IV:v. and IV:iii.): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking fear (III:lix.Note); in other words (Def. of the Emotions:xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue, when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
Note.- What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained in III:lix.Note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.
Prop. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
Proof.- Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition (III:xxxix.Note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III:xlii.). But the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV:xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason, and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance. Therefore the free man, lest be should become hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving their favours.
Note.- I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.